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ABSTRACT: 
This Article examines the agreement requirement in resale price 
maintenance (“RPM”) cases and the longstanding exception to the ban on 
RPM under the Colgate doctrine.  It argues for the abolition of the doctrine 
for a number of reasons.  First, there are no persuasive theoretical 
justifications for requiring an agreement in RPM cases as the most relevant 
purpose served by an agreement requirement under antitrust law does not 
apply to RPM.  Second, there is no logically coherent and theoretically sound 
theory of agreement under the doctrine, which means that there is no 
principled way to apply the agreement concept in RPM cases.  Third, there 
is no sound economic basis for requiring an agreement in RPM cases as none 
of the main theories of harm and pro-competitive justifications of RPM is 
premised on an agreement.  Finally, it is argued that the Colgate doctrine has 
provided a highly unsatisfactory safe harbor for businesses to implement 
RPM due to costs and manpower involved in complying with the 
jurisprudence under Colgate.  This Article also argues that dealer termination 
requires a different treatment from that accorded by Monsanto and Business 
Electronics after Leegin and proposes a framework for determining the 
legality of dealer termination independent of the existence of an RPM 
scheme. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Colgate doctrine and the associated issue of an agreement 
requirement for resale price maintenance (“RPM”) schemes have long been 
a source of confusion and needless complication in antitrust analysis.  The 
Colgate doctrine holds that it is permissible for a supplier to implement an 
RPM scheme through unilateral policy announcements and a refusal to deal 
with non-compliant dealers.  The doctrine draws a line between permissible 
unilateral conduct and illegal concerted action.  The doctrine itself is simple 
enough to understand.  Its application, however, has been beset with 
difficulties.  The Supreme Court spent a great part of the last century 
attempting to clarify the precise scope of the doctrine.  In the process, it has 
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implicitly proposed a number of theories of agreement to help the courts 
decide when an illegal agreement is consummated.  Unfortunately, none of 
these theories are logically coherent or theoretically sound, nor do they 
provide meaningful guidance to businesses.  More fundamentally, the 
insistence on an agreement in the RPM context is much ado about nothing.  
The purpose of an agreement requirement is to help us identify conduct with 
possible anticompetitive effects.  For RPM, regardless of the existence of an 
agreement, the fact that the dealers comply with the supplier’s demand of 
minimum resale prices means that resale prices are maintained.  The 
agreement requirement is completely divorced from the economic effects of 
RPM.  None of the main theories of harm and economic justifications for 
RPM are premised on an agreement.  The harm and benefits will materialize 
as long as resale prices are maintained, either through unilateral compliance 
or a mutual agreement.  The Colgate doctrine and the subsequent efforts to 
distinguish between permissible unilateral conduct and illegal concerted 
action have rendered compliance with the law on RPM needlessly costly and 
complex.  The only beneficiaries of this state of affairs are lawyers advising 
clients. 
There would have been stronger justifications for these inefficiencies if 
the per se rule for RPM were still in place.  Under the per se rule, some 
clearly competitively harmless conduct was condemned.  Efforts were made 
to use the agreement requirement to carve out such conduct.  Using a formal 
device such as an agreement requirement to tackle a substantive issue is 
ineffective at best.  Unfortunately, that was the only available solution when 
the per se rule applied.  This is no longer the case after Leegin.  With the 
abolition of the per se rule, all the previous justifications for maintaining the 
agreement requirement have disappeared.  It is, therefore, worth taking a 
hard look at the continual validity of the Colgate doctrine and the agreement 
requirement. 
This Article thus follows Professor Kaplow’s lead in critiquing the 
continual relevance of the vertical agreement requirement in antitrust 
analysis.1  However, it differs from Kaplow’s analysis in a number of 
important ways.  First, it is only concerned with the agreement requirement 
in resale price maintenance cases rather than vertical agreements in general.  
In particular, it focuses on the theoretical underpinning and continual 
viability of the Colgate doctrine.  Second, it provides a much more detailed 
overview of the case law and delves more closely into the logical 
inconsistencies in Monsanto and Business Electronics, two of the most 
recent Supreme Court cases on the vertical agreement issue.  Third, while 
 
 1.  Louis Kaplow, The Meaning of Vertical Agreement and the Structure of Competition 
Law, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 563, 563 (2016).  
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Kaplow stops short of arguing for the abolition of the vertical agreement 
requirement outright, this Article proposes the abrogation of the Colgate 
doctrine to achieve greater clarity and logical consistency in the law.  
However, much of the logic in Kaplow’s arguments would be equally 
relevant here. 
This Article is divided into eight sections.  After this introduction, 
Section II provides an overview of the Supreme Court jurisprudence on the 
Colgate doctrine and the agreement requirement for RPM.  Section III 
examines the various possible purposes for requiring the proof of an 
agreement under antitrust law and questions whether the relevant purpose 
applies to the RPM context.  Section IV explores the various theories that 
have been put forward in the case law on the notion of an agreement and 
assesses their logical coherence and theoretical soundness.  Section V 
discusses the prevailing economic theories of harm and justifications for 
RPM and concludes that none of them is premised on the existence of an 
agreement.  Section VI reviews the practical justification for the Colgate 
doctrine and argues that the doctrine has done more harm than good from a 
business perspective.  Section VII summarizes the various proposals put 
forward in this Article and explains how they should be applied.  Section 
VIII concludes the Article. 
I.       EVOLUTION OF THE CASE LAW ON THE NOTION OF AGREEMENT IN 
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
The notion of a vertical agreement in the context of RPM has long 
puzzled the courts.  An agreement is required in order to establish a violation 
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  Determining the existence of an agreement 
between the supplier and the dealers in the context of an RPM is not always 
a straightforward issue.  In United States v. Colgate & Co., the Supreme 
Court promulgated the Colgate doctrine, which held that a supplier has the 
right to announce the conditions upon which it will deal with suppliers and 
to refuse to deal with those who fail to abide by the conditions.2  The case 
laid down the simple, and seemingly uncontroversial, rule that unilateral 
imposition of an RPM does not violate Section 1.3  The devil, however, is in 
the details.  What followed in the ensuing decades was a string of cases in 
which the Supreme Court attempted to determine what conduct qualifies as 
permissible unilateral conduct and what constitutes an illegal concerted 
action between the supplier and the dealers in a variety of factual scenarios. 
 
 2.  United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). 
 3.  Id. 
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A. Colgate and Its Progeny 
1. United States v. Colgate & Co. 
After laying down the per se rule for RPM in Dr. Miles4, the Supreme 
Court was again confronted with an RPM case in United States v. Colgate & 
Co.  At issue was whether the conduct perpetrated by Colgate in the case 
constituted an RPM illegal per se under Dr. Miles.5  In language that has 
been repeatedly quoted by the courts ever since, Justice McReynolds held 
that Colgate’s course of conduct in the case constituted permissible unilateral 
conduct under Section 1, declaring that: 
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, 
the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or 
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to 
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom 
he will deal; and of course, he may announce in advance the 
circumstances under which he will refuse to sell.6 
This has come to be known as the Colgate doctrine. 
There was some confusion as to the basis upon which the Court 
proclaimed the Colgate doctrine.  The confusion stems from the fact that 
while the trial court judge interpreted the indictment in the case as alleging 
no agreement and nothing more than unilateral conduct,7 the factual record 
suggested that Colgate went substantially beyond that.
8
  This confusion has 
led commentators to question the foundation of the doctrine.9  Other 
commentators have questioned the precise scope of the doctrine.  Hay 
 
 4.  Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
 5.  Colgate, 250 U.S. at 306. 
 6.  Id. at 307.  
 7.  Id. at 304. 
 8.  The factual record indicated that Colgate “requests, often complied with, information 
concerning dealers who had departed from specified prices; investigat[es] . . . those not 
adhering thereto and plac[es] their names upon ‘suspended lists;’ requests to offending dealers 
for assurances and promises of future adherence to prices, which were often given . . . .”  Id. 
at 303.  This anomaly is due to the Criminal Appeals Act, under which the Supreme Court 
had no authority to review the interpretation of an indictment by a lower court and instead 
must confine itself to the question of whether the lower misconstrued the statute.  Id. at 301-
02. 
 9.  Edward H. Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban on Resale Price 
Maintenance, SUP. CT. REV. 258, 285-92 (1960) (arguing that Levi argues Colgate itself does 
not lend support to doctrine); Terry Calvani & Andrew G. Berg, Resale Price Maintenance 
after Monsanto: A Doctrine Still at War with Itself, DUKE L.J. 1163, 1169 (1984) (“The fact 
that the Colgate decision rested heavily on procedural aspects of the case—the government’s 
failure to allege the existence of illegal agreements—made the Court’s attempted distinction 
between unilateral action and concerted conduct of uncertain precedential value.”).  
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observes that “[n]arrowly construed, Colgate merely holds that under 
[S]ection 1 of the Sherman Act a plaintiff must allege an agreement between 
the manufacturer and dealers.”10  Only if read more broadly did Colgate 
meaningfully limit the application of Section 1 to vertical restraints.11 
2. United States v. A. Schrader’s Son Inc. 
The Supreme Court proceeded to address the question as to the precise 
scope of the Colgate doctrine in a series of cases in the next few decades.  
The Supreme Court encountered its first RPM case post-Colgate a year later 
in United States v. A. Schrader’s Son, Inc.12  The district court in this case 
had noted that the only difference it could discern between Dr. Miles and 
Colgate was the existence of written agreements in Dr. Miles and their 
absence in Colgate.13  The district court concluded that that was a distinction 
without a difference, and therefore Dr. Miles must have rested on a different 
principle: that there is no violation of Section 1 absent a purpose to 
monopolize interstate trade.14  In overruling the district court, the Supreme 
Court clarified that Colgate was not meant to overrule Dr. Miles, and 
reiterated the distinction between permissible unilateral action and an 
agreement to fix resale prices.15  The Supreme Court further indicated that 
an agreement can be “implied from a course of dealing or other 
circumstances.”16  An agreement for RPM purposes need not be express, as 
in Dr. Miles and Colgate. 
3. Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing 
A year later, the Supreme Court held in Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing 
that there is no agreement for the purpose of Section 1 if the defendant 
merely announced a policy of refusal to sell to previously non-compliant 
dealers, repeatedly called its dealers’ attention to the policy, and the dealers 
 
 10.  George A. Hay, Vertical Restraints After Monsanto, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 418, 424 
(1985). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  United States v. A. Schrader’s Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920). 
 13.  Id. at 97. 
 14.  Id. at 97-98.  Viewed from the perspective of subsequent cases, the district court’s 
decision was befuddling in that it was undisputed that there were agreements between the 
defendant and its dealers in the case.  The district court had noted that all of the defendant’s 
contracts with the dealers provided that the dealers “should not resell such products at prices 
other than those fixed by the defendant.”  Id. at 95.  The case clearly falls on the side of Dr. 
Miles in the Dr. Miles-Colgate divide.   
 15.  Id. at 99. 
 16.  Id.  
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quietly acquiesced to the policy and abided by it.17  Cudahy Packing was to 
be the only case in which the Supreme Court would rule in favor of the 
defendant in an RPM case where the existence of an agreement was at issue 
until the 1980s.  The Court reiterated the fact that an agreement can be 
implied from course of conduct and circumstances.  By so holding, however, 
the Court implicitly drew a distinction between an express agreement, albeit 
implied from circumstantial evidence, and tacit acquiescence.18 
From the perspective of the Colgate doctrine, the most interesting part 
of the Cudahy Packing opinion was the dissent.  Justice Pitney argued that 
the defendant and its dealers’ course of conduct in the case provided a 
sufficient basis for a jury to infer the existence of an agreement.19  Justice 
Pitney noted that: 
[U]pon finding many persons, actuated by a common motive, 
exchanging communications between themselves respecting a 
plan of conduct and acting in concert in precise accordance with 
the plan, the jury might find that they had agreed or combined to 
act as in fact they did act; that their simultaneous pursuit of an 
identical programme was not a miraculous coincidence, but was 
the result of an agreement or combination to act together for a 
common end.20 
4. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing 
In FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing, the Supreme Court confronted for the 
first time the issue of the permissible amount of enforcement effort in a 
unilateral RPM policy.21  The Court held that the defendant’s conduct in the 
case had crossed the line of permissible unilateral conduct and constituted an 
agreement for the purpose of Section 1.22  The opinion referred to a wide 
range of conduct.  The Court, however, admonished the FTC to focus on four 
 
 17.  Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing, 256 U.S. 208, 209-10 (1921). 
 18.  C. Douglas Floyd, Vertical Antitrust Conspiracies After Monsanto and Russell 
Stover, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 269, 289 (1985). 
 19.  Cudahy Packing, 256 U.S. at 216-17. 
 20.  Id. at 217.  Justice Pitney’s exact position on the Colgate doctrine is unclear.  On the 
one hand, his disagreement with the majority indicates that, in his view, the sort of unilateral 
conduct that is ostensibly exempted by the Colgate doctrine should constitute an agreement.  
On the other hand, his reference to the exchange of communication between the supplier and 
its dealers suggests that his view can be reconciled with the Colgate doctrine, which has been 
understood to prohibit direct and indirect communication between the supplier and its dealers.  
However, subsequent language in his dissent suggests that Justice Pitney did not consider 
exchange of communication to be necessary for finding an agreement.  Id. at 217-18.  
Concerted action in pursuit of self-interests would suffice. 
 21.  FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing, 257 U.S. 441 (1922). 
 22.  Id. at 455. 
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types of conduct in its order.  The enumerated conduct includes (1) reporting 
the names of offending dealers; (2) putting offending dealers on lists of no 
supply unless these dealers provide assurance that they will not sell below 
the stipulated prices again; (3) using salesmen and agents to monitor 
compliance by the dealers; and (4) using numbers and symbols to track the 
passage of products to ensure compliance with the RPM scheme.23  
Interestingly, the Court did not designate the defendant seeking assurances 
from jobbers and wholesale dealers of future compliance and securing the 
cooperation of wholesalers, jobbers, and retailers in reporting price cutters 
as conduct to be proscribed by the FTC’s order.24  Such conduct turned out 
to be crucial in subsequent cases.  Explaining the reasons that the Court 
found the enumerated conduct objectionable, the Court noted that the system 
went “far beyond the simple refusal to sell goods to persons who will not sell 
at stated prices,”25 and showed “suppression of the freedom of competition 
by methods in which the company secures the co-operation of its distributors 
and customers, which are quite as effectual as agreements express or implied 
intended to accomplish the same purpose.”26  What tipped the balance in the 
case was the comparable effectiveness of the ostensibly unilateral conduct in 
maintaining an RPM scheme.27 
 
 23.  Id. at 456.  Some commentators have emphasized other conduct in the case as 
particularly relevant, such as, “tracing price cutters, separating retailers from banned 
wholesalers, and requiring wholesalers not to sell to price-cutting retailers until (after 
assurances as to future conduct) they were restored.”  Levi, supra note 9, at 299-300. 
 24.  However, some commentators have deemed the use of intermediaries to monitor 
compliance by retailers as a crucial fact in the case.  See, e.g., Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Leegin, 
the Rule of Reason, and Vertical Agreement, U. IOWA LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 
10-40 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1673519 [https://perma.cc/265V-4J6F]  (“In Beech-
Nut, involving traditional agreements and the use of intermediaries to control retailers, the 
Court emphasized the policy against resale price maintenance in finding a violation of Federal 
Trade Commission Act §5.”); Glen O. Robinson, Explaining Vertical Agreements: The 
Colgate Puzzle and Antitrust Method, 80 VA. L. REV. 577, 584 (1994) (“In FTC v. Beech-Nut 
Packing Co., it held that the requisite agreement could be found from a manufacturer’s 
enlisting wholesalers actively to monitor retailers to ensure compliance.”). 
 25.  Beech-Nut, 257 U.S. at 454. 
 26.  Id. at 455. 
 27.  The dissent criticized the majority’s determination of legality based on the 
mechanisms used to enforce the RPM scheme and the effectiveness of the mechanisms.  Id. 
at 459.  The dissent argued that if the defendant had the right to choose with whom it would 
deal, there would be no reasons to prohibit the defendant from recording the names of non-
compliant dealers, using special salesmen to monitor compliance, or marking its products with 
number and symbols to allow easy tracing.  Id.  If the distinction was between unilateral 
conduct and concerted action, all three types of conduct would seem to be unilateral in nature 
because they do not involve joint action on the part of the defendant and the dealers.  However, 
there is clearly conduct in the case that is not unilateral in nature, such as seeking assurances 
from wholesalers and jobbers of compliance and enlisting wholesalers and jobbers to monitor 
compliance by retailers.  
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5. U.S. v. Bausch & Lomb Optical 
In U.S. v. Bausch & Lomb Optical, the focus was again on how the 
defendant enforced the RPM scheme.28  The Supreme Court found that the 
conduct at issue exceeded permissible unilateral conduct on two grounds.29  
The first ground was that the wholesalers accepted the defendant’s “plan of 
distribution by cooperating in prices, limitation of sales to and approval of 
retail licensees.”30  The Court did not specify how the wholesalers accepted 
the plan.  Prior to noting their acceptance of the plan of distribution, the Court 
commented that “there is more here than mere acquiescence of 
wholesalers . . . .”31  A review of the Court’s description of the operation of 
the plan, however, suggests that the wholesalers did not expressly 
communicate their acceptance to the defendant.32  They merely acted 
according to the wishes of the defendant.  The second ground was an 
agreement between the defendant and some of the wholesalers to fix resale 
prices and to limit sales to retailers approved by the defendant.33  Noteworthy 
is the Court’s observation that whether the agreement was attained by an 
express agreement or “by acquiescence of the wholesalers coupled with 
assistance in effectuating its purpose is immaterial.”34  In other words, it 
seems that on both grounds, it would have sufficed if the wholesalers merely 
acquiesced to the defendant’s demands without any explicit 
communication.35  This creates the anomalous situation where there is no 
agreement if the retailers comply with the supplier’s conditions by 
acquiescence, but there would be an agreement if the wholesalers acquiesced 
to assist in policing the RPM scheme, a criticism that will be reiterated by 
Justice Harlan in Parke, Davis.36 
 
 28.  U.S. v. Bausch & Lomb Optical, 321 U.S. 707 (1944) 
 29.  Id. at 723. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Id. at 714-15.  However, the district court did find that there were agreements 
between the defendant and its wholesalers.  
 33.  Id. at 723. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See Robinson, supra note 24, at 584 (“In United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical 
Co., the Court went one step further, holding that employing wholesalers in a scheme of 
enforcement constituted a ‘combination’ with them, even if the wholesalers merely 
acquiesced in the manufacturer’s scheme.”); Floyd, supra note 18, at 289-90 (“After a twenty-
year hiatus, the Court in United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. reconfirmed the 
implications of Beech-Nut by declining to draw a sharp line between voluntary ‘agreements’ 
on the one hand and coerced compliance or acquiescence on the other.”).   
 36.  Floyd, supra note 18, at 290 (“After Bausch & Lomb, . . . [there would be a violation] 
so long as the alleged conspirators had done more than acquiesce in setting their own resale 
prices, but had in some sense ‘cooperated’—whether through agreements or coercion and tacit 
acquiescence being immaterial—in the implementation of a supplier’s plan of resale price 
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There is also language in the majority opinion suggesting that the 
Supreme Court may have taken a more holistic approach to the issue of 
agreement.  The Court observed that: 
The requirement of the wholesalers’ recommendation as to the 
business character of the applicant for a retail license, the evidence 
of espionage, the limitation of resales to Soft-Lite37 retail licensees, 
the existence of the ‘Protection Certificate’ to mark the wholesaler 
who might violate the arrangement, the uniformity of the prices, 
as prescribed in Soft-Lite’s published lists, which retailers are 
charged by wholesalers – all amply support, indeed require, the 
inference of the trial court that a conspiracy to maintain prices 
down the distribution system existed between the wholesalers and 
Soft-Lite through the years prior to this suit.38 
It is instructive to examine each of the facts upon which the Court relied 
to substantiate a finding of an agreement.  The requirement of a wholesaler’s 
recommendation to grant a retail license can be interpreted as the 
wholesaler’s concurrence that a particular retailer will abide by the minimum 
prices and is therefore suitable for inclusion in the RPM scheme.  It, 
however, does not unequivocally indicate a commitment on the part of the 
wholesalers to sell only to compliant retailers.  It at most is only suggestive 
of such a commitment.  Evidence of espionage is similar to the use of 
salesmen and agents to monitor compliance in Beech-Nut.  The Court did not 
explicitly state who conducted the espionage.  Earlier in the opinion, the 
Court referred to “surveillance through Soft-Lite’s salesmen.”39  If this is 
what the Court was referring to, the monitoring work did not involve third-
party intermediaries and was only done by the defendant’s own employees.  
Reliance on this factor would be equally subject to the criticism of the dissent 
in Beech-Nut.  The limitation of resale to Soft-Lite retail licensees could be 
the result of nothing more than a unilateral refusal to sell to non-compliant 
retailers, and hence should not support a finding of an agreement.  The 
“Protection Certificate” arrangement is similar to Beech-Nut’s use of 
numbers and symbols to facilitate the tracing of its products40 and again 
should be unobjectionable.  Lastly, the Court cannot rely on price uniformity 
as a supporting fact for an agreement, as price uniformity would also result 
if the RPM scheme was enforced only by unilateral conduct.  In short, the 
only relevant fact is that wholesaler’s recommendation is required for a retail 
 
maintenance through restricted dealing, reporting of price-cutters, or similar ‘cooperative 
methods.’”). 
 37.  Soft-Lite was the Bausch & Lomb subsidiary that was at issue in the case.  
 38.  U.S. v. Bausch & Lomb Optical, 321 U.S. 707 (1944). 
 39.  Id. at 716. 
 40.  Id. at 714. 
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license, which can be construed as circumstantial evidence that there is an 
agreement between the wholesalers and the defendant. 
6. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. 
The next RPM case to reach the Supreme Court was United States v. 
Parke, Davis & Co.41  The Supreme Court again found that there was an 
illegal agreement to enforce an RPM scheme on two principal grounds.42  
First, Parke, Davis “used the refusal to deal with the wholesalers in order to 
elicit their willingness to deny Parke Davis products to retailers and thereby 
help gain the retailers’ adherence to its suggested minimum retail prices.”43  
In doing so, Parke, Davis “created a combination with the retailers and the 
wholesalers to maintain retail prices and violated the Sherman Act.”44  
Second, Parke, Davis entered into negotiations with individual retailers to 
secure their agreement to suspend advertising of discounted products.45  
Distilling from the holding of Beech-Nut and Bausch & Lomb, the Court 
asserted the following: 
[A]n unlawful combination is not just such as arises from a price 
maintenance agreement, express or implied; such a combination is 
also organized if the producer secures adherence to his suggested 
prices by means which go beyond his mere declination to sell to a 
customer who will not observe his announced policy.46 
This seems to suggest that any effort to enforce an RPM scheme beyond a 
mere announcement of a refusal to sell would render an RPM scheme an 
illegal agreement.  The Court hinted that the reason it objected to 
enforcement effort beyond mere announcement was its coercive effects on 
retailers.47  The only permissible kind of acquiescence is one that results from 
“a matter of individual free choice prompted alone by the desirability of the 
product.”48  An important acknowledgment made by the Court in the case 
was that the economic effects of an illegal RPM agreement are the same as 
one resulting from a unilateral refusal-to-deal policy permissible under 
Colgate.49  This calls into question the soundness of the Colgate doctrine 
 
 41.  United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). 
 42.  Id. at 45. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 46. 
 46.  Id. at 43. 
 47.  Id. at 46-47.  
 48.  Id. at 47. 
 49.  Id. at 44 (“True, there results the same economic effect as is accomplished by a 
prohibited combination to suppress price competition if each customer, although induced to 
do so solely by a manufacturer’s announced policy, independently decides to observe 
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from an economic perspective, an argument that will be pursued 
subsequently. 
Parke, Davis stands for the proposition that a supplier cannot enlist the 
assistance of intermediaries such as wholesalers to enforce an RPM scheme, 
even if the assistance is enlisted not through an outright agreement, but from 
mere acquiescence of the wholesalers.50  Condemnation of the use of 
intermediaries has been a running theme since Beech-Nut.51  Parke, Davis 
merely reaffirmed it in starker terms, as the wholesalers’ involvement was 
rather minimal compared to that in Beech-Nut and Bausch & Lomb. 
This theory of an RPM agreement has been subject to considerable 
criticisms.  Justice Harlan in his dissent questioned why voluntary 
acquiescence to a supplier’s unilateral policy on the retailer level is not 
illegal but becomes so when the same acquiescence is made simultaneously 
at the wholesaler level.52  A number of commentators have noted the same 
flaw in this theory.53  This is especially so because by interposing wholesalers 
between the supplier and the retailers, there is no direct contact between the 
supplier and the retailers, and the relationship between them becomes more 
remote.54  The holding in Parke, Davis favors markets in which the supplier 
can effectuate an RPM scheme without the help of intermediaries, most 
likely where the supplier does not use wholesalers.  It effectively gives 
suppliers that sell directly to retailers greater liberty to effectuate an RPM 
scheme, a result that is arbitrary and devoid of economic justifications. 
Criticisms notwithstanding, Parke, Davis can be understood to have 
lent further support to the enforcement and the coercion theories of 
 
specified resale prices.  So long as Colgate is not overruled, this result is tolerated but only 
when it is the consequence of a mere refusal to sell in the exercise of the manufacturer’s right 
‘freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.’”). 
 50.  See Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 9 (stating that the Parke, Davis court relied on 
Parke, Davis’ use of wholesalers to enforce its RPM scheme rather than the voluntary 
acquiescence of retailers in finding a manufacturer combination); Levi, supra note 9, at 262 
(“There is no evidence that any of them [wholesalers] made any agreement with Parke, Davis 
as to prices or that Parke, Davis ever solicited an agreement from any of them as to this 
matter.”). 
 51.  Levi, supra note 9, at 325. 
 52.  United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 55 (1960). 
 53.  See Edward O. Correia, Resale Price Maintenance—Searching for a Policy, 18 J. 
LEGIS. 187, 192 (1992) (“By involving the wholesaler, the supplier has still not obtained any 
assurance from the retailer as to future pricing practices.  It has simply used the same 
technique of influencing behavior through threatening termination at the wholesaler level.”); 
Floyd, supra note 18, at 294 (“[T]here is an inherent conflict between recognizing a 
combination among manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers (because both wholesalers and 
retailers could be terminated for refusing to comply) yet refusing to recognize a combination 
when retailers alone comply in order to avoid termination.”). 
 54.  Correia, supra note 53, at 192. 
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agreement.55  The former holds that an illegal RPM agreement is found when 
the supplier undertakes enforcement effort beyond a certain level.  Parke, 
Davis itself seemed to have set that level as anything beyond mere 
announcement of a policy of unilateral refusal to deal, which is a very strict 
standard.  The latter asserts that an illegal RPM agreement is found if a 
retailer is subject to pressure beyond the inherent attractiveness of the 
product to comply with the supplier’s demand. 
7. Albrecht v. Herald Co. 
The next Supreme Court case that is relevant to the agreement issue is 
Albrecht v. Herald Co.56  The case involved vertical maximum price fixing.  
The case did not raise the issue of when an agreement exists between the 
supplier and the retailer; it instead focused on what kind of agreement 
sufficed for the purpose of establishing a violation of Section 1.  The dealer 
in that case refused to abide by the vertical maximum prices set up by a 
newspaper publisher and the publisher attempted to coerce the dealer to 
comply by soliciting assistance of a third-party delivery company and a 
third-party solicitation agent.57  There was clearly no agreement between the 
newspaper publisher and the non-compliant dealer on vertical maximum 
prices.  Thus, there arose the issue of whether there was an illegal agreement 
in the case.  The Court held that the requisite agreement was found between 
the newspaper publisher on the one hand and the solicitation agent and the 
delivery company on the other hand.58  Even though the two third parties had 
no financial interest in the success of the vertical maximum price fixing 
scheme, the Court thought that the agreements between them and the 
publisher sufficed because the third parties were aware of their role in the 
price fixing scheme and knew that their service would no longer be required 
if the non-compliant dealer succumbed.59 
Footnote 6 of the opinion indicated an even more expansive 
understanding of the notion of an agreement.60  Burns argued that the Court’s 
view on agreement in this case is so broad that “it came close to holding that 
there was no legal two-party vertical arrangement, at least if it involved 
prices.”61  The Court suggested that in addition to the agreement between the 
 
 55.  Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 9. 
 56.  Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 57.  Id. at 147. 
 58.  Id. at 149-50. 
 59.  Id. at 150. 
 60.  Id. at 150 n.6.  It has been noted that the understanding of agreement expressed in 
this footnote gained substantial acceptance by the courts, at least until Monsanto.  Floyd, 
supra note 18, at 292. 
 61.  Jean Wagman Burns, Rethinking the “Agreement” Element in Vertical Antitrust 
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publisher and the third parties, the plaintiff could have relied on three other 
agreements as well.62  The first one is that between the publisher and the 
plaintiff, at least as of the date the plaintiff finally succumbed to the 
defendant’s pressure.63  The second one is that between the publisher and 
other compliant dealers.64  The third one, perhaps rather surprisingly, is that 
between the publisher and the final consumers, the newspaper readers; the 
publisher, for a period, sold newspapers directly to the end consumers with 
the help of the third parties.65  Justice Harlan heavily criticized the majority’s 
treatment of the agreement issue.  In particular, he argued that the majority’s 
reliance on the agreement between the defendant and the two third-party 
agents and the suggestion that the agreement between the defendant and 
other compliant dealers would have sufficed is misguided.66 
Justice Harlan argued that the third parties had no economic interest in 
the relationship between the publisher and the non-compliant dealer.67  It is, 
strictly speaking, not true that the third parties had no economic interest in 
the behavior of the non-compliant dealer.  They would be terminated as soon 
as the non-compliant dealer capitulated.  They therefore preferred continual 
non-compliance.  What is true is that their economic interest is different 
from, and contrary to, the interest of the publisher in maintaining the vertical 
maximum price fixing scheme.  With respect to the agreement with the 
compliant dealers, Justice Harlan argued that as opposed to the typical RPM 
situation where each dealer had an interest in the maintenance of the policy 
as deviation by one would harm all, the dealers had no interest in how each 
other’s territory was administered in Albrecht.68  The dealers’ territories 
operated separately.  Justice Harlan can be understood to have propounded 
another theory of agreement under vertical restraints: the economic interest 
theory, which holds that an agreement should not be considered for the 
purpose of a Section 1 violation if either party to the agreement does not have 
an economic interest in the success of the allegedly illegal scheme.69 
 
Restraints, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 19 (1990). 
 62.  Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 n.6 (1968). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 158-60. 
 67.  Id. at 161 (“Once it is recognized that Kroner had no interest whatever in forcing his 
competitor to lower his price, and was merely being paid to perform a delivery job that 
respondent could have done itself, it is clear respondent’s activity was in its essence 
unilateral.”).  
 68.  Id. at 161. 
 69.  This theory probably is less relevant to the RPM context as most of the parties 
involved have a stake in the maintenance of the RPM.  When one dealer defects, every other 
dealer operating in the same market will be affected.  One scenario in which this may not be 
the case is if retailers operate in different geographical areas or customer segments and the 
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Lastly, reference should be made to a prescient comment made by 
Justice Harlan concerning the role of agreement in the law on vertical 
restraints.  He argued that: 
The Court’s difficulties on all of its theories stem from its 
unwillingness to face the ultimate conclusion at which it has 
actually arrived: it is unlawful for one person to dictate price floors 
or price ceilings to another; any pressure brought to bear in support 
of such dictation renders the dictator liable to any dictatee who is 
damaged.  The reason for the Court’s reluctance to state this 
conclusion bluntly is transparent: this statement of the matter takes 
no account of the absence of a combination or conspiracy.70 
Although this comment was made in the context of vertical maximum 
price fixing, it resonates in the string of RPM cases that have been examined 
so far.  Given how far the Colgate doctrine has been pared back and the 
endorsement of the coercion theory in Parke, Davis and Albrecht71, one may 
question whether the Court has effectively condemned unilaterally imposed 
RPM. 
8. Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp. 
In the same year as Albrecht, the Supreme Court decided Perma Life 
Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., which, although strictly speaking was 
not concerned with the agreement issue, sheds light on the Court’s 
understanding of the relationship between coercion and agreement.72  The 
issue in the case was whether distributors who had adopted a variety of 
vertical restraints, including exclusive dealing, tying, exclusive territory, and 
RPM, under pressure from the manufacturer were barred from recovery 
under the antitrust law by the in pari delicto doctrine.73  The Court held that 
the distributors were not barred from recovery by the in pari delicto doctrine 
even though they had adopted the vertical restraints imposed by the 
 
plaintiff is trying to establish an agreement between the supplier and one retailer by referring 
to an agreement between the supplier and retailers operating in another territory or another 
customer segment.  
 70.  Id. at 162 
 71.  See Correia, supra note 53, at 192 (“Thus, the Court reasoned, if Parke Davis 
recognized an agreement based on coercion of retailers through the use of wholesalers, an 
agreement would also be formed if a supplier coerced a dealer to charge a particular price 
through the use of an agent soliciting away the dealer’s customers.  Moreover, the Court stated 
that an agreement for purposes of the Sherman Act could be found based on unwilling 
compliance by the coerced dealer.”). 
 72.  Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968) (holding that the 
doctrine of in pari delicto is not a defense in an antitrust action), overruled by Copperweld 
Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
 73.  Id. at 137-38. 
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defendant.74  The Court noted that the distributors’ “participation was not 
voluntary in any meaningful sense.”75  It acknowledged that the distributors 
sought the franchises enthusiastically, but only acceded to the vertical 
restraints “because their acquiescence was necessary to obtain an otherwise 
attractive business opportunity.”76  In his concurrence, Justice White noted 
that subject to the market power and leverage of a powerful counterparty, the 
plaintiff “was unwilling to enter the illegal scheme, was motivated 
principally by what he thought was economic necessity — the need to avoid 
losing business by being unable to offer a major product line[.]”77  Therefore, 
the distributors should not bear equal responsibility for the conduct and 
should not be barred from recovery. 
This case is particularly noteworthy for the observation that coercion 
does not elicit assent that is voluntary in any meaningful sense.  If an 
agreement is understood to be a voluntary meeting of the minds, then an 
agreement brought about through coercion does not qualify.  Moreover, the 
opinion suggests that the Court’s threshold for coercion or undue pressure is 
quite low.78  The opinion did not mention any specific acts of coercion that 
were found in some of the earlier cases, such as Parke, Davis.  It seems that 
the defendant did not undertake any affirmative acts to solicit compliance 
apart from “the communicated danger of termination[.]”79  Lastly, the Court 
implicitly endorsed the economic interest theory. The Court argued that the 
distributors should not bear responsibility for the exclusive dealing 
requirement and the full-line product requirement because these two 
restraints were clearly against their economic interest.80  The implicit 
argument is that the distributors should not be deemed to have voluntarily 
assented to these restraints when the restraints were against their economic 
interest. 
9. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. 
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court decided two important cases on the 
notion of agreement in vertical restraint cases, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite 
 
 74.  Id. at 140. 
 75.  Id. at 139. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 145-46. 
 78.  Id. at 155 (Harlan, J., concurring) (suggesting that the plaintiffs could potentially 
benefit from the “coercion” exception to the in pari delicto doctrine, although the majority 
did not use the term “coercion” to refer to the defendant’s conduct). 
 79.  Id. at 142 (quoting United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372 
(1967)). 
 80.  Id. at 140-41. 
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Service Corp.81 and Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.82  
Both cases differ from the previous cases in a number of significant ways.  
First, both cases involved dealer termination, in which the Court was asked 
to infer a vertical price fixing agreement from the act of termination.83  
Although inference of an RPM agreement from circumstantial evidence is 
nothing new, what is different is that dealer termination itself could be 
anticompetitive under certain circumstances.  That is not true of the conduct 
from which the Court was asked to infer an agreement in the previous cases.  
In these two cases, the plaintiffs did not pursue dealer termination as an 
antitrust violation directly, probably because at the time, resale price 
maintenance was still illegal per se.  However, that is no longer the case after 
Leegin and it is worth exploring decoupling RPM from dealer termination 
and treating each as an independent violation.  Second, although the Court 
did rule for the plaintiff in Monsanto, these two cases reversed the hitherto 
long-term trend of pro-plaintiff outcomes in Supreme Court RPM cases.  The 
Supreme Court significantly tightened the requirement for a showing of an 
agreement in RPM cases.84  It is worth exploring the continual relevance of 
the cases from the previous decades after Monsanto and Business 
Electronics. 
In Monsanto, at issue was whether an RPM agreement could be inferred 
from the existence of dealer complaints and termination that followed or 
even came about in response to the complaints.85  Monsanto had terminated 
a price-cutting distributor Spray-Rite following complaints from other 
distributors.86  Spray-Rite brought suit, alleging that its termination was part 
 
 81.  Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (holding that to find 
existence of a vertical price-fixing agreement, something more than evidence of complaints 
by other distributors is needed and the jury should determine whether the plaintiff was 
terminated because of price-fixing conspiracy between the manufacturer and distributors). 
 82.  Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (holding that vertical 
restraint of trade is not per se illegal under the Sherman Act unless it includes agreement about 
price). 
 83.  These two cases are dealer termination cases perhaps because they were both brought 
by private litigants as opposed to the government, unlike in a vast majority of the RPM cases 
in the previous decades.  Private RPM cases would almost by definition involve dealer 
termination.  If the dealer complies with the minimum prices, there would be no case to bring.  
Only when a dealer refuses to comply with these prices and is terminated would he have an 
incentive to sue.  It is of course possible for a dealer to sue when a manufacturer refuses to 
trade with the dealer for his refusal to abide by the RPM scheme.  But such a suit would be 
more challenging as it would be more difficult for the plaintiff to prove that it has suffered 
injury.  
 84.  This may be partly due to the fact that both cases were private action and the Court 
was careful not to encourage excessive dealer termination cases. 
 85.  Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 759. 
 86.  Id. 
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of an illegal RPM scheme Monsanto had put in place.87  The Supreme Court 
held that the existence of dealer complaints and termination that came about 
in response to those complaints is not alone sufficient to substantiate an 
illegal vertical price fixing agreement.88  Instead, “[t]here must be evidence 
that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and non[-
]terminated distributors were acting independently.”89  Under this standard, 
“the antitrust plaintiff should present direct or circumstantial evidence that 
reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer and others ‘had a conscious 
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful 
objective.’”90  The Court gave a number of reasons for its holding.  First, the 
Court reiterated that under Colgate, there is an important distinction between 
permissible unilateral action and illegal concerted action.91  Second, the 
Court argued that a heightened evidentiary standard is necessary to preserve 
the dividing line between the rule of reason for vertical non-price restraints 
and the per se rule for vertical price restraints.92  Third, the Court cautioned 
against attaching too much weight to dealer complaints because a 
manufacturer who has legitimate business needs to have constant 
communication with its dealers and dealers are an important source of 
 
 87.  Id. at 757. 
 88.  Id. at 763; but see Floyd, supra note 18, at 274 (stating that most of the appellate 
courts that had considered the issue had held that such evidence was sufficient to create a jury 
issue on whether the manufacturer and the complaining dealers acted in concert); id. at 275 
(arguing that upon showing of such evidence, the burden should shift to the defendant to show 
that it was acting unilaterally). 
 89.  Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764, questioned in Floyd, supra note 18, at 274 (criticizing 
the Court’s holding as inconsistent with general rules on the sufficiency of evidence to create 
a jury issue by stating that a plaintiff “need not introduce evidence excluding all possible 
circumstances that would defeat liability, so long as the evidence that it does produce is 
sufficient to permit a reasonable inference that would support liability”).  
 90.  Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco Inc., 
637 F.2d 105 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)). 
 91.  Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761; See Burns, supra note 61, at 23-24 (“Yet, to separate 
such legal communications and distribution arrangements from illegal ones, the Court once 
again fell back on the ‘unilateral action’ versus ‘agreement’ distinction of Colgate.  Under 
this approach, the Court concluded that complaints from distributors about other price-cutting 
distributors are ‘natural’ and not indicative of ‘illegal concerted action,’ and that merely 
showing that a manufacturer acted in response to such complaints did not, by itself, prove the 
existence of an unlawful agreement.  The manufacturer could have received the complaints 
and communicated with its dealers but nonetheless have acted unilaterally.”) 
 92.  Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762; but see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Dr. Miles’s Orphans: 
Vertical Conspiracy and Consignment in the Wake of Leegin, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125, 
1142 (2010) (arguing that the Court did not address the issue of the distinction between price 
and non-price restraints head-on, but instead tinkered with the evidentiary standard for an 
agreement and that the Court could have required lower courts to give clear instructions to the 
jury on the distinction between vertical price and non-price restraints).  
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information for the manufacturer.93  Allowing a plaintiff to establish an 
agreement based on dealer complaints and termination in response to them 
would threaten to strangle such communication. 
Applying this new evidentiary standard, the Court held that there was 
sufficient evidence in the case to establish an RPM agreement between the 
defendant and its dealers.94  First, there was evidence that the defendant 
actively solicited compliance from a price-cutting dealer through 
communication with its parent company, upon which the dealer gave 
assurance to Monsanto that it would abide by the minimum resale prices.95  
Second, the Court referred to a newsletter from one of Monsanto’s 
distributors that made some reference to an arrangement.96  The Court argued 
that this reference could be interpreted as reference to a price fixing 
agreement.97 
It is difficult to determine the extent to which Monsanto modified the 
prior case law on the existence of agreement.  This is because the factual 
scenario and focus of inquiry in Monsanto are quite different from those in 
the previous cases.  In Monsanto, the question was not how much more a 
supplier can do beyond mere unilateral announcements without creating an 
illegal agreement.  Assuming that the RPM scheme in Monsanto was 
implemented through unilateral announcements, the one additional step 
Monsanto took was the termination of Spray-Rite, which was clearly 
permitted under Colgate.  As it turns out, Monsanto went beyond making 
unilateral announcements — it sought assurances from non-compliant 
dealers — which means that there was clearly an illegal agreement under the 
Colgate line of cases.  Instead, the question in Monsanto was about to what 
extent parallel action by independent actors can be interpreted as constituting 
an agreement, the parallel action here being dealer complaints and 
termination by the supplier, both of which could have happened with or 
without an agreement between the supplier and the complaining dealer.  The 
Court held that if the parallel action can be given an innocuous and an 
anticompetitive explanation equally plausibly, the former is to be preferred.98  
Thus, Monsanto dealt with different questions from the ones posed in the 
previous cases and the Colgate line of cases was arguably left undisturbed. 
Floyd asserted the contrary view: that the Colgate line of cases did not 
 
 93.  Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763. 
 94.  Id. at 765. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 765-766. 
 97.  Id. at 766, questioned in Calvani & Berg, supra note 9, at 1198 (arguing that the 
Court’s reliance on the ambiguous evidence of a newsletter as sufficient evidence provides 
little guidance to counsel on the sufficiency of evidence). 
 98.  Robinson, supra note 24, at 599.   
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survive Monsanto.99  He argued that: 
If, as the Supreme Court has now announced in Monsanto, the sine 
qua non of illegality is not only a ‘conscious commitment to a 
common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective’, but 
also a showing that ‘the distributor communicated its acquiescence 
or agreement, and that this was sought by the manufacturer’, it is 
difficult to see how Parke, Davis, Beech-Nut and related decisions 
can survive.100 
This was with reference to footnote 9 of the opinion.  Floyd overstated 
the impact of Monsanto on the Colgate line of cases.  Footnote 9 states that: 
The concept of “a meeting of the minds” or “a common scheme” 
in a distributor-termination case [emphasis added] includes more 
than a showing that the distributor conformed to the suggested 
price.  It means as well that evidence must be presented both that 
the distributor communicated its acquiescence or agreement, and 
that this was sought by the manufacturer.101 
This footnote imposes a new communication requirement on 
agreements in the context of vertical price restraints and would have 
implicitly overturned the longstanding rule in the Colgate line of cases that 
an agreement can be implied from circumstantial evidence had the Court not 
limited this new rule to dealer termination cases.  This rule has a much more 
limited scope.  It does not say that every vertical price fixing agreement must 
be substantiated with evidence of communication between the supplier and 
the dealer concerning assurance of compliance.  Instead, it effectively says 
that a vertical price fixing agreement cannot be inferred solely from dealer 
termination.  It must be substantiated with additional evidence.  In fact, it is 
unclear the Court even applied the rule faithfully in the case.  In addition to 
the evidence that Monsanto sought assurance of compliance from a 
distributor through its parent company, the Court also relied on the 
ambiguous evidence of the newsletter.  If evidence as ambiguous as the 
newsletter would suffice, the Court in effect required much less than express 
communication between the supplier and the dealers.102 
One may in fact argue that the Court’s detailed analysis of the issue of 
the sufficiency of dealer termination in response to dealer complaints as 
 
 99.  See also Correia, supra note 53, at 198 (noting that after Monsanto and Business 
Electronics it has become very difficult to establish liability in dealer termination cases).  
 100.  Floyd, supra note 18, at 298 (quoting Monsanto Co v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 
U.S. 752, 764 n.9 (1984)). 
 101.  Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 n.9. 
 102.  However, admittedly, one can argue that the Court used the newsletter as additional 
evidence to bolster the primary evidence of Monsanto seeking assurance from a distributor 
through its parent company. 
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proof of an agreement is much ado about nothing.  The fact that Monsanto 
sought assurances of compliance with its RPM scheme through the parent 
company of a distributor and obtained the assurance from the distributor 
subsequently was more than sufficient to support the finding of an RPM 
agreement under the standard laid down by the previous cases.103  A simple 
application of the Colgate doctrine would have led to the conclusion that 
there was an agreement.  Colgate only allows unilateral announcement of 
policy and forbids seeking of assurances from dealers.  Moreover, the parent 
company can be characterized as an intermediary, and the use of an 
intermediary to ensure compliance was held to be sufficient to support a 
finding of agreement under Parke, Davis.104  Therefore, without resorting to 
any new evidentiary standard, the Court could have arrived at the same 
conclusion.  Monsanto added nothing new to the issue of the existence of 
agreement in vertical price restraints.  The only issue that needed to be 
addressed in the case was whether the termination was pursuant to the price 
fixing scheme, which the Court dealt with in fairly summary fashion. 
One is not even sure about the significance of the distributor termination 
in determining Monsanto’s liability.  The Court did not seem to suggest that 
dealer termination is an independent antitrust violation, at least in the factual 
context of the case.  The focus of the inquiry was whether there was an illegal 
RPM scheme.  Once there was direct evidence of an agreement between 
Monsanto and its compliant distributors, the question of inferring the 
existence of an illegal vertical price fixing agreement from dealer 
termination in response to complaints became superfluous.  Consequently, 
one may argue that the real issue in Monsanto was not the existence of an 
agreement in vertical price restraints, but the legality of dealer termination.  
Under Colgate, it is legal for a supplier to terminate a dealer that refuses to 
comply with the minimum prices set by the supplier.  The twist presented in 
Monsanto was whether it would make any difference if the termination was 
made in response to dealer complaints.  Dealer complaints may indicate 
anticompetitive potential because it is possible that the supplier would have 
tolerated price cutting by the non-compliant dealer and would not have 
terminated that dealer but for the complaints.105  In that case, the termination 
 
 103.  This has led Correia to comment on the fortuitous nature of the case.  The only reason 
the plaintiff was able to prove an agreement was the non-compliance of one of the dealers.  If 
there had been complete compliance in the scheme, Spray-Rite would have been out of luck.  
Correia, supra note 53, at 203.  
 104.  See U.S. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45 (1960) (finding that Parke Davis 
had committed illegal vertical price fixing when it used its wholesalers to deny products to 
uncooperative retailers).   
 105.  See Correia, supra note 53 at 197 (“[T]erminating a discounting dealer certainly 
affects the degree of price competition among dealers.  By agreeing to eliminate the 
discounter, the supplier and the remaining dealer have reduced price competition at the retail 
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was made under pressure from the complaining dealer to shield that dealer 
from price competition.106  The Court’s answer was that dealer termination 
in response to complaints would only be illegal if it was made in the context 
of an illegal vertical price fixing scheme, which was further substantiated by 
evidence of communication of assurance between the supplier and the 
complaining dealers.107 
What is the significance of the vertical price fixing scheme to the 
anticompetitive potential of complaint-motivated dealer termination?  Does 
the existence of a vertical price fixing scheme render the termination more 
anticompetitive?  The answer would seem to be no.  If a powerful dealer uses 
its bargaining power to pressure the supplier to terminate a price-cutting 
dealer, the result is the same regardless of whether there is a vertical price 
fixing scheme: the elimination of a source of price competition on the dealer 
level.  To the extent that intrabrand competition is important to protect, this 
elimination raises a competitive concern.  In fact, the Court’s requirement 
that the termination be made in the context of a vertical price fixing scheme 
is almost counter-intuitive.  The existence of such a scheme means that there 
is a greater likelihood that the supplier would have independently wanted to 
terminate the price-cutting dealer, which would render the termination less 
anticompetitive and more permissible, since the supplier would only be 
exercising its right under Colgate.  Complaint-motivated dealer termination 
would be more problematic if the supplier does not have a strong preference 
over resale price and yet terminates a price-cutting dealer under pressure 
from another dealer. 
This leads to another anomaly in the Monsanto case.  In discussing 
whether Monsanto’s termination of Spray-Rite was pursuant to its RPM 
scheme, the Court suggested that Monsanto’s attribution of the termination 
to Spray-Rite’s performance was pretextual and that Monsanto was 
ultimately motivated by Spray-Rite’s price cutting.108  The Court noted that 
the first thing a Monsanto official mentioned in a post-termination meeting 
with Spray-Rite was the latter’s prices.109  The Court further noted that 
 
level.”). 
 106.  Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 765. 
 107.  Id. at 768.  The Court’s application of this rule to the facts of the case suggests that 
the Court may not have been entirely convinced about the rule itself.  This possible lack of 
conviction notwithstanding, one questions why the Court decided to impose a higher 
evidentiary standard on the proof of an agreement in a dealer termination case than the usual 
RPM cases, which do not require proof of communication.  One possible reason is perhaps 
that dealer termination cases are almost by definition private cases, and the Court was getting 
increasingly concerned about the flood of dealer termination cases in the federal courts.  The 
Court hence wanted to deter these cases by imposing a higher evidentiary standard.  
 108.  Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 765. 
 109.  Id. at 767. 
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Monsanto never discussed with Spray-Rite the criteria which allegedly 
formed the basis for Spray-Rite’s termination.110  But it was unclear why it 
would have been more problematic if Monsanto had terminated Spray-Rite 
due to its price cutting.  Colgate clearly stated that a supplier has the full 
right to terminate a dealer who refuses to abide by its minimum resale prices.  
It would not have mattered what Monsanto’s real reason was for terminating 
Spray-Rite.  Under Colgate, Monsanto would have the right to terminate 
Spray-Rite for any reason, including price cutting.  Instead, the Court should 
have focused on whether Monsanto would have terminated Spray-Rite 
absent dealer complaints.  The termination would have been much more 
problematic if Monsanto would not have done so. 
Monsanto also highlights one of the incongruities of the Colgate 
doctrine in light of the coercion theory of agreement.  Under the Colgate 
progeny, if a supplier undertakes extra measures, such as making use of 
wholesalers and marking the products for easy tracing, to coerce a dealer to 
comply with the RPM scheme, an illegal agreement would arise.  But under 
Colgate, it would be perfectly legal for the supplier to use its ultimate 
weapon of coercion: termination.  This creates a situation where a supplier 
must refrain from using a moderate amount of coercion, but instead can 
legally use the most coercive weapon.  One can argue that the difference is 
that in the case of moderate coercion, the dealer complies and abides by the 
RPM scheme.  In the case of termination, the dealer ultimately refuses to 
comply.  However, if that is the basis for deciding whether there is an illegal 
agreement, it seems to be no longer about the presence of coercion, but about 
whether there is a meeting of the minds and compliance with the scheme. 
10.     Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp. 
Business Electronics Corp. is another dealer termination case decided 
by the Supreme Court in the 1980s.111  In that case, the defendant Sharp 
Electronics had terminated the plaintiff Business Electronics as a retailer for 
its calculators after receiving complaints from another retailer, Hartwell.112  
At issue was whether the dealer termination was governed by the per se rule 
or the rule of reason.113  The Court formulated the issue as one concerning 
the dividing line between vertical price restraints which were at the time per 
se illegal and vertical non-price restraints which were subject to the rule of 
reason.114  The Court held that the per se rule does not apply to dealer 
 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
 112.  Id. at 721.  
 113.  Id. at 720. 
 114.  Id. at 725. 
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termination absent a further agreement on the price or price levels to be 
charged by the remaining dealers.115  The Court justified this holding on the 
grounds that in dealing with vertical restraints, there is a presumption in 
favor of the rule of reason.116  This is because a liberal application of the per 
se rule would erode the protection afforded by GTE Sylvania117 of vertical 
non-price restraints and the solicitude the Court had expressed in the case for 
interbrand competition.118 
Similar to Monsanto, the focus in Business Electronics is on when 
dealer termination would be illegal, and not how much more a supplier can 
do beyond mere announcements to enforce an RPM scheme.  The Court in 
Business Electronics went one step further than the Monsanto court.  In 
Monsanto, the Court had held that ambiguous common action by the supplier 
and complaining dealers is not sufficient to establish a violation of the 
antitrust law.119  In Business Electronics, the Court held that even an 
agreement between a supplier and a complaining dealer is not enough to 
establish a violation.120  There must be showing of a concomitant vertical 
price fixing agreement.121  This is because a dealer may have been terminated 
for violation of a vertical non-price restraint as opposed to a vertical price 
restraint.  In order to guard against false positives, dealer termination would 
only be subject to the per se rule when there was clear evidence of a vertical 
price fixing agreement.122  The Court, however, said nothing in the opinion 
about how this vertical price fixing agreement could be proved.  Therefore, 
one can presume that the approaches laid down in the pre-Monsanto cases 
 
 115.  Id. at 727. 
 116.  Id. at 726. 
 117.  Continental T.V., Inc., et al. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 118.  See Bus. Elec., 485 U.S. at 726 (stating that “interbrand competition is the primary 
concern of the antitrust laws; and that rules in this area should be formulated with a view 
towards protecting the doctrine of GTE Sylvania”). 
 119.  Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64 (“On a claim of concerted price fixing, the antitrust 
plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to carry its burden of proving that there was such an 
agreement.  If an inference of such an agreement may be drawn from highly ambiguous 
evidence, there is considerable danger that the doctrines enunciated in Sylvania and Colgate 
will be seriously eroded. . . .  There must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that 
the manufacturer and non[-]terminated distributors were acting independently.”). 
 120.  Bus. Elec., 485 U.S. at 726-27 (“There has been no showing here that an agreement 
between a manufacturer and a dealer to terminate a ‘price cutter,’ without a further agreement 
on the price or price levels to be charged by the remaining dealer, almost always tends to 
restrict competition and reduce output.  Any assistance to cartelizing that such an agreement 
might provide cannot be distinguished from the sort of minimal assistance that might be 
provided by vertical non[-]price agreements like the exclusive territory agreement in GTE 
Sylvania, and is insufficient to justify a per se rule.” (emphasis added)). 
 121.  Id. at 735-36.  
 122.  Harrison, supra note 92, at 1142. 
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continue to apply.123 
Given that the main justification for the rule in Business Electronics is 
the preservation of the divide between the different legal rules that applied 
to vertical price and non-price restraints, the case lost much of its 
significance after the divide was removed by Leegin.  The residual 
 
 123.  Correia, however, argued that Business Electronics has rendered the holding of 
Monsanto largely moot: 
Sharp, in most cases, makes the evidentiary hurdles erected by Monsanto moot.  
Even if the plaintiff can prove that the supplier who terminated it agreed with a 
complaining dealer about the termination, it is unlikely to prove that the 
complaining dealer and the supplier agreed on the complaining dealer’s prices.   
Correia, supra note 53, at 211.  More damagingly, Harrison argued that Business Electronics 
had practically ended the per se rule under Dr. Miles because after Business Electronics, 
courts have come to require an agreement on the actual price level to warrant the per se rule: 
Business Electronics, for all practical purposes, ended the reign of Dr. Miles.  
After Business Electronics, evidently the only way to engage in unlawful RPM 
was to not only have just an agreement stabilizing resale price, but also have an 
agreement on the actual price level . . . . After Business Electronics, it was clear 
that agreements except those pegging a specific price were also exempt.  Indeed, 
after Monsanto and Business Electronics, findings that firms have engaged in per 
se unlawful RPM are rare. 
Harrison, supra note 92, at 1143; see also Burns, supra note 61, at 27-28 (explaining how the 
Business Electronics holding made findings of purely vertical per se illegal restraints 
obsolete).  Harrison’s prognosis of the impact of Business Electronics reflects a careless 
reading of the case.  To the extent that his description of the lower courts’ treatment of 
Business Electronics was true, the lower courts have misread Business Electronics.  
  A careful reading of the case shows that Justice Scalia was specifically referring to 
situations in which there was an agreement to terminate a price-cutting dealer.  He noted in 
the opinion that “[t]here has been no showing here that an agreement between a manufacturer 
and a dealer to terminate a ‘price cutter,’ without a further agreement on the price or price 
levels to be charged by the remaining dealer, almost always tends to restrict competition and 
reduce output.”  Business Electronics, 485 U.S. at 726-27.  Nowhere did the Court assert that 
this requirement of an explicit agreement on price applies to all RPM schemes, including 
those without dealer termination.  Moreover, in a number of places in the opinion, Justice 
Scalia referred to the possibility that dealer termination may be the result of enforcement of a 
vertical price or non-price restraint.  One cannot be certain which applies in a particular case 
simply from observing dealer termination.  Although Justice Scalia concluded his opinion 
with the assertion that “a vertical agreement is not illegal per se unless it includes some 
agreement on price or price levels,” Bus. Elec., 485 U.S. at 735-36, viewed holistically, the 
opinion was clearly addressing situations in which there is dealer termination, and not vertical 
restraints in general.  
  In addition, Justice Scalia did not address in his opinion the issue of how an agreement 
on price can be proved.  From the Colgate line of cases, it is clear that an agreement on price 
can be proved from circumstantial evidence, including evidence of coercion or complex 
enforcement effort.  In any case, even if it were true that Business Electronics stands for the 
proposition that there must be some explicit agreement on price or price levels proved by 
direct evidence, such a strict rule is no longer warranted after the per se rule has been 
overruled in Leegin.  
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significance of the case concerns the legality of dealer termination.  The case 
can be understood to establish the principle that even clearly complaint-
motivated dealer termination on its own is not illegal absent a concomitant 
vertical price fixing agreement.  The Court’s reasoning can be subject to a 
number of criticisms.  One may argue that the false positive concern Justice 
Scalia highlighted in the case was concocted out of thin air.  As Justice 
Stevens pointed out in his dissent, nothing in the record suggested that there 
was a vertical non-price restraint in the case.124  There was no evidence that 
Sharp had entered into an exclusive distribution agreement or other kinds of 
vertical non-price restraints with either Business Electronics or Hartwell.125 
Moreover, the insistence on evidence of a vertical price fixing 
agreement is redundant.  As argued earlier, such an agreement is only 
relevant to the extent that it sheds light on the incentives of the supplier to 
terminate the non-compliant dealer.  If Sharp did not have an RPM scheme 
to protect, it was probably not terribly concerned about resale prices.  Sharp 
could have terminated Business Electronics because of Hartwell’s 
complaints, Business Electronics’ own performance, or other legitimate 
business reasons.  Yet in this case, there was no uncertainty as to the impetus 
for the termination.  The jury had found that Business Electronics was 
terminated because of Hartwell’s complaints.  Another fact that reinforces 
the conclusion that Sharp would not have terminated Business Electronics 
absent Hartwell’s complaints is that Hartwell itself had sold below the 
minimum prices recommended by Sharp.126  If Sharp had implemented an 
RPM scheme, it clearly was not a binding one.  Sharp was willing to tolerate 
some deviations by dealers from the recommended prices.  Nor should it 
matter that the supplier and the complaining dealer have a specific agreement 
on price level, as Justice Scalia required.  Complaint-motivated dealer 
termination is no less anticompetitive simply because the supplier and the 
complaining dealer did not agree on a specific price level.  If a powerful 
dealer picks out price-cutting dealers one by one by pressuring the supplier 
to terminate them, intrabrand price competition will still be stifled despite 
the lack of an agreement on a specific price level. 
Justice Scalia argued that dealer termination is only problematic when 
committed in the context of a vertical price fixing agreement because of the 
potential of such an agreement to aid cartelization.127  The implication is that 
 
 124.  Bus. Elec., 485 U.S. at 739 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Correia, supra note 53, at 209 
(“Since the supplier was not alleged to have imposed any non-price vertical restraint on its 
dealers, there was no purpose for terminating the discounting dealer other than eliminating 
price competition.”); Harrison, supra note 92, at 1143 (suggesting that vertical agreements 
that do not specify a specific resale price are legal after Business Electronics). 
 125.  Bus. Elec., 485 U.S. at 740 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 126.  Id. at 721. 
 127.  Id. at 727.  Commenting on the significance of the existence of the vertical price 
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dealer termination on its own had no competitive significance.  Justice 
Scalia’s view that RPM is only anticompetitive if it aids cartelization is 
unduly narrow and ignores how RPM can be anticompetitive when initiated 
by a powerful manufacturer to foreclose upstream rivals or, more relevant to 
this case, by a powerful dealer to forestall innovation in distribution and 
competition by lower-cost and more efficient rival dealers.  The record was 
not clear on whether Business Electronics was more efficient and whether it 
had free-ridden on Hartwell’s sales and promotional efforts.128  It is thus 
inconclusive that Hartwell had used the dealer termination to pursue an 
anticompetitive goal.  But there is at least a prima facie case of 
anticompetitive intent that should not be dismissed out of hand simply 
because there was no concomitant vertical price fixing agreement.  In fact, 
as pointed out earlier, the lack of a vertical price fixing agreement renders 
dealer termination more suspicious and more likely to be complaint- 
motivated.  Therefore, the majority was wrong in holding that complaint-
motivated dealer termination could not be an antitrust violation without a 
concomitant vertical price fixing agreement. 
Justice Stevens in his dissent shared the same view concerning the 
possible anticompetitive potential of complaint-motivated dealer 
termination.129  He laid out a three-step framework for determining whether 
dealer termination violates the antitrust law.  First, the plaintiff needs to 
satisfy the hurdle erected by Monsanto to provide “evidence that tends to 
exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and non[-]terminated 
distributors were acting independently.”130  Second, the plaintiff must show 
that the agreement “was based on a purpose to terminate [a dealer] because 
of its price cutting.”131  Third, the supplier “may rebut the evidence tending 
to prove that the sole purpose of the agreement was to eliminate a price cutter 
by offering evidence that it entered the agreement for legitimate, non-price-
 
fixing agreement, Robinson noted that “[t]he Court in Sharp was also astute in recognizing 
that even an agreement between supplier and dealer did not necessarily imply an agreement 
to fix price and hence would not suffice to establish a per se violation.”  Robinson, supra note 
24, at 598.  However, the correct question to ask is not whether dealer termination should be 
illegal per se, which admittedly would be too harsh a rule.  Instead, the question should be 
whether dealer termination should be illegal under certain circumstances, and the answer 
clearly should be yes.  The inquiry was arguably obfuscated during the per se rule era because 
the plaintiff would always seek to link dealer termination to an RPM scheme to take advantage 
of the per se rule.  However, Justice Scalia’s treatment of the issue is such that it amounts to 
holding that dealer termination is always legal unless accompanied by a vertical price fixing 
agreement.   
 128.  Id. at 721. 
 129.  Id. at 736-758. 
 130.  Id. at 753 (quoting Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764). 
 131.  Id.  
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related reasons.”132  This framework represents a good step toward 
determining the legality of complaint-motivated dealer termination.  There 
are, however, a number of problems with it.  First, Justice Stevens again 
neglected to recognize the right of a supplier under Colgate to terminate a 
dealer for whatever reason, including price cutting, so long as the supplier 
was not influenced by a complaining dealer to do so.  Therefore, it cannot be 
that termination of a dealer is illegal if it is due to the dealer’s price cutting.  
Dealer termination should only be illegal if it was done at the behest of a 
complaining dealer to protect that dealer from price competition. 
Second, Justice Stevens recited the formula from Monsanto for 
evidence that excludes the possibility of independent action. It is worth 
parsing out what exactly should be required by this phrase.  There are three 
possibilities.  The first possibility is that there was an agreement between the 
supplier and the complaining dealer to implement an RPM scheme.  The 
second one is that there was an agreement between the supplier and the 
complaining dealer that the former will terminate the price-cutting dealer, 
perhaps in exchange for a promise that the latter will continue to carry the 
former’s products.  The third one is that the plaintiff is required to show that 
the supplier was influenced by the complaining dealer in its decision to 
terminate the price-cutting dealer.  Varying degrees of influence can be set 
for this required showing, ranging from that the dealer complaint was one of 
the factors contributing to the decision, to that the supplier would not have 
terminated the price-cutting dealer but for the dealer complaint.  Footnote 9 
of the Monsanto opinion suggests that the Court intended the first 
formulation.133  The Court required mutual communication of acquiescence 
to the price fixing agreement by the supplier and the complaining dealer.  
This requirement, it has been argued, is counter-intuitive and unduly 
stringent. 
The alternative is an agreement between the supplier and the 
complaining dealer to terminate the price-cutting dealer.  It is important to 
consider what such an agreement entails and how it is related to the potential 
anticompetitive effects of the termination.  It is somewhat artificial to speak 
of an agreement on the termination of the price-cutting dealer.  This is 
because there is always an ongoing distribution agreement governing the 
relationship between the supplier and the complaining dealer.  The supplier 
and the dealer do not enter into separate agreements on resale price 
maintenance or dealer termination as such.  Dealer termination will be one 
of the items of negotiation between the supplier and the dealer in their 
ongoing relationship.  If the dealer complains to the supplier about price 
 
 132.  Id. at 754. 
 133.  Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 n.9. 
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cutting and demands termination of the price-cutting dealer, and the supplier, 
which otherwise would not have terminated the latter dealer, complied with 
the complaining dealer’s demand, we have all the ingredients of an 
anticompetitive termination.  Requiring proof of an agreement to terminate 
the price-cutting dealer adds nothing to the analysis. 
An agreement usually requires the proverbial meeting of the minds or 
exchange of promises or commitment.  Short of express communication, 
meeting of the minds is an abstract concept that is easy to describe but hard 
to prove.  Exchange of promises or commitment can be the alternative 
benchmark.  The problem here is that while the supplier will promise to 
terminate the price-cutting dealer, what the complaining dealer promises in 
return is often implicit.  Unless the complaining dealer explicitly says that it 
will terminate the relationship if the price-cutting dealer is kept, like what 
happened in Business Electronics, the complaining dealer’s reciprocal 
commitment will be implicit in its continual business relationship with the 
supplier.  The complaining dealer’s demand would be more persuasive if 
backed by a threat to terminate the relationship.  But in reality, the dealer can 
communicate this threat subtly without ever explicitly stating it, especially 
if the law premises liability on an express exchange of promises.  In that 
case, an exchange of promises or commitment would be very difficult to 
prove.  Requiring proof of an agreement to terminate the price-cutting dealer 
would erect an unnecessary hurdle for the plaintiff. 
This is especially so because the potential for competitive harm from 
termination of a price-cutting dealer does not depend on the existence of an 
agreement to terminate that dealer.  The removal of a non-free-riding, price-
cutting dealer harms intrabrand competition and gives rise to the possibility 
of a powerful dealer forestalling innovation in distribution and competition 
from a more efficient rival dealer.  If the termination comes from the 
supplier, it could be explained by a pro-competitive reason or simply the 
supplier exercising its right to terminate under Colgate.  But if the 
termination was motivated by a complaining dealer, the only legitimate 
reason is if the price-cutting dealer is free-riding.  Absent that, a competing 
dealer has no pro-competitive reason for desiring the termination of a price-
cutting rival dealer.  Nowhere in this analysis is the presence of an agreement 
essential or helpful to the reasoning. 
The remaining alternative is whether the supplier was influenced by the 
dealer complaint in its decision.  Among the varying degrees of influence 
that can be required, the but-for standard is the most appropriate.  A 
contributing factor standard would be a significant threat to the supplier’s 
right to terminate a dealer under Colgate.  It is possible that the supplier 
would have terminated the dealer anyway and the dealer complaint only gave 
it the final push.  But this termination could very well be illegal under a 
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contributing factor standard.  A but-for standard can be satisfied as follows. 
First, the plaintiff will be asked to show that it was terminated because of a 
rival dealer’s complaint about its price cutting.  The plaintiff will be further 
asked to demonstrate that the complaining dealer is more important to the 
supplier’s business than the price-cutting dealer and thus the supplier would 
side with the complaining dealer when forced to choose between the two.  
These two showings establish a prima facie case that the termination was 
motivated by a dealer complaint and would not have happened without such 
a complaint.  Then the burden shifts to the supplier to show that it had reasons 
other than dealer complaints to terminate the price-cutting dealer.  For 
example, the supplier can show that the price-cutting dealer was free-riding 
on other dealers’ services.  This would provide a legitimate business reason 
for termination and rebut the prima facie case that the supplier was pressured 
by the complaining dealer to terminate. 
The Business Electronics case itself is an apt illustration of a 
termination that would not have happened but for dealer complaints.  Sharp 
itself tolerated Hartwell’s price cutting, which means that it could not have 
been motivated by Business Electronics’ price cutting to terminate it.  There 
were no suggestions that Business Electronics’ performance was otherwise 
not up to standard.  It seemed apparent that the sole reason that Sharp 
terminated Business Electronics was Hartwell’s complaint. 
11.    Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 
Leegin, of course, had nothing to do with the existence of an agreement 
in an RPM scheme. It was not about the form of an RPM scheme, but instead 
about the substance of such schemes.134  However, the change in the 
substantive analysis necessitates changes in the formal analysis as well.  In 
a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court overruled the per se rule for RPM that had 
been in place for ninety-six years since Dr. Miles.135  In the majority opinion, 
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that RPM can be anticompetitive and pro-
competitive, but concluded that “[n]otwithstanding the risks of unlawful 
conduct, it cannot be stated with any degree of confidence that resale price 
maintenance ‘always or almost always tends to restrict competition and 
decrease output.’”136  He further observed that as a per se rule “would 
proscribe a significant amount of procompetitive conduct, these agreements 
appear ill suited for per se condemnation.”137 
An evaluation of the substantive merits of the Leegin decision would 
 
 134.  Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 894. 
 137.  Id. 
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require a separate article.  Suffice it to note for now that the abolition of the 
per se rule for RPM has far-reaching implications on the law on agreement 
in vertical restraints under Colgate and its progeny.  At the very least, the 
sharp distinction drawn by the Business Electronics court between vertical 
price and non-price restraints is no longer justified.  This means that dealer 
termination should no longer be illegal only when undertaken in the context 
of a vertical price fixing agreement.  Dealer termination can be 
anticompetitive even in the absence of such an agreement. 
B. The Consignment Exception 
The consignment issue is strictly speaking different from the agreement 
issue discussed above.  It is not about when there is an illegal agreement 
under an RPM scheme.  However, the two issues share some important 
similarities.  First, both serve as an exception to the general rule against 
RPM.  Under the agreement issue, if the supplier’s conduct falls short of an 
illegal agreement, there is no illegal RPM scheme.  Under the consignment 
exception, if an arrangement is deemed to be a genuine consignment under 
U.S. v. General Electric, it again will not be deemed an illegal RPM 
scheme.138  Both are exceptions based on form that affect the applicability of 
the substantive rule. 
The two leading cases on the consignment exception to the general rule 
on RPM are General Electric and Simpson v. Union Oil, which had almost 
identical facts except that the goods in General Electric, the light bulbs, were 
patented.139  Yet the cases produced opposite results.140  In General Electric, 
the company used agents to sell lamps to final customers through a 
consignment under which the title of the goods never passed to the agents.141  
The agents only bore the costs in storage, transportation, handling, sale, and 
distribution, held the proceeds of sale on trust for General Electric, and were 
required to return all the unsold lamp within a certain period of time.142  The 
Supreme Court held that these were genuine agents who were selling lamps 
on consignment from General Electric.143  The Court focused on a number of 
factors, including the fact that General Electric retained ownership of the 
lamp, which was passed on directly to the final customers, that the agents 
 
 138.  United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) (holding that genuine contracts 
of agency are not violations of the Sherman Act, however widespread they may be). 
 139.  Id. at 479. 
 140.  Id.; Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (holding that maintaining 
gasoline prices through a coercive consignment agreement between a company and station 
operator was illegal under antitrust laws). 
 141.  Gen. Elec., 272 U.S. at 484. 
 142.  Id. at 481-82.  
 143.  Id. at 484. 
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had no obligation to pay General Electric until the lamps were sold to final 
customers, and that the agents had no right to deal with the lamps in any way 
inconsistent with General Electric’s ownership.144  The Court further noted 
that the fact that the agents were responsible for loss or damage to the goods 
and for the various operational expenses was not inconsistent with a genuine 
agency model.145 
In Simpson, Union Oil distributed its oil to retail customers under a 
consignment system under which agents signed one-year leases with Union 
Oil.146  The leases would be terminated if the agent did not follow the prices 
prescribed by the company.147  Like in General Electric, title to the oil 
remained with Union Oil until it was sold to final customers.148  The agents 
were similarly responsible for losses of the consigned gasoline in his 
possession and for personal liability and property damage insurance.149  
Furthermore, the agent bore all the costs of operation and was compensated 
on a commission basis.150  The Court held that the consignment system was 
an illegal RPM scheme on a number of grounds.151  First, the Court noted 
that the lease system was used in a coercive manner to compel the agents to 
follow the prices prescribed by Union Oil.152  The Court compared the lease 
system to the techniques used by the defendant in Parke, Davis and observed 
that it was equally if not more effective than those techniques.153  Second, 
the Court stated that the system covered a vast gasoline distribution system 
and fixed the retail prices of many retail outlets.154  Third, the Court noted 
that the agents bore all the risks of operation but yet had no control over the 
most important parameter affecting the profitability of their businesses.155  
Unsurprisingly, Union Oil attempted to rely on General Electric to salvage 
its case.156  The Court rejected the reliance on General Electric on the 
grounds that the goods in General Electric were patented, even though the 
General Electric court placed no emphasis on that fact in upholding the 
consignment system.157 
In light of these conflicting precedents, the task of drawing the line 
 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Simpson, 377 U.S. at 14. 
 147.  Id. at 14-15. 
 148.  Id. at 15. 
 149.  Id.  
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. at 17-21. 
 152.  Id. at 17. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. at 21-22. 
 155.  Id. at 20-21. 
 156.  Id. at 22-23. 
 157.  Id. at 23. 
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between permissible use of a consignment system to control resale prices and 
an illegal RPM scheme has been largely left to the lower courts, which have 
generally focused on the independence of the agents from the supplier.158  
Commentators have argued that it is exceedingly difficult to distinguish 
General Electric and Simpson, and that it has been generally assumed that 
Simpson has implicitly rejected General Electric.159  Despite this view and 
the government’s successful challenge of the General Electric consignment 
system in a 1973 action following Simpson160, lower courts have continued 
to uphold the use of bona fide consignment system to establish resale 
prices.161  The wisdom of the consignment exception has been called into 
question.  Harrison argued that “the use of agents or consignees may not 
involve a resale but they are still agreements and may be anticompetitive.”162  
One may defend the exception on the ground that if the supplier has never 
parted with title to the goods, it should retain the right to set the resale price 
 
 158.  Harrison, supra note 92, at 1150. 
 159.  Calvani & Berg, supra note 9, at 1178.  
 160.  United States v. Gen. Elec., 358 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
 161.  See Valuepest.com of Charlotte, Inc. v. Bayer Corp., 561 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that RPM arrangement was legal because a genuine agency relationship existed 
between the distributors and manufacturers which bore the economic risks of distribution); 
Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that relationships between moving 
equipment rental company and independent dealers were genuine agencies and thus the RPM 
provisions therein were legal); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Serv., 823 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(finding that manufacturer’s national account program did not constitute an illegal resale price 
maintenance scheme because distributor did not act as a separate business entity bearing 
independent economic risks of independent commercial transactions); Hardwick v. Nu-Way 
Oil Co., Inc., 589 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that the oil company’s retention of the 
sole right to set price of gasoline at the pump did not constitute illegal price fixing under 
antitrust laws because the station operator had no independent authority to set prices or control 
sales and few managements rights regarding the business); Pogue v. Int’l Indus., Inc., 524 
F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1975) (finding no illegal vertical price-fixing because plaintiff sold 
merchandise only on consignment and defendant maintained dominion and control over 
merchandise); Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Prod. Co., 479 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding 
that exemption for RPM provisions under General Electric applies to agency agreements, but 
ends when the patent expires); North Am. Prod. Corp. v. Nick Penachio, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 
746 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that fresh produce distributor could not establish a claim for 
vertical price restraint because it was an agent and not an independent distributor of the 
wholesale supplier); Illinois Corp. Travel, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1485 (N.D. 
Ill. 1988) (finding that any price-fixing agreement between the travel agency and the airline 
was legal because agency was airline’s true agent); Everhart v. United Refining Co., No. C79-
1555-Y, 1980 WL 1993 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 16, 1980) (granting summary judgment for 
defendant denying antitrust claim because the plaintiff was an employee and not an 
independent contractor and thus RPM provision benefited from the General Electric 
exception).  But see Greene v. Gen. Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that 
the MFSA system constituted a vertical price-fixing violation of the Sherman Act because 
retailers were independent distributors which bore economic risks). 
 162.  Harrison, supra note 92, at 1148. 
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of its own goods.  After all, one should have the right to choose how one 
disposes of one’s own property.  This argument, which is premised on a 
distinction between sale and non-sale transaction, was however firmly 
rejected by the Supreme Court in GTE Sylvania.163  The Sylvania court noted 
that “[n]or is there even an assertion in the [Schwinn] opinion that the 
competitive impact of vertical restrictions is significantly affected by the 
form of transaction.”164  This observation seems to be equally applicable to 
a regular RPM scheme and one implemented through a consignment system. 
II.       JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE AGREEMENT REQUIREMENT IN 
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS 
Before exploring whether an agreement is necessary for establishing a 
vertical restraint, it is important to define an agreement.  In the context of 
horizontal agreements, Kaplow defined an agreement as “a harmony of 
opinion, action, or character.”165  He further explained that “[a] harmony of 
opinion exists when there is a meeting of the minds”166, a phrase which 
appears frequently in the discourse on the notion of agreement, especially 
horizontal agreements.167  The Supreme Court imported this concept into the 
realm of vertical restraints in Monsanto, holding that to prove the existence 
of a vertical price fixing agreement after dealer termination, the plaintiff 
must adduce evidence that indicates “a unity of purpose or a common design 
and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement.”168  
Kaplow described meeting of the minds as “a metaphorical phrase that 
directs attention to parties’ subjective states.”169  By adopting this 
metaphorical phrase, the concept of agreement focuses not on the parties’ 
action, but on their subjective state of mind, which may entail examination 
of issues such as what the parties were thinking at the time of the agreement, 
their motives for entering into the agreement, and how willing they were to 
enter into the agreement.  Much of the discourse on agreement has taken 
place in the horizontal context.  It turns out that there are substantial 
differences in the role played by the concept of agreement in the horizontal 
and the vertical contexts such that the horizontal approach to agreement may 
not be suitable for and directly transposable to the vertical context. 
 
 163.  GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. at 54. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Louis Kaplow, On the Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law, 99 
CAL. L REV. 683, 705 (2011).  
 166.  Id. 
 167.  See American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946) (using the phrase to 
characterize a horizontal conspiracy). 
 168.  Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 (quoting Am. Tobacco Co., 328 U.S. at 783). 
 169.  Kaplow, supra note 165, at 707. 
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A. Purpose of the Agreement Requirement 
Why does antitrust law attach so much importance to the concept of 
agreement in the application of Section 1?  The simplest answer is that it is 
a statutory requirement.  Section 1 states that “[e]very contract, combination 
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to 
be illegal.”170  Courts have encapsulated the concepts of contract, 
combination, and conspiracy in the overarching notion of agreement and 
deemed an agreement to be a prerequisite for the application of Section 1.171  
This of course does not answer the question.  The fact that an agreement is 
required by the statutory language does not indicate what purpose the 
concept is supposed to serve, which in turn affects how it should be crafted 
and applied. 
The requirement of an agreement may serve a number of purposes.  
First, it may be used to draw the boundary between multilateral conduct and 
unilateral conduct.  Section 1 does not prohibit unilateral conduct and only 
forbids conduct involving more than one party.  One justification for 
distinguishing multilateral conduct from unilateral conduct is that “conduct 
of a single firm is less threatening than that engaged in by a collective.”172  
While this assertion has a great deal of intuitive appeal and is a widely-
accepted mantra in antitrust law, upon deeper reflection, it is unclear why it 
is so.  What determines the quantum of competitive harm that can be inflicted 
by particular conduct is the degree of market power wielded by the party or 
parties involved.  It cannot be true that a single firm with 90% market share 
is capable of less competitive harm than ten firms each possessing 2% market 
share.  Therefore, it cannot be categorically asserted that concerted action is 
inherently more anticompetitive than unilateral conduct. 
Even if it was accepted that concerted action is more dangerous than 
unilateral conduct, an agreement would not be necessary to allow the parties 
to pool together their market power.  If parties act in the same manner against 
the same firms or customers, their conduct will produce the same effect 
regardless of whether they have an agreement or not, however an agreement 
is defined.  If, for whatever reason (some of which will be addressed 
subsequently), it is decided that it is important to distinguish between 
deliberate pooling of market power and mere parallel conduct, this concern 
is much more relevant in the horizontal context as opposed to the vertical 
context. 
 
 170.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 171.  Lawrence A. Sullivan & Warren S. Grimes, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN 
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK § 5.2 (2000). 
 172.  Id.  
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While there is aggregation of market power in the horizontal context,173 
— and it may be necessary to distinguish between problematic and 
permissible aggregation — vertical restraints do not result in the pooling of 
market power.  In fact, Judge Posner characterized vertical restraints as 
“unilateral abuses of market power.”174  Without an aggregation of market 
power, the need to distinguish between problematic and permissible 
aggregation disappears.  Furthermore, the need to distinguish between 
multilateral and unilateral conduct in the vertical context is much less urgent.  
The notion of agreement hence plays a much less important role in vertical 
restraints. 
The second possible purpose to be served by the agreement requirement 
is to determine the extent of voluntariness in the parties’ actions.  This is one 
of the issues that follows from focusing on the parties’ subjective minds.  
Based on Kaplow’s definition of agreement as harmony of opinion, action, 
or character, one would assume that an agreement represents voluntary 
assent to the joint enterprise.  This is probably true in the context of 
horizontal agreements.  Except for extreme scenarios in which a firm is 
coerced into joining a cartel by more powerful firms in the market, most 
horizontal agreements are fully voluntary.  Therefore, the degree of 
voluntariness is usually not an issue in horizontal restraint cases.  Voluntary 
assent, however, cannot be taken for granted in vertical restraints.175 
The simple reason is that while the supplier’s interest and the dealer’s 
interest may not fully align, an agreement may nonetheless be formed 
because of one party’s reliance on the business relationship.176  In the RPM 
 
 173.  See Burns, supra note 61, at 11 (stating that horizontal arrangements combine 
otherwise competing firms’ market power, while vertical arrangements do not increase market 
power); Correia, supra note 53, at 210 (“Horizontal agreements may create market power by 
allowing firms acting jointly to raise prices over competitive levels when a single firm cannot.  
This ability to create market power through agreements among competitors is the basis of the 
concern about horizontal agreements generally.”); Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 1 
(“[H]orizontal agreements concern us because they may create market power that did not 
previously exist.  The ordinary cartel agreement creates market power by consolidating the 
price [and] output choices of firms that otherwise lack power over output or price.”). 
 174.  Richard A. Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 229, 
229 (2005). 
 175.  See Burns, supra note 61, at 13-14 (stating that while horizontal agreements 
generally involve a common plan for the common benefit of the participating firms, vertical 
agreements do not necessarily include such unity of purpose and may even be undesirable for 
dealers upon whom manufacturers place restraints); Calvani & Berg, supra note 9, at 1165-
66 (stating that in the horizontal context, competitors acting in concert have a common 
economic interest, while in the vertical context, the economic interests of manufacturers and 
vendors may conflict). 
 176.  See Burns, supra note 61, at 14-15 (identifying three scenarios within manufacturer-
imposed vertical restraints in which a dealer could be pleased, indifferent, or opposed to the 
restraints but still must participate in the agreement because of its reliance on the 
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context, a dealer may disagree with a minimum resale price because it wishes 
to be a no-frills price cutter.  A dealer may disagree with the minimum resale 
price because it believes that the price is set too low and estimates that a 
higher level of service than is supported by the current minimum resale price 
would attract more customers and increase sales. 
A dealer may also disagree with an RPM scheme because it is used to 
facilitate a manufacturer cartel.  If the dealer level of the market is 
competitive, the dealers will only earn a competitive return, and the supra-
competitive profit generated by the cartel will only go to the suppliers or 
manufacturers.  In the meantime, the upstream cartel will reduce downstream 
sales and hence dealer revenue.177  Conversely, the dealers may organize a 
cartel and require a supplier or manufacturer to police it through an RPM 
scheme.  The supplier will be hurt by this cartel as downstream sales will fall 
as a result of the cartel.  If the supplier can only charge a competitive 
wholesale price and does not get to share the profit from the dealer cartel, 
the supplier will be worse off and will oppose the RPM scheme.178 
In the horizontal context, when the interests of the two parties are not 
aligned, there will be no joint enterprise.  In the vertical context, however, 
an agreement could still be formed despite the partial misalignment of 
interests.  Parties to a vertical agreement may need each other’s business so 
much that the gains from a continual trading relationship outweigh the loss 
from the misaligned interests.  For instance, a dealer may determine that 
reduced sales as a result of a manufacturer cartel are still better than no sales 
from that manufacturer.  Or a supplier may decide that reduced upstream 
sales as a result of a dealer cartel are better than no sales at all if it abandons 
all dealers.  Due to the multitude of financial considerations which may go 
in opposite directions in the vertical context, an agreement does not mean 
that there is full, voluntary assent.  A party may have accepted a vertical 
agreement grudgingly. 
The foregoing discussion is particularly relevant to the coercion theory 
of agreement.  It suggests the futility of inquiring into the degree of coercion 
to which the party is subject to.  Unless there is complete alignment of 
interests between the supplier and the dealer in the use of RPM, or at least 
indifference to its use, there is always a degree of coercion involved in a 
party’s participation in an RPM scheme.  Therefore, if the search for an 
agreement is meant to determine the extent to which the parties consent to 
the RPM scheme voluntarily, the exercise is likely to be a pointless one.  An 
inquiry into the degree of coercion would be fruitful if it provided useful 
information on the competitive effects of the RPM scheme.  There is, 
 
manufacturer). 
 177.  Id. at 15-16.  
 178.  Id. 
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however, unlikely to be a direct correlation between the competitive harm of 
an RPM scheme and the degree of coercion involved. 
Coercive measures may be necessary to secure compliance when the 
counterparty resists.  Assuming that it is a supplier-imposed RPM scheme, 
the supplier will implement coercive measures when the dealer refuses to 
abide by the RPM scheme.  This will happen when the two parties have 
similar levels of bargaining power, their economic interests with respect to 
the RPM scheme diverge, and the supplier’s threat to terminate a non-
compliant dealer for some reason lacks credibility, which causes the dealer 
to test the waters by resisting.  Therefore, the degree of coercion reflects the 
parties’ relative bargaining power, the extent to which the parties’ interests 
coincide, and the credibility of the threat to terminate the relationship.  The 
question is whether any of these factors shed light on the competitive effects 
of an RPM scheme. 
A supplier may have a great deal of bargaining power because it has 
substantial market power in the market or because its product is a must-carry 
product for the dealers.  A dealer may wield substantial bargaining power 
because it is a prominent retailer with substantial market share or it is a 
quality-certifying retailer which is particularly important to a supplier selling 
high quality products.179  All this information may be relevant to the analysis 
of the likely competitive effects of an RPM scheme.  However, as opposed 
to trying to deduce such information indirectly from the degree of coercion, 
it would be much more straightforward to extract the information directly 
and apply it in the competitive effects analysis. 
There is no clear correlation between the alignment of the parties’ 
interests and the likelihood of competitive harm of an RPM scheme.  It would 
seem that when RPM is used to facilitate a cartel, either at the supplier or the 
dealer level, supplier and dealer interests would clash.  Cartelization at one 
level would almost always reduce sales at the other level.  Meanwhile, if an 
RPM scheme is used by a powerful supplier or dealer to foreclose rivals, the 
counterparty would need to be sufficiently compensated so that it is worth 
its while to take part in the foreclosure strategy.  In that case, supplier and 
dealer interests would likely be aligned.  There is similarly no discernible 
pattern in the alignment of the parties’ interests when an RPM scheme is 
used pro-competitively.  For instance, when an RPM scheme is used to 
prevent free riding or to certify quality, there are always some dealers that 
agree with the supplier and some price- cutting dealers that do not.  
Therefore, the alignment of the parties’ interests is not a useful indicator of 
 
 179.  See Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, Resale Price Maintenance and 
Quality Certification, 15(3) RAND J. ECON. 346 (1984) (arguing that RPM can be used in a 
procompetitive manner by preventing free-riding of a quality certifying retailer by other low-
cost retailers). 
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the competitive effects of an RPM scheme. 
The credibility of the threat to terminate depends on a range of factors, 
one of which is the clarity and firmness with which the consequence of non-
compliance has been communicated to the counterparty.180  If a supplier has 
made it firm and clear that it will terminate a non-compliant dealer 
immediately and the supplier’s product is important to the dealer, it will 
require not much coercion on the part of the supplier to secure compliance.  
The clarity of communication between the parties, however, tells us nothing 
useful about the likely competitive effects of an RPM scheme. 
The degree of voluntary participation in a joint enterprise could serve 
one function: to determine the degree of relative culpability of the parties.  
In Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., the Supreme Court 
was confronted with the issue of whether the defendant’s franchisees were 
barred by the common law defense of in pari delicto from suing the supplier 
over a range of allegedly illegal vertical restraints imposed by the supplier.181  
The concurring justices expressed a range of views on the extent to which 
relative culpability should bar recovery under antitrust law.182  Justice Fortas 
argued that a fellow member of a collusive scheme should not be allowed to 
“sue the other for discriminatory or restrictive practices which allegedly 
diminished its take from the enterprise.”183  Justice Marshall argued, 
“[W]here a defendant in a private antitrust suit can show that the plaintiff 
actively participated in the formation and implementation of an illegal 
scheme, and is substantially equally at fault, the plaintiff should be barred 
from imposing liability on the defendant.”184  The majority, however, seemed 
to have gone further than the concurring justices and proclaimed, “[N]othing 
in the language of the antitrust acts [] indicates that Congress wanted to make 
the common-law in pari delicto doctrine a defense to treble-damage 
actions[.]”185  In the remainder of the opinion, the Court seemed to have 
softened its stance and merely asserted that the plaintiffs should not be 
denied recovery “merely because they have participated to the extent of 
utilizing illegal arrangements formulated and carried out by others.”186  The 
Court proceeded to explain how the vertical restraints imposed in the case 
were against the franchisees’ interests and note that they only accepted these 
restraints to maintain their business relationship with the defendant.187 
 
 180.  It also depends on the extent to which the party can do without the counterparty, 
which ties back to some of the issues addressed under bargaining power.  
 181.  Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp. 392 U.S. 134, 135 (1968). 
 182.  Id. at 138-147. 
 183.  Id. at 147. 
 184.  Id. at 149. 
 185.  Id. at 138. 
 186.  Id. at 139. 
 187.  Id. 
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The lack of clarity concerning the precise scope of the holding 
notwithstanding, it is clear that the degree of voluntary participation should 
be a relevant consideration in determining the relative culpability of the 
parties.  It is difficult to dispute Justice Marshall’s view that a party that is 
equally at fault in the illegal scheme should not be allowed to recover from 
a fellow wrongdoer.  This, however, does not justify the imposition of an 
agreement requirement in every vertical restraint case.  The inquiry into 
agreement is not undertaken to determine relative culpability; it is done to 
decide whether a vertical restraint has been put in place.   In most vertical 
restraint cases, the issue of the plaintiff’s culpability does not arise.  There is 
no need to impose an agreement requirement in the vast majority of cases in 
which relative culpability is irrelevant.  Encapsulating the relative culpability 
inquiry in the agreement requirement is also logically questionable.  The fact 
that a party is much more at fault for the wrongdoing than the other party 
does not mean that a wrongdoing does not exist.  Therefore, the need to 
determine relative culpability does not justify an inquiry into the degree of 
voluntary participation under the rubric of the existence of an agreement. 
The third possible purpose to be served by the requirement of an 
agreement is to locate conduct that is subject to possible antitrust 
condemnation.  This suggests that the usual mode of analysis would be first 
to identify the existence of an agreement that may raise antitrust concerns 
and then to apply substantive analysis to determine the competitive effects 
of the conduct.  In reality, however, the existence of an agreement usually 
only matters when substantive harm has been observed and the question is 
whether it is produced by the proscribed conduct.  Therefore, the existence 
of an agreement is usually critical only when a particular outcome that is 
consistent with per se illegal conduct has been observed.  It is seldom a 
pivotal issue when the conduct is subject to the rule of reason because 
whether particular conduct took place does not immediately determine 
legality.  The agreement requirement is hence especially relevant in the 
horizontal context, where it is important to determine whether collusion 
exists from the observation of parallel pricing behavior. 
Courts and commentators have generally concurred that as a matter of 
substantive antitrust policy, parallel conduct by multiple parties does not run 
afoul of the law absent an agreement showing that the parties were acting 
with a common purpose or striving to achieve a common goal.188  Hence, 
 
 188.  A number of reasons inform this view, including the fact that price uniformity can 
be the result of both intense competition and collusion and the practical difficulties in crafting 
remedies.  But see Kaplow, supra note 165, at 809-14 (raising theoretical objections against 
allowing parallel conduct of multiple parties in case of no apparent agreement); Louis 
Kaplow, An Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 343, 346 (2011) (arguing 
that the harms of horizontal price fixing should be addressed by focusing on the extent and 
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when a firm raises price in response to a competitor’s price increase, the law 
needs to determine whether it does so pursuant to a common understanding 
with its competitor or only in accordance with its independent judgment 
about changes in market dynamics.  This is especially the case because the 
per se rule applies to horizontal price fixing.  The legality of parallel pricing 
behavior hinges on whether it is done with a common purpose or pursuant to 
a common scheme.  Once it is found that the defendants have agreed to fix 
prices, the inquiry ends.  Thus, the concept of agreement serves an important 
purpose in the horizontal context. 
The concept of agreement does not serve the same purpose in the 
vertical context.189  There is no need to distinguish between consciously 
parallel pricing behavior from deliberate concerted price increase.  When a 
dealer charges the minimum prices demanded by the supplier, there is no 
question that the dealer does so at the behest of the supplier, regardless of 
whether there is express communication between the parties or whether the 
result was accomplished solely through unilateral announcements.  The 
dealer is responding to the supplier’s demand and not reacting to changes in 
market dynamics upon exercising its own independent judgment.  A firm 
raising its price is part of the normal operation of the market and may not be 
an invitation to collude or part of a collusive scheme.  When a supplier 
demands a dealer to conform to minimum resale prices, there is no ambiguity 
as to what the supplier wants the dealer to do. Nor is it part of normal market 
operation.  It would be very difficult for antitrust law to prohibit a firm from 
raising or adjusting its prices and its competitor from responding to it.  The 
same difficulty is absent if the antitrust law wants to prohibit any attempt to 
impose an RPM scheme, either through unilateral announcements or 
concerted action. 
The one plausible argument in defense of drawing a distinction between 
unilaterally imposed and concerted RPM schemes is the preservation of 
trader freedom, which is the argument made by the Supreme Court in 
Colgate.190  However, the invocation and endorsement of the trader freedom 
argument in the RPM context and its rejection elsewhere in antitrust, such as 
cartel conduct and monopolization, is arbitrary and incapable of a principled 
justification.  Robinson argues: 
[I]t is the central purpose of antitrust law to interfere with trader 
 
duration of the pricing, not on the means of achieving the price). 
 189.  Commentators have noted that the concept of agreement serves different purposes in 
the horizontal and the vertical restraint contexts.  Burns, supra note 61, at 3 (“[T]he Court has 
unthinkingly transplanted the language and learning of horizontal agreements into the vertical 
context, with the result being that the Court’s rationale for scrutinizing vertical restraints is 
now at odds with the law of vertical agreements.”); Robinson, supra note 24, at 597.  
 190.  United States v. Colgate Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
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freedom where it causes social harm; any distinction between 
unilateral and concerted action-’agreement’ in the broadest sense 
of that term-must depend, therefore, on an assessment that the two 
types of action have different consequences rather than on notions 
of mercantile freedom.191 
In short, the agreement requirement cannot be justified solely on the 
basis of boundary setting between permissible and illegal conduct divorced 
from substantive policy considerations. 
When the per se rule applies to particular conduct, it is perhaps 
inevitable that the concept will be laden with substantive content.  After all, 
we are trying to conduct the formal and the substantive analysis 
simultaneously.  When the rule of reason applies, however, there is no reason 
for the agreement requirement to be used as a proxy for substantive analysis.  
The substantive analysis can be conducted after the formal identification.  
The separation of formal identification and substantive analysis means that 
the sole purpose of the concept of agreement is to serve as an identification 
device — to identify situations in which the substantive issues may arise.  If 
two different forms of conduct may produce the same effect, the 
identification device should identify both as candidates for further 
examination.  The legality of particular conduct can no longer be premised 
on such a formal concept as the existence of agreement.  It must be 
determined with reference to substantive antitrust considerations, i.e., 
whether the conduct creates consumer harm.  Antitrust has always been 
about substance, not form.  Formal devices cannot be applied in such a way 
that they obscure substantive policy objectives of antitrust.  This is especially 
true for vertical restraints.  Robinson notes, “The existence or nonexistence 
of a vertical agreement is altogether irrelevant to the kind of public injury 
that the antitrust laws are designed to prevent.”192 
To sum up, the agreement requirement cannot be justified by the need 
to distinguish between multilateral and unilateral conduct in the vertical 
context because of the absence of aggregation of market power in vertical 
restraints. It also cannot be justified as a tool to assess the degree of coercion 
in an RPM scheme because absent complete alignment of the parties’ 
interests, there is always some degree of coercion in every RPM scheme and 
because the degree of coercion is not an accurate indicator of competitive 
harm.  The appropriate purpose of the agreement requirement is to serve as 
a device for identifying the locus of possible competitive harm.  However, 
the identification of an agreement is much less important in the vertical 
context where the rule of reason applies across the board after Leegin.  Given 
 
 191.  Robinson, supra note 24, at 581.  
 192.  Id. at 581.  
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that the competitive effects of particular conduct will be assessed after 
substantive analysis, the concept of agreement should no longer draw 
arbitrary distinctions between situations that produce the same substantive 
effects.  If unilaterally imposed and mutually agreed RPM schemes produce 
the same substantive effects, they should be treated similarly by the formal 
identification device. 
B. Evidentiary Issues 
There are some evidentiary issues concerning the proof of an agreement 
in the vertical context.  The first is the question of which agreement counts.  
One major difference between horizontal restraints and vertical restraints is 
that it is not necessary for competitors to enter into agreements with each 
other in order for markets to operate.  If the agreement is a bona fide 
cooperative agreement between competitors, such as a joint venture, the 
issue of agreement usually does not arise.  There is no question that the 
parties have agreed to start a collective venture.  If the agreement were a 
cartel agreement, then the discovery of any agreement between them would 
result in condemnation.  Thus, in the horizontal context, when the existence 
of an agreement is an issue, the proof of an agreement usually determines 
liability.  In the vertical context, under the Colgate doctrine, the issue of 
agreement arises against the backdrop of a supply agreement between the 
supplier and the dealer.  As Professor Hovenkamp has argued, if one were to 
apply the approach to cartel agreements in the vertical context, it would 
amount to the evisceration of the agreement requirement.193  By definition, 
an agreement must exist in the vertical context.  Therefore, the plaintiff 
would need to show not only that there is an agreement between the supplier 
and the dealer, but that there is an agreement that would attract liability.194  
If the alleged conduct was RPM, the plaintiff would need to show that the 
supplier and the dealer agree to set minimum resale prices.  What 
complicates matters is the fact that there is likely to be regular 
communication between the supplier and the dealer over a variety of issues, 
and they share the common goal of increasing sales of the product.195 
The task of identifying the agreement that attracts liability is made more 
difficult by the fact that the Supreme Court has been rather cavalier about 
which agreement counts for the purpose of liability.196  The Court’s approach 
 
 193.  Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 2.  
 194.  Burns, supra note 61, at 10.  
 195.  Correia, supra note 53, at 190.  
 196.  Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 12 (“A curiosity of many dealer-complaint cases is 
their failure to identify the nature and content of the alleged complainer-manufacturer 
agreement.”); Correia, supra note 53, at 199 (noting that the Monsanto court failed to 
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to the identification of agreement can be categorized into two situations: 
direct proof of an RPM agreement and inference by dealer termination.  In 
the direct proof situation, the Court has resorted to the following: an 
agreement to fix resale prices either with the non-compliant dealer197 or the 
compliant dealers; an agreement with third parties, including wholesalers 
and third-party agents, to enforce an RPM scheme;198 an agreement with 
wholesalers and dealers to report on non-compliant dealers;199 and even an 
agreement with the customers of a non-compliant dealer.200 
In the dealer termination context, the Court has examined the possibility 
of an agreement with a complaining dealer to terminate a non-compliant 
dealer,201 and an agreement to fix resale prices in conjunction with an 
agreement to terminate a non-compliant dealer.202  It was argued earlier that 
in the context of dealer termination, it is unnecessary to identify an 
agreement between the supplier and a complaining dealer to terminate the 
non-compliant dealer or an RPM agreement between the supplier and the 
complaining dealer.  The focus should be on whether the supplier would have 
terminated the non-compliant dealer but for dealer complaints.  As for the 
direct proof context, one cannot help but feel that there is a degree of 
artificiality in premising liability for resale price maintenance on the 
agreements between the supplier and various parties to enforce the RPM 
scheme.  It is almost as if the Court has observed the result of uniform resale 
prices and sets about looking for an agreement, any possible agreement, 
within the RPM scheme to satisfy the agreement requirement for liability.  If 
the purpose of the agreement requirement is to identify the locus for 
competitive harm, however, these agreements with third parties to enforce 
the RPM scheme should not matter. 
One way to rationalize the Court’s use of these agreements to establish 
liability is to deem an agreement to enforce an RPM as circumstantial 
evidence from which one can infer the existence of an agreement to fix resale 
prices.  The probative value of these agreements, however, is likely to be 
limited. Evidence of enforcement mechanisms indicates the existence of an 
RPM scheme; otherwise, there would be nothing to enforce.  However, it 
does not tell us whether the scheme was the result of an illegal agreement or 
a unilaterally announced policy.  One may argue that enforcement 
mechanisms would need to be more elaborate in the latter case because if the 
 
articulate the precise agreement at issue).  
 197.  See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 163 (occurring at the moment the non-compliant dealer 
capitulates and complies with the supplier’s demand.).   
 198.  Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 163; Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. at 45. 
 199.  Beech-Nut Packing, 257 U.S. at 446. 
 200.  Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 163.  
 201.  Bus. Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. at 722. 
 202.  Id. at 726-27. 
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dealers had agreed to the scheme in the first place, they were more likely to 
comply with it, resulting in less need for active policing.  That would be true 
if the RPM scheme were equally in the dealers’ interests as the supplier’s 
interest.  But as was previously discussed, it need not be true.  It is important 
to bear in mind the prisoner’s dilemma facing dealers.  The dealers have great 
incentive to cheat because if every other dealer but himself abided by the 
RPM scheme, he would stand to profit handsomely.  Therefore, an 
enforcement mechanism would be necessary even for an RPM scheme 
produced by an agreement. 
In any case, even if it were accepted that a unilaterally imposed RPM 
scheme required more active enforcement, it would be very difficult to 
determine the appropriate threshold for such enforcement.  The answer is 
likely to be so case-specific that using an agreement to enforce an RPM as 
circumstantial evidence is unlikely to be a fruitful endeavor.  Therefore, if 
identification of an agreement were to be a meaningful exercise, it should be 
the RPM scheme itself that should be the subject of identification, not other 
ancillary agreements.  Obviously, all this confusion concerning what is the 
appropriate agreement to be used to satisfy the agreement requirement would 
be obviated if one no longer insisted on an agreement in RPM cases. 
Another evidentiary issue is the relevance of parallel conduct.  This 
issue carries over from the horizontal context, within which one of the central 
issues for the agreement requirement is to what extent one can infer an 
agreement from parallel conduct.203  In the vertical context, the parallel 
conduct spoken of is usually dealer complaints and termination by the 
supplier.  By the same logic, it may be tempting to conclude that parallel 
conduct on its own should not constitute a vertical agreement, as some 
commentators have argued.204  It is worth pointing out, however, that parallel 
conduct is a bit of a misnomer in the vertical context.  In the horizontal 
context, two competitors charge the same price or raise the price by the same 
amount; their conduct is literally parallel.  In the vertical context, the supplier 
and the dealer do not undertake parallel conduct.  Only the supplier can 
terminate the non-compliant dealer; the complaining dealer cannot.  
Therefore, the most that can be said about the situation is that there is parallel 
intention or preference on the part of both the supplier and the complaining 
dealer as they desire the same outcome: the termination of the non-compliant 
dealer. 
If an agreement is interpreted as a meeting of the minds, it admittedly 
can be a bit of a stretch to infer an agreement from parallel conduct.  The 
same conduct may be motivated by different intentions or the same intention 
 
 203.  Floyd, supra note 18, at 279.  
 204.  Id. 
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arrived at independently.  However, in the vertical “parallel conduct” 
scenario, we know that both parties desire the same outcome.  They both 
want the non-compliant dealer terminated.205  Yet in the vertical context, not 
only do we demand common intentions among the parties to establish an 
agreement, we also demand common motivations.  We require that the 
supplier and the complaining dealer desire the same outcome for the same 
reason.  They both want to terminate the price-cutting dealer, not because he 
was free-riding, but because they want to shield the complaining dealer from 
legitimate price competition.  In other words, they want to terminate the 
price-cutting dealer for an anticompetitive reason.  This heightened 
requirement is a concession to the fact that, in the context of RPM, the same 
intention can be motivated by an anticompetitive or a pro-competitive 
reason.  And we do not want to penalize a supplier for wanting to terminate 
a free-riding dealer. 
A number of comments are in order.  First, this is another example of 
substantive considerations seeping into a formal definition issue.206  When 
the per se rule applied to RPM, there was no proper analysis of the 
substantive issues.  There was no proper consideration of whether the RPM 
scheme was justified by prevention of free-riding.  Therefore, the Court 
indirectly incorporated this analysis in the agreement issue.  However, the 
agreement issue is not the proper place for considering the applicability of a 
substantive defense, especially when full analysis of it is now possible under 
the rule of reason.  It is therefore questionable whether the heightened 
requirement of common motivation is still justified.  Second, even if this 
requirement were to be retained, it should only apply to situations in which 
free riding is plausible.  It has been pointed out that for many goods and 
services subject to RPM, there is no sales or after-sales service to speak of.207  
In the absence of such service, there is no free riding concern.  A stricter 
definition of agreement that aims to distinguish between anticompetitive and 
pro-competitive dealer termination would no longer be justified. 
Third, if an agreement is interpreted as a meeting of the minds, then 
common intentions should indicate an agreement.  This means that every 
time a dealer complains about another dealer and the supplier agrees with the 
complaining dealer and terminates the non-compliant dealer, there would be 
an agreement.  This basically would cover every dealer termination scenario.  
 
 205.  Id. at 278 
 206.  See Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 5 (explaining that the court must first define its 
concept of an agreement before analyzing questions of motive).  
 207.  See Marina Lao, Resale Price Maintenance: A Reassessment of its Competitive 
Harms and Benefits, in MORE COMMON GROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW? 59, 
75, 80 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2011) (explaining that the market provides a wide array of 
options, one of which includes low-service stores, which provide little retail service, to suit 
customers’ price and service needs).  
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This may raise concerns because it may be feared that it would open 
floodgates to dealer termination suits, which the Supreme Court was so eager 
to control in Monsanto and Business Electronics.  This concern, however, is 
overblown because the fact that an agreement is found in every dealer 
termination situation does not mean that every instance of dealer termination 
is illegal.  The substantive analysis that is removed from the formal issue of 
agreement can be reincorporated in a later stage to consider the competitive 
effects of dealer termination.  It is here where the justification of dealer 
termination, such as the prevention of free riding, is considered.  As argued 
earlier, if the supplier can prove that its termination decision was motivated 
by free riding concerns, the plaintiff will have failed to satisfy the but-for 
standard in the proposed analytical framework for dealer termination cases. 
Eschewing the requirement of common motivations helps to remove an 
artificial barrier to dealer termination suits, which presently require a 
plaintiff to show that the termination was motivated by an improper reason 
— either by showing there is a separate vertical price fixing agreement or 
other means — when it is possible that no plausible claims of free riding can 
be made.  Instead, in the substantive analysis stage, once the plaintiff has 
shown that he was terminated due to his price-cutting and that the 
complaining dealer’s business is more important to the supplier than the non-
compliant dealer’s business, the burden shifts back to the defendant to justify 
the termination by alternative reasons. 
Parallel conduct is not confined to dealer termination.  It is also found 
in the initial establishment of an RPM scheme through unilateral 
announcements of policy.  When a supplier announces the minimum resale 
prices it wishes its dealers to charge and the dealers comply, one may 
characterize it as parallel conduct.  This is subject to the same qualification 
that it is not the conduct that is parallel — the supplier and the dealers did 
not undertake the same action — but the intention that is parallel.  They both 
share the intention to put in place an RPM scheme under which every dealer 
would charge the minimum resale prices.  Under the Colgate doctrine, this 
common intention would not constitute an agreement. Again, we need to 
know that the common intention is motivated by the same motive.  Professor 
Hovenkamp argued that “[i]f unilateral termination of a price cutter because 
of price cutting does not constitute an agreement, then no agreement exists 
unless there is a motive for and evidence of the manufacturer’s agreement 
with some third party.”208  He further argued that the notion of motive cannot 
be considered in the abstract: “[A] motive to affect resale prices (1) is not 
meaningful unless we distinguish resale price control as such from 
preventing free riding on important services provided by other 
 
 208.  Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 5. 
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dealers . . . .”209  In other words, Professor Hovenkamp advocated the 
incorporation of substantive analysis into the definition of an agreement in 
the initial RPM agreement context just as the Supreme Court has done in the 
dealer termination context.  The same criticisms that have been made above 
apply equally here.  Formal and substantive issues should be kept separate.  
If substantive considerations were to be incorporated into the definition of 
agreement, it should only be done when free riding is a pertinent concern.  
And lastly, if an agreement is understood to be a meeting of the minds, 
common intention should suffice to establish an agreement and the 
substantive analysis should be undertaken subsequently.  In other words, 
under this conception of an agreement, it is difficult to draw a distinction 
between a unilaterally imposed and mutually agreed RPM. 
III.       VARIOUS THEORIES OF AGREEMENT UNDER THE COLGATE 
DOCTRINE 
The foregoing arguments suggest that there are no strong justifications 
for drawing a sharp distinction between unilaterally imposed RPM and RPM 
obtained through agreements and insisting on an agreement in vertical 
restraints.  What follows is an examination of the various theories on 
agreement presented in the case law to determine whether there is any 
coherent internal logic to the concept of agreement encapsulated in the case 
law.  It will be shown that not only does the concept of agreement lack 
convincing justifications in the vertical context, there is also no sound and 
internally consistent way to distinguish between the absence and presence of 
agreement. 
A. Coercion Theory 
The coercion theory is probably one of the most prominent theories 
presented in the pre-Monsanto case law on the existence of an agreement.  
The crux of the theory is that if the defendant does not rely on the inherent 
attractiveness of its product to obtain compliance with its suggested retail 
prices, but instead undertakes additional coercive measures to secure 
compliance, there is an agreement to implement the RPM and is hence 
illegal.210 
The coercion theory has a long lineage.  In Bausch & Lomb, the 
 
 209.  Id. at 4. 
 210.  See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 54 (1960) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that the majority found that the defendant impermissibly brought 
about compliance with prices by cutting off wholesalers who continued to sell to price-cutting 
retailers, and seeking assurances from retailers that they would comply with prices).   
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Supreme Court characterized what Beech-Nut had done in the Beech-Nut 
case as coercion through its special agents.211  In Simpson, the Court again 
described what Parke, Davis had done in that case as coercion, asserting that 
“[w]e made clear in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. [citation 
omitted] that a supplier may not use coercion on its retail outlets to achieve 
resale price maintenance.”212  The Court further observed that the leasing 
system in place in Simpson was coercive to the lessees because the lessees 
would not want to risk losing the leases.213  In Albrecht, the employment of 
third-party agents to take the dealer’s customers away and put pressure on 
the non-compliant dealer was also deemed to be coercive.214  What followed 
in the 1970s and 1980s were a number of appellate court decisions in which 
the Court relied on the concept of coerced compliance with an RPM scheme, 
without more, to substantiate the finding of an agreement.215  Commentators 
have disagreed on whether the coercion theory survived Monsanto.  Some 
have argued that it did not.216  Some have suggested that it did by referring 
to lower court cases since Monsanto that continued to use evidence of 
pressure or coercion as evidence that excludes the possibility of unilateral 
action under Monsanto.217 
An important issue that needs to be examined under the coercion theory 
is what is the relationship between coercion and the Colgate right to 
terminate a non-compliant dealer.  One would think that the greatest threat a 
supplier can use against a dealer is termination.  There is no greater coercion 
to which a supplier can subject a dealer.  This point is also related to the 
arbitrary distinction drawn by the Court between the inherent attractiveness 
of the product as opposed to coercive measures in Parke.  Recall that the 
Court in that case asserted that a supplier cannot use coercive measures, but 
must rely on the inherent attractiveness of its products to induce dealers to 
comply with its RPM policy.  The two are essentially one and the same.  
Coercive measures derive their effectiveness from the importance of the 
 
 211.  See United States. v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 722 (1944) (“The 
Beech-Nut Company, without agreements, was found to suppress the freedom of competition 
by coercion of its customers through special agents of the company, by reports of competitors 
about customers who violated resale prices, and by boycotts of price cutters.”). 
 212.  Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 17 (1964) (citation omitted).  
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co. v. 
Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
 215.  Floyd, supra note 18, at 292.  
 216.  See, e.g., id. at 298 (arguing that a literal reading of Monsanto says that “coerced 
compliance with a scheme of resale price maintenance, standing alone, is no longer a viable 
theory of antitrust combination or conspiracy”). 
 217.  See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 92, at 1146 (referring to Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys 
“R” Us, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Pa. 2008), as evidence that coercion continued to be 
a relevant consideration after Monsanto). 
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supplier’s business to the dealer.  The supplier can do no more than to halt 
the supply of the product.  It was noted earlier that the Supreme Court 
incongruently objected to the use of moderate coercion in cases such as 
Beech-Nut and Parke while endorsing the use of maximum coercion through 
termination in Colgate.  If the Colgate doctrine sanctions the use of the 
highest level of coercion, what can the coercion theory really mean?  One 
would assume that if coercion is to be the basis for determining when the 
Colgate right of termination has been exceeded, the benchmark would be 
whether a greater amount of coercion than termination has been used. 
A review of the case law suggests that in Beech-Nut and Parke the so-
called coercion condemned by the Court was not the use of greater coercion 
than termination, such as physical violence or sabotage, but the use of agents 
to monitor and implement compliance with a view of terminating non-
compliant dealers.218  In Simpson, it seems that the Court believed the 
coercion came from the threat of termination itself.219  In Albrecht, the 
coercion came from the use of third-party agents to put pressure on the non-
compliant dealer.220  Simpson’s characterization of coercion in that case was 
clearly inconsistent with the Colgate doctrine.  It effectively meant 
termination is coercion.  The method of coercion in Beech-Nut and Parke, 
Davis cannot be correctly described as coercion.  All that the defendant did 
was put in place measures to allow it to detect non-compliance and to 
exercise its Colgate right of termination.221  The defendants did not apply any 
more pressure than was inherent in the right of termination. 
Albrecht, however, presented an interesting case.  The defendant 
resorted to all those measures most probably because it did not want to 
terminate the non-compliant dealer.  This could be because the non-
compliant dealer was the best dealer in the relevant geographic area and thus 
the defendant needed it.  In other words, the defendant and the dealer had 
comparable bargaining power.  Or perhaps the defendant thought that its 
threat of termination was not credible and thus the dealer did not believe that 
the defendant would follow through.  The entire incident of employing third-
 
 218.  See FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing, 257 U.S. 441, 452 (1922) (holding that requiring 
distributors to resell products at standard prices, and refusing sale to non-compliant 
distributors was done in such a way to suppress competition); United States v. Parke, Davis 
& Co., 362 U.S. 29, 38 (1960) (ruling that enticing wholesalers to deny products to non-
compliant retailers constituted price-fixing, since customers did not willingly agree to prices 
as a matter of individual choice). 
 219.  See Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. at 13, 17 (1964) (holding that threat 
of termination of a lease agreement unless entering into a consignment agreement was an 
actionable wrong).  
 220.  See Albrecht 390 U.S. at 152 (demonstrating that securing compliance with resale 
prices by means in addition to mere policy announcement and refusal to deal would constitute 
an illegal combination to fix prices). 
 221.  Colgate, 250 U.S. at 304. 
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party agents to take away the dealer’s customers was to demonstrate to the 
dealer the consequences of termination.  Whether the defendant’s conduct in 
Albrecht should count as coercion would depend on whether the Colgate 
right of termination encompasses the right to demonstrate the consequences 
of termination.  Basic logic would suggest that if A goes beyond B, the right 
to do A would encompass the right to do B.  Moreover, if coercion was to be 
a coherent theory of agreement to delineate the boundary of the Colgate 
doctrine, the most sensible formulation of the theory would be that the 
defendant cannot exceed the amount of coercion inherent in termination.  If 
that is the case, it is clear that the amount of coercion entailed by a 
demonstration of the consequences of termination can be no greater than 
actual termination itself.  Therefore, the Supreme Court has failed to 
articulate persuasively the precise nature and scope of coercion that would 
take the defendant outside the protection of the Colgate doctrine.  What 
should count as coercion under a coherent theory of coercion would be, for 
example, the defendant’s threat to terminate multiple lines of business with 
the dealer following the dealer’s non-compliance of minimum prices in one 
line of business. 
Furthermore, the coercion theory is subject to the criticism articulated 
earlier that it is futile to inquire into the degree of coercion to which the 
parties are subject.  Unless there is a complete alignment of interests between 
the supplier and the dealer in the use of RPM, there is always a degree of 
coercion involved.  The degree of coercion also provides little useful 
information, such as the likelihood that the RPM scheme is being used 
anticompetitively or pro-competitively.  What the degree of coercion 
involved in an RPM scheme tells us is the relative bargaining power of the 
parties, the extent to which the parties’ interests coincide, and the credibility 
of the threat to terminate the relationship, none of which sheds light on the 
ultimate issue of the competitive effects of the RPM scheme. 
Ultimately, the greatest flaw of the coercion theory is its logical 
inconsistency.  If an agreement is understood to be a meeting of the minds, 
it signifies voluntary assent to a common course of action or joint enterprise.  
The more voluntary the assent is, the stronger the claim that the parties have 
agreed.  Under the coercion theory, however, the more coerced a party is to 
accede to the counterparty’s request, the more likely that there is an 
agreement.  In other words, coerced compliance gives rise to an agreement 
while willing compliance does not.222  This is obviously counter-intuitive.  If 
anything, as was argued in Perma Life Mufflers, it would seem that there is 
less of an agreement when one party is coerced because there is less free 
 
 222.  See Floyd, supra note 18, at 295 (stating that unwilling compliance should be sharply 
distinguished from willing compliance regarding a supplier’s suggested resale prices).  
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will.223  Robinson notes that “[i]t seems hardly necessary to argue that 
coercion of dealers is not only not the same as an agreement but also is 
inconsistent with the existence of an agreement taken in its ordinary sense to 
imply voluntary assent.”224  The reason for such a counter-intuitive theory is 
the conflation of the existence of an agreement with the blameworthiness or 
the anticompetitiveness of the conduct.  While it may make sense to say that 
the use of coercion to achieve one’s objective is objectionable and therefore 
may render it more problematic under antitrust law, it certainly does not 
make sense to say that the use of coercion creates an agreement. 
The incongruity of this notion is highlighted by the seemingly direction-
specific nature of this theory.  In the usual application of this theory, the 
supplier is the source of coercion.  But this need not be the case.  The source 
of coercion could be a powerful dealer.  According to the case law, when a 
supplier uses coercive measures to enforce an RPM scheme, there is an 
agreement.  In contrast, when a dealer exerts pressure on the supplier to 
terminate a price-cutting dealer, there is not necessarily an agreement.  One 
still needs to inquire whether the supplier terminated the non-compliant 
dealer on its own free initiative, or only due to pressure from the complaining 
dealer.225  While this is sound as a matter of substantive analysis, there is no 
logical basis as a matter of the coercion theory to distinguish between 
coercion from a supplier and that from a dealer.  Both could be equally 
coercive if coming from a party with a great deal of bargaining power.  The 
only explanation for this incongruous outcome is that coercion is being used 
as a proxy for substantive analysis, especially coercion originating from a 
dealer. 
B. Enforcement Theory 
The enforcement theory of agreement can be said to overlap with the 
coercion theory to some extent, since the Court seemed to define coercion as 
adopting additional measures to monitor compliance and put pressure on 
dealers.  The Court in Parke, Davis stated that the reason additional 
enforcement efforts are objectionable is because they coerce.226  The theory 
essentially determines the existence of an agreement based on the amount of 
 
 223.  See Robert Pitofsky & Kenneth W. Dam, Is the Colgate Doctrine Dead?, 37 
ANTITRUST L.J. 772, 778 (1968) (explaining that Colgate protection is more likely to apply 
when parties enter into an agreement voluntarily).  
 224.  Robinson, supra note 24, at 600.  
 225.  Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 6, 13 (contemplating the relationship between a 
termination and the cause).  
 226.  Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 46-47 (stating that organizing a conspiracy or combination 
of traders to promote compliance with suggested resale prices was sufficient additional to 
mere termination). 
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effort the supplier has exerted to implement, monitor, and police the RPM 
scheme.  The general idea is that the greater is the enforcement effort, the 
more likely that there is an agreement. 
A number of cases provide the basis for the theory.  The earliest case in 
which the Court can be said to have propounded the theory was Beech-Nut, 
in which the Court held that a company cannot rely on methods to secure 
compliance with an RPM scheme that are as effective as an express or 
implied agreement.227  The Court found particularly troubling conduct such 
as compiling lists of non-compliant dealers to which no supply was to be 
made, using salesmen and agents to monitor compliance, and using numbers 
and symbols to help track products.228  In Bausch & Lomb, the Court 
emphasized the defendant’s reliance on its wholesalers to enforce the RPM 
scheme.229  The Court also mentioned espionage, institution of a licensing 
scheme for retailers and exclusive reliance of licensed dealers, and the use 
of a protection certificate to identify non-compliant wholesalers.230  In Parke, 
Davis, it seems that the only additional enforcement effort the defendant 
undertook — apart from soliciting compliance from retailers directly not to 
advertise discounted products, which would clearly count as an agreement 
— was the use of wholesalers to help police the RPM scheme.  Finally, the 
Albrecht court objected to the defendant’s recruitment and use of third-party 
agents to solicit the non-compliant dealer’s customers and to serve these 
customers.231 
A review of these cases suggests certain trends in the case law in what 
the Supreme Court finds problematic.  First, the Court clearly objected to the 
use of third parties, be they unrelated agents or wholesalers, to solicit 
compliance.  Second, the Court seemed to take issues with monitoring 
efforts, either by own employees or third-party agents, of dealer compliance 
or through the use of measures that allow tracking of products.232  Third, the 
Court seemed to have problems with the institution of a formal punitive 
mechanism through the compilation of offender lists or other means. 
One central issue in the enforcement theory is the delineation of 
permissible and impermissible enforcement efforts and measures.  In his 
 
 227.  FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 455 (1922). 
 228.  Id. at 456.  
 229.  United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 723 (1944). 
 230.  Id. at 721. 
 231.  See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 147 (objecting to the use of a  solicitation service). 
 232.  See Carl H. Fulda, Individual Refusals to Deal: When Does Single-Firm Conduct 
Become Vertical Restraint?, 30 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 590, 604-05 (1965) (defining 
unilateral refusal as acceptable when detection of price cutting is unsolicited and solely the 
result of the manufacturer’s own effort); see also Pitofsky & Dam, supra note 223, at 779 
(arguing that even techniques like open and systematic shopping done solely by the seller can 
still be construed as means extending beyond Colgate rights). 
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dissent in Parke, Davis, Justice Harlan argued that the defendant’s 
enforcement efforts were much less elaborate in that case than in Beech-Nut 
and Bausch & Lomb and did not warrant condemnation.233  In fact, 
commentators have argued that after Parke, Davis, what was within the 
scope of permissible conduct was unilateral announcement of policies and 
refusal to deal with non-compliant dealers.234  Drawing the line of 
permissible enforcement measures at the very boundary of the Colgate 
doctrine itself is certainly possible.  However, doing so would defeat the 
purpose of the theory if it was meant to delineate the boundary between 
concerted action and unilateral conduct beyond the Colgate doctrine.  It is 
not even clear if this boundary is logically consistent.  Termination of a non-
compliant dealer constitutes an enforcement measure, and perhaps the most 
heavy-handed one at that.  If the enforcement theory prohibits any 
enforcement effort, it should prohibit termination as well.  That would 
effectively amount to the repudiation of the Colgate doctrine.235  Under this 
formulation of the theory, the only permissible exercise of the Colgate right 
would be in the initial selection of dealers.  Presumably the refusal to make 
an initial selection of a dealer constitutes more as the institution rather than 
enforcement of an RPM scheme.  This is effectively the theory pursued by 
the FTC in the Russell Stover case.236  The enforcement theory also seems to 
contradict the essence of the Colgate doctrine.  If the doctrine stands for the 
proposition that at least some RPM schemes are permissible, then it is not 
clear why efforts to enforce them should render these schemes illegal.  This 
is tantamount to giving someone a legal right but prohibiting him from 
enforcing it.  Allowing a firm to adopt RPM must entail giving it the power 
to adopt reasonable measures to implement it. 
Assuming that Justice Harlan was correct and Parke, Davis had in fact 
gone too far, then it is worth trying to delineate the scope of permissible 
enforcement.  The case law is quite clear that the use of agents is 
impermissible.  While one may concede that the use of agents to inflict 
 
 233.  See Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 55-56 (explaining that unilateral behavior otherwise 
permissible should not be deemed impermissible due to similar unilateral action at the retail 
level).  But see Beech-Nut, 257 U.S. at 455 (holding that an organized, effective enforcement 
effort constituted unfair methods of competition); see also Bausch & Lomb, 321 U.S. at 723 
(inferring from the aggressive, widespread, highly organized programs that this was 
impermissible conduct). 
 234.  See Kathryn A. Kusske, Refusal to Deal as a Per Se Violation of the Sherman Act: 
Russell Stover Attacks the Colgate Doctrine, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 463, 471-72 (1984) (arguing 
that after Parke, Davis, the Colgate doctrine only protected two manufacturer actions: the 
right to announce policy, and the right to refuse to deal with noncompliant retailers). 
 235.  See Colgate, 250 U.S. at 304 (1919) (holding that a company may unilaterally 
withhold or terminate business without violating antitrust law).  
 236.  See Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (1983) (holding that a candy 
manufacturer’s mere refusal to sell at certain prices did not constitute unlawful coercion). 
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punishment on a non-compliant dealer crosses the line, it is much harder to 
defend the condemnation of the use of wholesalers.  The reliance on 
wholesalers to police and give effect to an RPM scheme may merely reflect 
the fact that the supplier does not deal with the retailers directly and must go 
through wholesalers to sell to retailers.  In that case, there is no way a supplier 
can terminate a non-compliant dealer without making use of the wholesaler.  
There is simply no direct relationship between the supplier and the retailer 
to terminate.  The only way supply to the offending retailer can be terminated 
is by instructing the wholesaler to stop selling to the retailer.  There is no 
way for such a supplier to exercise its Colgate right without going through 
its wholesalers.  As argued earlier, if the Court were to outlaw the use of 
wholesalers in the implementation of an RPM scheme, the Court would be 
effectively offering preferential treatment to firms that deal directly with 
their retailers.  This may be merely a function of the industry structure or the 
nature of the product.  A rule that allows firms dealing directly with their 
retailers but not those dealing with retailers through wholesalers to impose 
RPM is arbitrary at best and lacks any sound economic justification. 
The Court’s prohibition of monitoring effort and adoption of punitive 
mechanisms such as an offender’s list is equally perplexing.  If the Colgate 
doctrine allows a supplier to terminate a non-compliant dealer, it must by 
implication allow the supplier to make effort or put in place a system to 
detect non-compliance.  Otherwise, the Colgate right of termination would 
ring hollow.  Therefore, the use of employees or third parties to monitor 
compliance and the institution of a system to track products cannot be a basis 
for finding an illegal agreement.  This is especially true after Monsanto, 
which clearly sanctioned the use of dealers to monitor compliance of other 
dealers.237  There is no logical reason to allow the use of dealers on the one 
hand and to prohibit the use of employees and other third parties on the other 
hand.  It is also unclear what is objectionable about compiling a list of 
offenders which may be subject to termination.  Such a list may serve two 
functions.  One is to let wholesalers know which retailers they are to stop 
selling to.  If the use of wholesalers to implement an RPM scheme is allowed, 
the supplier must be permitted the means to communicate with its 
wholesalers concerning implementation, such as to whom the wholesalers 
can sell.  Another function is to warn offending dealers about possible 
termination.  If a supplier is allowed to terminate a non-compliant dealer, 
surely it must be allowed to give advanced warning to such a dealer prior to 
termination.  In short, none of the bases upon which the Court attempted to 
distinguish between permissible and impermissible enforcement are tenable.  
If the enforcement theory were to form the basis for delineating the boundary 
 
 237.  Correia, supra note 53, at 202. 
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of permissible unilateral conduct, there must be a logically consistent and 
defensible principle for distinguishing permissible from impermissible 
enforcement. 
C. Effectiveness Equivalence Theory 
The effective equivalence theory has not been as widely propounded as 
the coercion theory and the enforcement theory.  Its genesis lies in the Beech-
Nut case, in which the Supreme Court proclaimed that “[t]he specific facts 
found show suppression of the freedom of competition by methods in which 
the company secures the co-operation of its distributors and customers, 
which are quite as effectual as agreements express or implied intended to 
accomplish the same purpose.”238  Levi notes that this proclamation from the 
Court introduced significant uncertainty to the Colgate doctrine.239  The 
notion that methods of implementation that are as effective as an express or 
implied agreement will be condemned was reaffirmed in Parke, Davis, in 
which the Court made reference to the holding in Beech-Nut that firms 
cannot use methods of implementation that were as effective as agreements 
to obtain compliance with an RPM scheme.240 
There are a number of problems with the theory.  First, the theory 
assumes that express and implied agreements only have one level of 
effectiveness, which is obviously not true.  Without clearly identifying the 
kind of agreement that would be the comparator for the application of the 
theory, the theory provides little practical guidance on what constitutes 
permissible unilateral conduct.  Second, the effectiveness of an agreement 
obviously depends on its enforcement mechanisms.  An agreement under 
which the defendant is allowed to employ a full range of enforcement 
mechanisms will surely be more effective than if the defendant is confined 
to suing for breach of contract.  Therefore, the effectiveness equivalence 
theory is necessarily tied to the enforcement theory and cannot be 
meaningfully applied without resolving the fundamental question under the 
enforcement theory.  And once one has resolved the question of permissible 
enforcement mechanisms, it is questionable how much the effectiveness 
equivalence theory adds to the analysis.  More fundamentally, the 
effectiveness equivalence is at odds with the Colgate doctrine.  The basic 
premise of the Colgate doctrine is that methods of implementing an RPM 
 
 238.  Beech-Nut, 257 U.S. at 455. 
 239.  Levi, supra note 9, at 321.  
 240.  Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 42 (1960); see also Levi, supra note 9, at 278 (“Mr. Justice 
Brennan’s opinion for the Court in Parke, Davis sketched the growth of the relevant segment 
of resale price doctrine through three stages. . . [including] the proposition that illegality may 
be caused by any methods as effectual as agreements.”).  
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scheme which may have the same effectiveness could result in different legal 
consequences.  An RPM scheme implemented by an implied agreement may 
be no more effective than one publicized by a unilateral policy 
announcement and enforced by threat of termination, but the former is illegal 
while the latter is not.  Therefore, the effectiveness equivalence theory 
cannot be applied to determine the boundary of the Colgate doctrine. 
D. Economic Interest Theory 
The economic interest theory can be attributed to Justice Harlan’s 
dissent in Albrecht, in which he argued that it was erroneous for the majority 
to infer an agreement between the newspaper publisher and the agents 
because the latter had no economic interest in the success of the defendant’s 
vertical price ceiling scheme.241  Justice Harlan further rejected the claim that 
there could be an agreement among the different dealers of the publisher 
because the dealers did not share any common economic interest.  Whether 
one dealer complies with the price ceiling scheme mattered little to other 
dealers.242  He noted that “the effectiveness of a price ceiling imposed on one 
distributor does not depend upon the imposition of ceilings on other 
distributors, be they competitive or not.”243  He concluded by stating that 
“[f]or the manufacturer who purports to act unilaterally in dictating a 
maximum price really is acting unilaterally.  No one is economically 
interested in the price squeeze but himself.”244  Perma Life Mufflers also 
endorsed the economic interest theory.245 
There are difficulties with Justice Harlan’s argument.  As argued earlier, 
it is clear that the third-party agent had an economic interest in the 
agreement, the agreement being the one in which the publisher paid the agent 
to undertake work to undermine the non-compliant dealer.  In fact, there was 
no question that there was an agreement between the publisher and the agent.  
While it is true that the agent had no interest in the success of the vertical 
maximum price fixing scheme, the disconnect results from the fact that the 
majority used an ancillary agreement as a substitute for what should be the 
agreement at issue, the price fixing scheme.  Justice Harlan’s argument was 
an indirect criticism of the majority’s cavalier choice of agreement to focus 
on.  But it was plainly incorrect to say that there was no agreement between 
the publisher and the agent. 
The presence of congruent economic interests is a necessary but not a 
 
 241.  Albrecht 390 U.S. at 161. 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id. at 163. 
 245.  Perma Life Mufflers, 392 U.S. at 138. 
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sufficient condition for the finding of an agreement.  The fact that the parties’ 
economic interests converge does not mean that they necessarily have an 
agreement.  Meanwhile, the converse is probably true.  The absence of 
congruent economic interests may negate the existence of an agreement.  
Therefore, the most that the economic interest theory can do is to serve as a 
screen for plausible agreements.  If the parties do not share economic 
interests in a common outcome, there is probably no agreement between 
them.  The theory, however, does not provide a basis for positive 
identification of an agreement. 
It is important to caution against a deep inquiry into the economic 
interests of the parties.  Economic interests inform motives.  When we ask 
whether the parties share common economic interests, we are effectively 
asking whether they have the motive to enter into an agreement.  It was 
argued earlier that inquiring about motives at the stage of determining the 
existence of an agreement amounts to a premature consideration of 
substantive issues.  In many instances, motives are used as a proxy for 
competitive effects.  When it is now possible to weigh the anticompetitive 
effects and pro-competitive benefits openly under the rule of reason analysis, 
there are scant justifications for persisting with the outdated practice. 
E. Implied Acceptance Theory 
The implied acceptance theory has an illustrious academic pedigree.  As 
early as the 1960s, Professor Turner asserts that: 
[i]f a manufacturer induces acquiescence by his distributors in a 
policy of resale price maintenance, he has created a series of tacit 
vertical agreements, and it seems wholly irrelevant to that 
conclusion that he obtained these tacit agreements by threats of 
refusal to deal, carried out against those who refused to 
acquiesce.246 
The rationale is that the practical effects of the conduct are the same 
regardless of whether compliance was secured by an agreement or refusal to 
deal.247  Professor Hovenkamp reiterates Turner’s sentiment when he argues 
that, on the theory of an implied acceptance of the supplier’s terms, “a 
vertical agreement can be found when there is an announced condition or its 
equivalent on future dealing, the sanction for noncompliance is credible, and 
the market effects are proved or presumed to be similar to those of express 
 
 246.  Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious 
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 689 (1962). 
 247.  See id. at 688 (stating that practically there is no difference between compliance 
secured by an agreement or refusal to deal). 
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agreements.”248 
The Supreme Court can be said to have implicitly endorsed the theory 
on at least two occasions, Bausch & Lomb and Parke, Davis.  In Bausch & 
Lomb, the Court noted that the wholesalers: 
[A]ccepted Soft-Lite’s proffer of a plan of distribution by 
cooperating in prices, limitation of sales to, and approval of retail 
licensees. That is sufficient. . . . Whether this conspiracy and 
combination was achieved by agreement or by acquiescence of the 
wholesalers coupled with assistance in effectuating its purpose is 
immaterial.249 
In Parke, Davis, the Court similarly found an agreement when the 
wholesalers acquiesced to help implement the RPM scheme by refusal to 
deal.250 
Professor Hovenkamp posits that the defendant may attempt to dispel 
the notion of an agreement by making very clear that “it makes no offer, 
requests no acceptance, and desires no dealer commitment with respect to 
the goods on hand” or arguing that the unilateral policy announcement only 
serves to provide “fair notice to dealers who might otherwise claim unfair 
surprise when terminated. . .”251 If the implied acceptance theory is to have 
any meaningful application, it cannot be circumvented simply by resorting 
to semantic arguments. How the defendant characterizes its action — non-
solicitation of offer or fair notice — does not change the nature of its action, 
which is indirectly to seek compliance with its conditions. 
While the implied acceptance theory comports with common sense, 
there is a very fine line between the application of the implied acceptance 
theory and a repudiation of the Colgate doctrine.252  The Supreme Court itself 
acknowledged that what is permitted under Colgate results in the same 
economic effects as an illegal agreement.253  Hovenkamp himself 
 
 248.  Hovenkamp, supra note 24 at 7. 
 249.  Bausch & Lomb, 321 U.S. 707, 723 (1944). 
 250.  See Parke, Davis, 362 at 45 (finding that the wholesaler’s refusal to deal to retailers 
who did not adhere to Parke Davis’ suggested retail price was a violation of the Sherman Act 
because of an implied agreement between Parke, Davis and the wholesalers). 
 251.  Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 7. 
 252.  See Burns, supra note 61 at 19 (“Certainly, an implicit agreement in some sense was 
present in the Colgate situation insofar as the manufacturer made his wishes known and the 
conforming retailers went along because they knew that they had to comply in order to 
continue receiving goods.”); see also Fulda, supra note 232 at 595 (“The notion that any 
retailer who accepts goods for distribution with knowledge of the manufacturer’s 
announcement as to observance of retail prices gives an implied promise to comply may be 
logical, but, as a general proposition, it is irreconcilable with Colgate, which allows advance 
announcements of the circumstances under which the manufacturer would refuse to deal.”). 
 253.  See Parke, Davis 362 U.S. at 44 (offering a distinction between permissible and non-
permissible agreements under Colgate even though they have the same economic effect).  
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acknowledges this, and concedes that to reconcile the theory with the 
Colgate doctrine, one must interpret the doctrine as not granting an absolute 
right of refusal to deal.  His suggestion is to reformulate the Colgate doctrine 
as only permitting simple enforcement of the announced condition, which 
essentially amounts to refusal to deal, and precluding complex enforcement, 
which covers the range of enforcement measures prohibited by the cases 
from Beech-Nut to Parke.254 
There are a number of difficulties with this reformulation.  First, if the 
benchmark for equivalence is practical or market effects, there is no reason 
to accord different treatment to simple enforcement and complex 
enforcement.  The fact of the matter is that regardless of the enforcement 
mechanism, degree of coercion, or other details of implementation of an 
RPM scheme, if the scheme achieves its intended result, it produces the same 
market effects.  Therefore, drawing a distinction between simple and 
complex enforcement is inconsistent with the very basis of the theory.  
Second, if the theory is formulated to accommodate only simple 
enforcement, it amounts to a restatement of the Colgate doctrine and adds 
nothing to it.  In that case, the theory performs no useful function.  Lastly, 
under the suggested reformulation, the theory effectively morphs into the 
enforcement theory with all its attendant problems.  If the determinant of 
legality is to be the amount of enforcement, one would be better off adopting 
the enforcement theory and focus on the relevant issues head-on. 
Another possible reformulation of the theory to accommodate the 
Colgate doctrine is to focus on the amount or nature of individualized dealing 
between the supplier and the dealer.  Such conduct may include targeted 
announcement of the condition of compliance to a non-compliant dealer, 
warning of detection of non-compliance, perhaps in the form of a circulation 
of the offenders’ list as in Beech-Nut, or even reinstatement of a terminated 
dealer after reassurance by the dealer of future compliance.  It is certainly 
plausible to argue that when such individualized communication has taken 
place, the parties have reached an agreement.  When a targeted 
announcement or an individual warning is made, a strong argument can be 
made that the supplier is actively soliciting compliance from a specific 
dealer.  Reinstatement of a dealer in exchange for reassurance of compliance 
encapsulates an agreement.255  However, if that is where the implied 
 
 254.  See Hovenkamp, supra note 24 at 8 (suggesting that there is a distinction between 
simple and complex refusals to deal). 
 255.  See Warren S. Grimes, The Path Forward After Leegin: Seeking Consensus Reform 
of the Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 467, 489-90 (2008) (“The 
termination of a discounting dealer and, after a relatively short period, its reinstatement might 
constitute a non-verbal understanding or agreement on resale pricing that nullifies the 
defense.”); see also Fulda, supra note 232 at 596 (“Manufacturers should consequently be 
cautious in offering conditions under which dealings previously terminated would be 
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acceptance theory draws the line between permissible unilateral conduct and 
illegal concerted action, it does not add much to the conventional 
understanding of an agreement.  One need not resort to the theory to conclude 
that such individualized communication amounts to an agreement.  The kind 
of communication at issue verges very close to direct, explicit 
communication, which has always been a basis for agreement. 
F. Communication Theory 
The communication theory can be said to originate from footnote 9 in 
Monsanto, in which the Supreme Court asserted that: 
[t]he concept of ‘a meeting of the minds’ or ‘a common scheme’ 
in a distributor-termination case includes more than a showing that 
the distributor conformed to the suggested price. It means as well 
that evidence must be presented both that the distributor 
communicated its acquiescence or agreement, and that this was 
sought by the manufacturer.256 
In essence, this footnote requires communication in which the 
manufacturer seeks compliance and communication in which the dealer 
offers compliance.  There is some ambiguity as to the nature of 
communication required.  Hay argues that this requirement is tantamount to 
mandating a formal offer and acceptance and that implied acceptance no 
longer suffices.
257
  In fact, after Business Electronics, it is not even enough 
to show that there was an express discussion between the supplier and the 
dealers about prices.  It must be shown that there was an agreement about 
price or price level.  This was affirmed in the Fifth Circuit Leegin case after 
remand from the Supreme Court.  In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that 
there was an agreement between Leegin and its dealers on price in light of 
evidence of discussion of special occasion discounts between them in 
Hawaii, the Fifth Circuit held that “[a] manufacturer’s discussion of pricing 
policy with retailers and its subsequent decision to adjust pricing to enhance 
its competitive position do not create an antitrust violation or give rise to an 
antitrust claim.”258 
 
resumed, lest such negotiations, if successful, be interpreted as contracts rather than unilateral 
announcements.”); Pitofsky & Dam, supra note 223 at 779 (“The distributor who fails to abide 
by the seller’s conditions cannot be restored — at least not for a substantial period of time — 
because acceptance by the distributor of his old status rightly will be viewed as an assurance 
of compliance.”). 
 256.  Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764, (1984).  
 257.  See Hay, supra note 10, at 435 (suggesting “that something close to a formal offer 
and acceptance is necessary, and that the distributor’s mere adherence to the suggested price 
is not an adequate acceptance”). 
 258.  PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 420 (5th Cir. 
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The communication theory imposes a very high threshold for 
establishing an agreement.  If the commentators and the lower courts have 
interpreted Monsanto and Business Electronics correctly, it essentially 
requires nothing short of an express agreement that stipulates the resale price 
level.  This is nothing short of a sea change in the law on vertical agreement.  
This approach is commendable in the sense that it provides a very clear 
standard for determining the existence of an agreement.  It is arguably a 
mirror image of the Colgate doctrine, which can be read to suggest that 
anything more than unilateral policy announcement together with 
enforcement by a refusal to deal amounts to an illegal agreement.  Under the 
communication theory as propounded in Monsanto, anything short of an 
express agreement on price is permissible unilateral conduct.  However, such 
a theory suffers from many drawbacks.  It is economically unsound, and is 
inconsistent with prior case law on vertical agreements and horizontal 
agreements.  First, as noted by Hay, there is no reason to distinguish between 
an RPM scheme achieved by an express agreement and other methods from 
an economic perspective because their economic effects are the same.259  
While this argument can be applied to any attempt at line drawing between 
unilaterally imposed RPM and an illegal RPM agreement, it carries 
particular weight in this instance because an insistence on a formal 
agreement on price elevates form over substance, which has long been 
frowned upon by the antitrust law.  One cannot place a greater premium on 
formality than what is allegedly required under the communication theory. 
This insistence on formality in the vertical context has been repudiated 
by the Supreme Court since Schrader’s Son, when the Court declared that an 
agreement in the vertical context can be expressed or implied.260  This 
assertion has been repeatedly given express or implicit affirmation by the 
Court ever since.  Floyd argues that Monsanto has implicitly overruled these 
decisions.  He further argues that the communication theory is much less 
defensible than other attempts to articulate a theory on vertical agreements.261  
There are strong arguments that the Court should not be deemed to have 
 
2010).   
 259.  See Hay, supra note 10, at 435 (stating “the economic effect of the distributors’ 
compliance is identical to that of a formal agreement”).  
 260.  See United States v A. Schrader’s Son Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 99 (1920) (distinguishing 
between a company that indicates its wishes regarding prices and formal agreements, express 
or implied).  
 261.  See Floyd, supra note 18, at 300 (“In terms of the policies underlying antitrust 
conspiracy doctrine, the line that the Commission attempted to draw in Russell Stover 
between coerced acquiescence and willing compliance with suggested resale prices is much 
more defensible than the Supreme Court’s dictum in Monsanto, which rests the question of 
illegality on whether the supplier sought and obtained a ‘communication’ of acquiescence or 
agreement.”). 
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repudiated decades of case law and such a strongly established rule without 
detailed examination of the case law and an explicit overrule. 
There are a number of ways to reconcile the language in Monsanto with 
the decades of case law on vertical agreement.  First is the acknowledgement 
that the Monsanto court did not go as far as Hay argues and did not actually 
require express communication.  Implied or indirect communication would 
still suffice and footnote 9 in Monsanto was not meant to change the decades 
of case law on how an agreement can be proved, at least in so far as the 
supplier’s and the dealer’s conduct can be construed as communication.262  
Second, as previously argued, a more careful reading of Monsanto and 
Business Electronics suggests that the holding of those two cases were meant 
to be limited to dealer termination cases.  They were not meant to disturb the 
ways in which an agreement can be proved in cases absent dealer 
termination.  As Hay observes, “[T]he Monsanto Court seems to confer an 
elevated independent status for the manufacturer’s right to refuse to deal.”263  
The merit of such an elevation notwithstanding, it at least amounts to 
recognition that dealer termination cases are meant to be treated differently 
from other RPM cases.  Lastly, and most importantly, whatever strict 
approaches the Court adopted in Monsanto and Business Electronics were 
clearly motivated by the per se rule prevailing when those cases were 
decided.  Once the per se rule has been overruled, there are no good 
justifications for treating RPM cases and dealer termination with such 
circumspection and for adopting such a cautious approach to the proof of an 
RPM agreement.  Once all these arguments are accepted and it is conceded 
that implicit communication may give rise to an agreement, the 
communication theory amounts to nothing more than our conventional 
understanding of agreement applicable to both horizontal and vertical 
restraints. 
In conclusion, none of the theories on agreement put forward by the 
case law are logically coherent or theoretically sound nor do they provide 
meaningful guidance on how to distinguish between permissible unilateral 
conduct and illegal concerted action.  The attempt to draw a line between 
these two concepts under the Colgate doctrine remains beset with ambiguity.  
Perhaps the only logically defensible line one can draw is at the doctrine 
itself, under which the defendant is allowed to unilaterally announce its 
policy and terminate non-compliant dealers without any further engagement 
or communication, and nothing more. 
 
 262.  However, this may open to question the continual validity of the enforcement theory 
and the effectiveness theory, under which it is hard to characterize triggers for the application 
of the theories as communication.  
 263.  Hay, supra note 10, at 435.  
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IV.       ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AN AGREEMENT REQUIREMENT 
Having established that there is no logically coherent and theoretically 
sound basis for drawing the boundary between permissible unilateral 
conduct and illegal concerted action under the Colgate doctrine, it remains 
to be determined whether there is any economic basis for the doctrine.  A 
number of commentators such as Hay and Justice Brennan in Parke, Davis 
have acknowledged that focusing on the economic effects of the conduct, 
there is no clear distinction between the conduct permitted by the doctrine 
and that which is prohibited.264  A closer examination of the various 
economic theories and models confirms the observation that the notion of 
agreement serves no important function as far as the analysis of economic 
effects is concerned.265 
A. Economic Theories of Harm for RPM 
A variety of theories of harm have been proposed for RPM in the 
economic literature.  In general, the theories can be categorized under two 
headings: those involving cartels or coordinated action, either at the supplier 
or the dealer level, and those involving a powerful supplier or dealer 
exercising market power.  In the first category, the two most prominent 
theories of harm are the facilitation of a supplier cartel and the facilitation of 
a dealer cartel.  However, RPM does not only harm competition when a cartel 
is involved.  It can harm competition between firms at the supplier level 
when multiple firms employ RPM, even in the absence of a cartel.266  In the 
second category, RPM may harm competition when a powerful dealer uses 
it to foreclose innovation in distribution and when a powerful supplier uses 
it to foreclose rival access to effective distribution channels.267  Even in the 
absence of foreclosure, RPM employed by a single firm can still harm the 
welfare of inframarginal consumers when certain conditions are met. 
 
 264.  Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 512 (conceding that the economic effects of unlawful 
concerted actions under Colgate are the same as lawful individual conduct). 
 265.  See Robinson, supra note 24, at 592 (arguing that Jean Burns “perceptively” shows 
that there is no connection between the vertical agreement and the anticompetitive effects of 
resale price maintenance). 
 266.  See Robert L. Steiner, How Manufacturers Deal With the Price-Cutting Retailer: 
When are Vertical Restraints Efficient?, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 407, 407 (1997) (arguing that it 
frequently benefits the manufacturer to adopt restraints voluntarily, in the absence of cartels, 
and that these actions can adversely affect competition by creating barriers to entry of new, 
more efficient retailers). 
 267.  See id. (explaining that what might be privately efficient for a manufacturer might 
retard the entry of more efficient retailers). 
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1. Facilitation of Supplier Cartel 
Telser first articulated the possibility that RPM can be used to facilitate 
a supplier or manufacturer cartel.268  More recently, Jullien and Rey explain 
the function played by RPM in a supplier cartel as follows: 
The basic idea is that, because manufacturers can more readily 
observe rivals’ retail prices than rivals’ wholesale prices, RPM 
helps manufacturers to detect deviations from a collusive 
agreement.  Whenever manufacturers cannot perfectly infer 
wholesale prices from retail prices, they may find it more effective 
to collude directly on retail prices through RPM. . . .  Under RPM, 
retail prices are centrally set by the manufacturer and thus do not 
fully adjust to these local shocks on the retail environment.  As a 
result, retail prices are more uniform under RPM and deviations 
from an agreement are thus easier to detect, which facilitates 
collusion.269 
RPM also reduces the incentive to cheat in a supplier cartel.  Secret 
discounts to retailers become less profitable as the retailers cannot pass on 
the discounts to increase sales.270  Offering secret discounts to retailers will 
only lower the supplier’s revenue. 
According to Jullien and Rey, fixed resale prices are not without costs.  
The price rigidity resulting from RPM would prevent prices from adjusting 
to local shocks.271  Moreover, RPM may render collusion more fragile as 
defections may become more attractive as flexible prices allow the suppliers 
to take advantage of the retailers’ local information.272  Therefore, when 
deciding whether to employ RPM to facilitate the detection of collusion, the 
supplier faces a trade-off.  Flexible prices generate higher profit and stabilize 
collusion but make it more difficult to detect defections.273  Fixed prices 
remove price fluctuations resulting from local cost changes or demand 
shocks, thereby stabilizing the supplier cartel.274  RPM would not be 
 
 268.  Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 
96-99 (1960). 
 269.  Bruno Jullien & Patrick Rey, Resale Price Maintenance and Collusion, 38 RAND J. 
ECON. 983, 985 (2007). 
 270.  See Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Leegin and Procompetitive Resale Price 
Maintenance, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 349, 359 (2010) (Elzinga & Mills I) (“If manufacturers 
who engage in price fixing enforce RPM agreements with their retailers, the profitability of 
offering secret discounts to those retailers is reduced.”). 
 271.  See Jullien & Rey, supra note 269, at 985. 
 272.  Id. 
 273.  See id. (arguing that flexible retail prices generate higher profits but make it more 
difficult to detect deviations from tacit collusion). 
 274.  See Frank Mathewson & Ralph Winter, The Law and Economics of Resale Price 
Maintenance, 13 REV. IND. ORG. 57, 65 (1998) (arguing that RPM can enhance cartel stability 
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worthwhile if the monopoly price level was sustainable without RPM.275  It 
also would be difficult to sustain if local shocks were very important.276 
Facilitation of supplier cartels is obviously harmful from a competition 
perspective.  Jullien and Rey show in their model that RPM is likely to be 
detrimental to consumer welfare as average prices will increase 
substantially.277  RPM is particularly harmful when local shocks are mostly 
cost shocks and not demand shocks.278  In that case, RPM results in retail 
prices that are both higher on average and unresponsive to local cost 
fluctuations.279  Nothing in Jullien and Rey’s analysis requires a formal 
agreement.  All the effects they predict can result from the kind of unilateral 
conduct sanctioned by Colgate.280 
2. Facilitation of Dealer Cartel 
RPM can be used to facilitate dealer cartels, whereby the dealers 
effectively use the supplier as an enforcer of the cartel.281  Termination by 
the supplier will become the punitive mechanism for policing the cartel, 
which is probably one of the most effective enforcement mechanisms.  The 
dealers agree on a retail price among themselves and ask the supplier to 
impose the agreed price as the minimum resale price upon the dealers.282 
Correia describes a number of different scenarios for dealer cartels.  The 
first is an interbrand cartel, under which the colluding retailers require all 
 
by eliminating retail price variation). 
 275.  This may be possible already with two-part tariffs.  See Jullien & Rey, supra note 
269, at 992 (showing that RPM cannot be profitable when prices close to the monopoly level 
are already sustainable with two-part tariffs). 
 276.  See id. (demonstrating that RPM is unlikely to be profitable when local shocks are 
too important because the cost of price rigidity would offset any increase in collusive prices). 
 277.  See id. at 985 (arguing that RPM is likely to be undesirable because manufacturers 
will adopt it when doing so increases prices to a point that reduces consumer welfare). 
 278.  Jullien and Rey asserted that “[i]t is well known that consumers and society as a 
whole prefer retail prices that adjust to cost shocks but not to demand shocks.”  Id. at 995. 
 279.  See id. (concluding that RPM results in prices that are both higher on average and 
nonresponsive to cost conditions). 
 280.  Even though in their model, Jullien and Rey describe the manufacturer as offering a 
contract, it is clear that what this contractual offer entails is merely a declaration of the terms 
on which the manufacturer will deal with the dealers.  There is no need for negotiation or 
express or implied communication of acceptance.  All that matters is that the dealers adhere 
to the announced conditions.  See id. at 986-87 (setting forth a model of agreement that 
simplifies negotiations and formal agreement processes). 
 281.  See Elzinga & Mills I, supra note 270, at 359 (stating that “retailers enlist 
manufacturers as a cartel’s enforcer and use the manufacturer’s RPM policy as a cover for the 
cartel’s own price-fixing conspiracy”). 
 282.  See Calvani & Berg, supra note 9, at 1184 (explaining that resale price maintenance 
serves as a monitoring mechanism to police recalcitrant cartel members). 
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brand manufacturers to impose an RPM.283  The effect of such a cartel would 
be no different from a supplier cartel.284  Correia, however, argues that such 
a cartel is difficult to organize and maintain.285  The second is the 
conventional intrabrand cartel, under which only the prices for one supplier 
are fixed.286  The impact of such a cartel is less pernicious because consumers 
are still afforded other options, which should constrain the extent of price 
increase that the dealers can demand.  The third is parallel conduct by 
multiple dealers.287  A number of dealers may make the same demand on the 
supplier to raise resale prices.  Correia argues that such a situation presents 
great difficulty for antitrust enforcement as it could be the result of a cartel 
or completely legitimate requests from dealers to secure a normal return for 
their investments in sales and after-sales services.288  Such parallel requests 
need not be anticompetitive. 
The obvious question to ask is why a supplier would agree to facilitate 
a dealer cartel.  A supplier has nothing to gain from acquiescing to it.289  
Many commentators agree that for this theory of harm to be plausible, there 
must be an adequate account of the supplier’s incentive.290  For the dealers 
to be able to cajole the supplier into cooperating, they must collectively wield 
market power.  Baxter posits that this theory of harm would only apply if 
there were very few distributors and substantial difficulties which prevented 
the suppliers from introducing additional distribution outlets.291  Mathewson 
and Winter argue that one of the conditions for the dealer cartel theory is that 
 
 283.  See Correia, supra note 53, at 224 (describing interbrand cartels as arising when “the 
cartel pressures all the suppliers in a market to institute minimum dealer prices”).  
 284.  See id. (highlighting the similarities between interbrand cartels and supplier cartels).  
 285.  See id. at 225 (characterizing an interbrand dealer cartel as hard to organize and 
enforce).  
 286.  See id. (“Dealers from one supplier can, in theory, can pressure the supplier to impose 
RPM on all the dealers.”). 
 287.  See id. at 227.  
 288.  See id. at 228 (“When high price dealers demand that their suppliers terminate 
discounters, they may not be attempting to force retail prices over competitive levels in order 
to earn excess profits. They may simply be complaining that they cannot earn normal profits 
at the price charged by discount dealers.”).  
 289.  Calvani & Berg, supra note 9, at 1184 (stating that a resale price maintenance policy 
usually does nothing to support the manufacturer’s interests). 
 290. See, e.g., Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 179 at 347 (1984) (stating “A second 
requirement of an acceptable theory is that it establish some direct benefit to the manufacturer 
sufficient to warrant participation. While manufacturers sometimes capitulated to dealers’ 
pressure, such pressure is inadequate to explain manufacturers’ apparent fondness for 
RPM.”). 
 291.  See William F. Baxter, Vertical Restraints and Resale Price Maintenance: A ‘Rule 
of Reason’ Approach, 14 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 13, 24 (1982). (positing that if the 
number of potential distributors were very few and there were substantial difficulties 
preventing manufacturers from creating additional distribution outlets, distributors might 
employ RPM). 
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dealers have made substantial investments in traditional, low-volume outlets, 
which are threatened by the entry of discount outlets.292  The traditional 
retailers would then use a supplier-facilitated cartel to block the entry of the 
discounters to protect their quasi-rent.293  The dealer cartel theory is not 
without criticisms.  A number of commentators have noted that the theory is 
implausible given the conditions that are required for the theory to hold 
true.294 
Again, the use of RPM to facilitate a dealer cartel does not necessitate 
an agreement, especially after Monsanto and Business Electronics, which 
gave substantial leeway for dealer complaints about price-cutting dealers and 
legitimate communication between supplier and dealers even concerning 
prices.295  The kind of communication necessary for the dealers to have with 
the supplier to demand a supplier-facilitated cartel can be easily disguised as 
a dealer complaint.  In fact, if the Fifth Circuit Leegin case is an accurate 
indication of how courts will treat supplier-dealer communications in the 
future, dealers may not even need to disguise their request as a price 
complaint.  After the initial demand for a cartel has been conveyed, it can be 
arranged through the kind of unilateral conduct permitted under Colgate.296  
In short, the use of an RPM scheme to facilitate a dealer cartel can be 
achieved without an agreement. 
3. Cumulative Effects of Multiple RPM Schemes Absent Cartel 
Rey and Vergé show that even in the absence of an outright cartel, RPM 
can be used by multiple suppliers to coordinate their prices at the monopoly 
level.297  For the model to apply, there must be an interlocking relationship 
between the suppliers — they must sell through the same multi-brand 
 
 292.  See Mathewson & Winter, supra note 274, at 65 (using retail drug stores in the US 
and grocery outlets in Europe during the entry of large discounts as examples). 
 293.  See id. (describing the effect of this “cartelization” as the delaying or blocking of 
discount stores’ entry). 
 294.  See, e.g., Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, The Economics of Resale Price 
Maintenance, in 3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1841, 1846 (2008) (Elzinga & 
Mills II); Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 179, at 365.  
 295.  See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 (holding that standard for determining violation 
depended on direct or circumstantial evidence of a conscious commitment to a common 
scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective by the manufacturer and others); see also 
Business Electronics, 485 U.S. at (1988) (deciding that vertical restraints are not per se illegal 
without including some agreement on price or price levels). 
 296.  See Robinson, supra note 24, at 598 (explaining that a successful use of vertical 
restraints to affect a cartel depends on the supplier’s market power and monitoring ability, 
neither of which hinge on an agreement).  
 297.  Patrick Rey & Thibaud Vergé, Resale Price Maintenance and Interlocking 
Relationships, 58 J. IND. ECON. 928 (2010).  
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retailers — and the suppliers must be able to charge a two-part tariff, 
consisting of both a per-unit wholesale price for the product and a flat fee.298  
Monopoly prices will be achieved regardless of whether the retailers have 
market power.  The amount of retailer market power will only determine 
how the monopoly rent is split between the suppliers and the retailers.299  The 
function of the two-part tariff is to allow the suppliers to share in the 
monopoly profit — or even to expropriate the entire monopoly profit.300  The 
flat fee that the suppliers levy on the retailers is based on the overall revenue 
of the retailers, which includes sales of products of all brands.  This profit-
sharing mechanism causes the manufacturers to take into account the impact 
of their pricing decisions on other manufacturers, and prices to converge to 
the monopoly level.301  However, monopoly prices can only be attained in 
the absence of intrabrand competition among retailers.  Once retailers engage 
in intrabrand competition, retail prices will drop below the monopoly level 
and the manufacturers will raise wholesale prices so that they capture more 
of the overall profit through wholesale margin, rather than flat-fee profit 
sharing.302  According to Rey and Vergé, without RPM, 
[t]he existence of competition at both the upstream and 
downstream levels maintains retail prices below the monopoly 
level. This is because, as noted above, manufacturers only take into 
account the retail margin on rival products, and thus fail to account 
that a reduction in their own prices hurts their rival’s upstream 
profits. . . . The situation is then formally the same as if the two 
manufacturers were directly competing against each other.303 
This is where RPM comes in.  RPM eliminates intrabrand competition, 
which helps to maintain retail prices at the monopoly level, which in turn 
gives the manufacturers the incentive to keep wholesale prices at cost.  At-
cost wholesale prices minimize interbrand competition, as the manufacturers 
effectively pool their profits through the retailers and share them through the 
flat fees.304  In other words, interbrand competition is eliminated by the virtue 
of the interlocking relationships and the two-part tariff mechanism.  
Intrabrand competition is eliminated by the RPM, which helps to sustain 
monopoly prices.  In the presence of RPM, it is always possible for wholesale 
 
 298.  Id. at 930, 943. 
 299.  See id. at 945 (“In a double common agency situation, manufacturers must now 
ensure that retailers get at least as much as they could obtain by selling exclusively the rival 
brand; as we will see, this implies that manufacturers must leave a rent to retailers – that is, 
they cannot extract all the industry profits, even if they can make take-it-or-leave-it offers.”). 
 300.  Id. at 943. 
 301.  Id. at 930, 935. 
 302.  Id. at 930, 938. 
 303.  Id. at 936. 
 304.  Id. at 930, 937. 
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prices to be at cost and for retail prices to be at the monopoly level.305  Their 
model illustrates that upstream and downstream competition is interrelated.  
The lack of downstream intrabrand competition could curtail upstream 
interbrand competition.306  Rey and Vergé point out that these 
anticompetitive effects cannot be produced by other vertical restraints.307  
Even though RPM essentially creates an industry-wide cartel, there is no 
need for any industry-wide negotiation.308  In fact, all that is required is the 
setting of minimum resale prices that can be accomplished under the Colgate 
doctrine. 
4. Foreclosure by Powerful Supplier 
There are circumstances in which RPM can lead to anticompetitive 
outcome without the involvement of multiple suppliers.  The first one is 
when a powerful supplier uses RPM to foreclose rival suppliers by denying 
them access to effective distribution channels.309  The supplier effectively 
uses RPM to generate quasi-rent to purchase exclusivity or privileged access 
to distribution channels.310  This theory, however, only holds when a number 
of conditions apply.  First, there must be a limited number of distribution 
channels or a scarcity of prime retail locations.311  Otherwise, the supplier 
must be able to lock up a substantial portion of the distribution channels 
through its RPM scheme.312  The RPM scheme must be able to generate 
sufficient quasi-rent to compensate the retailers for the loss of sales from 
other brands, which in turn depends on the supplier’s market power.  If the 
supplier was a monopolist, it would have very strong ability to generate such 
rent.313  And since monopoly profit is greater than duopoly profit, a 
 
 305.  See id. at 938 (explaining that if RPM is allowed, then “[t]here always exists a 
symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which wholesale prices are equal to cost . . . retail 
prices are at the monopoly level. . . retailers earn zero profit and manufacturers share equally 
the monopoly profit”). 
 306.  Patrick Rey, Vertical restraints—an economic perspective, FISCALÍA NACIONAL 
ECONÓMICA, 28 (Oct. 13, 2012), http://www.fne.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Patrick-
Rey.-Vertical-Restraints.pdf [https://perma.cc/WAS3-HULF].  
 307.  Rey & Vergé, supra note 297, at 952-53. 
 308.  Id. at 930. 
 309.  See Elzinga & Mills I, supra note 270, at 360 (explaining that a manufacturer can 
use its RPM policy “to assure its retailers an attractive profit margin in implicit exchange for 
their deemphasizing or refusing to carry the goods of a competitor or new entrant”).  
 310.  Id. 
 311.  Rey, supra note 306, at 31.  
 312.  Elzinga & Mills II, supra note 294, at 1847.  
 313.  See Ittai Paldor, RPM as an Exclusionary Practice, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 309, 317-
18 (2010) (explaining that monopoly rents are generally larger than duopoly rents, and that 
monopolies leave industries with larger profits).   
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monopolist would always be able to share some profit with a retailer to 
exclude a rival that leaves both the monopolist and the retailer better off.314  
RPM has effectively become “a rent-shifting device.”315  Meanwhile, the 
more crowded the market is at the upstream level, the less likely it is that the 
supplier will be able to generate sufficient quasi-rent to share with the 
retailers.316  All this can be accomplished without an agreement.  As Paldor 
observes, for supplier exclusion of rivals through RPM to work, there is no 
need for an express agreement; a tacit agreement suffices.317  The supplier 
“may simply introduce RPM and rely on the incentives created by the system 
to assure that retailers carry only the incumbent’s product.”318  This is the 
kind of unilateral behavior permitted by the Colgate doctrine. 
5. Foreclosure by Powerful Dealer 
Another circumstance in which RPM can hurt competition in the 
absence of multiple-supplier involvement is if it is used by a powerful dealer 
to forestall price competition at the retail level.  This would be particularly 
pernicious if rivals were able to undercut the powerful dealer in price due to 
some innovation in distribution, the benefits of which RPM would prevent 
the rival dealer from passing on to consumers.319  In order for the powerful 
dealer to forestall competition from more efficient dealers, it must be able to 
persuade the supplier to terminate those dealers.  Again, one asks why the 
supplier would cooperate.  The answer must be that the dealer possesses a 
significant degree of market power.  Some of the conditions that are relevant 
to dealer cartels mentioned earlier would be equally relevant here.  In order 
for the dealer to wield that much market power, alternative and equally 
effective distributors must have difficulty entering the market.  In order for 
the powerful dealer to forestall competition and earn a supra-competitive 
profit, it needs to be able to eliminate more efficient rivals.  After Monsanto 
and Business Electronics, all this could be very effectively achieved without 
exceeding the boundary of the Colgate doctrine and creating an illegal 
agreement. 
 
 314.  Id. at 318. 
 315.  Id. at 315. 
 316.  See id. at 320 (asserting that when two, rather than one, competitors, exist, duopoly 
rents transform into “triopoly” rents, causing each firm’s share of the rents to drop from one-
half to one-third).  
 317.  Id. at 343. 
 318.  Id. 
 319.  Elzinga & Mills I, supra note 270, at 360 (asserting that retail price increases caused 
by RPM policy increase total welfare — even though they may only provide greater surplus 
to some consumers — as long as the gains to some consumers are greater than the losses to 
other consumers).  
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6. Harm on Inframarginal Consumers 
A supplier with some market power can cause consumer harm without 
attempting to foreclose rival suppliers or cartelize.  This can happen simply 
because different groups of consumer have disparate preferences for sales 
and after-sales services.  The idea that RPM can harm inframarginal 
consumers, even though it may benefit marginal consumers, originated from 
Michael Spence.320  The key insight is that when a firm tries to expand sales, 
it only focuses on the marginal consumers.321  However, the overall welfare 
effect of a firm’s policy depends on its impact on both the marginal and the 
inframarginal consumers.322  RPM may increase the welfare of the marginal 
consumers, but may reduce the welfare of inframarginal consumers by 
compelling them to pay a higher price for services that they do not need.  
Four conditions need to apply for this result to materialize: 
(1) [T]he manufacturer has some degree of monopoly power;323 (2) 
marginal consumers value the services stimulated by RPM and 
increase purchases despite the higher price; (3) intramarginal 
consumers do not find the services worth the higher price; and (4) 
the decreased utility of intramarginal consumers exceeds the 
increased utility of marginal consumers.324 
The inframarginal consumers are unlikely to be harmed in the presence of 
keen interbrand competition.  They can simply switch to an alternative brand 
if they are dissatisfied with the unwanted service foisted upon them.
325
 
The main idea is that marginal and inframarginal consumers have 
different preferences in terms of sales and after-sales services.  Marginal 
consumers are those who are on the fence about purchasing the product, and 
may therefore be particularly sensitive to any changes in price or quality-
adjusted price, which can be affected by the amount of sales and after-sales 
services.326  Meanwhile, inframarginal consumers are those whose valuation 
of the product exceed the current price and thus do not need extra services to 
 
 320.  A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality and Regulation, 6 BELL J. ECON. 417,425 
(1975). 
 321.  William S. Comanor & John B. Kirkwood, Resale Price Maintenance and Antitrust 
Policy, 3 CONTEMP. POL’Y ISSUES 9, 14 (1985) (“[V]ertically motivated RPM always benefits 
marginal consumers.”). 
 322.  Id.  
 323.  Id. 
 324.  Id. at 15; see also Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 179, at 371. 
 325.  Rey, supra note 306, at 13. 
 326.  William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the 
New Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983, 991 (1985) (explaining marginal and 
inframarginal consumers). 
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be enticed to purchase the product.327  Raising the price to induce extra 
services will be a waste from the perspective of these consumers, who would 
prefer to pay a lower price for the product with less service.328  Inframarginal 
consumers are likely to be knowledgeable consumers who do not require 
information and education at the store, while marginal consumers are likely 
to be relative novices to the product.329 
Whether an RPM scheme harms consumers overall thus depends on 
whether the gain of marginal consumers is outweighed by the harm to 
inframarginal consumers, which in turn depends on the relative size of the 
two groups of consumers and the difference between their relative valuations 
of the underlying product.330  Comanor argues that this means that there is a 
much weaker justification for RPM for established products, for which there 
is likely to be a higher proportion of knowledgeable consumers.331  Note that 
the kind of consumer harm described here does not depend on how the RPM 
scheme is put in place.  The same harm can result regardless of whether the 
RPM scheme is the result of a unilateral policy announcement or an illegal 
agreement. 
B. Economic Justifications for RPM 
A variety of justifications have also been offered for RPM.  In fact, 
within the economics literature, there seems to be a greater number of articles 
justifying than condemning RPM.  None of these justifications are premised 
on an RPM scheme being implemented through an agreement.  They would 
equally apply to an RPM scheme enacted through a unilateral policy 
announcement. 
1. Prevention of Free-Riding 
This is probably the most well-known of the justifications for RPM.  It 
was pioneered by Telser and has been elaborated and widely debated since.332  
The argument is probably too well rehearsed to warrant a full explanation 
here.  The idea is that a supplier would like the dealers to provide services to 
 
 327.  Id.  
 328.  Id. 
 329.  Id. at 992. 
 330.  See id. at 999 (“A second question is whether the losses suffered by infra-marginal 
consumers are likely to outweigh the gains to marginal consumers.  The answer depends on 
two related factors: the difference between the sizes of the two groups and the difference 
between their relative valuations of the underlying product.”). 
 331.  Id. at 1001. 
 332.  Telser, supra note 268, at 89-96.  
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increase sales.333  However, because of the difficulty in observing and 
verifying the provision of the services, the supplier cannot obtain these dealer 
services through a contractual arrangement.334  The supplier could choose to 
let the dealers decide whether they want to provide the services on their own 
and let them charge a higher retail price to recoup the costs of providing the 
services.  This, however, will not work because consumers will go to the full-
service dealers to learn about the product and obtain product demonstration, 
and go to the no-frills dealers to purchase the product at cheaper prices.  After 
a while the full-service dealers will realize that they are losing customers to 
the no-frills dealers and that it is no longer worth their while to provide the 
sales services the supplier wants.  The no-frills dealers are said to be free-
riding on the effort of the full-service dealers and the whole retail scheme 
unravels.  The free-riding explanation does not apply to every product.  Some 
products simply do not require any sales services.  According to Telser, new 
branded products335 and “old branded products purchased infrequently by 
relatively few households”336 are the prime candidates for RPM. 
Despite its widespread and intuitive appeal, some commentators have 
cast doubt on the applicability of the free riding explanation.  In Telser’s 
original conception, it was mostly applicable to sales services such as 
product demonstration.  It has since been extended from sales services to 
after-sales services.337  The free-riding explanation has much more limited 
validity with respect to after-sales services because the dealer can refuse to 
service a product it did not sell or charge separately for repair services.338  
Not every product requires sales services.  Yet RPM has been observed in 
many products that do not require such services, such as candies, pet food, 
jeans, shampoo, etc.339  It is mostly technically complex products that require 
such services.  Therefore, even if free riding does provide an adequate 
justification for RPM, it only does so for a limited subset of products. 
Apart from questioning the applicability of the argument to many 
products, commentators have also cast doubt on the link between higher 
retail margin and the provision of services desired by the supplier.  Klein and 
Murphy argue that the free-riding explanation is “fundamentally flawed”340 
 
 333.  Id. 
 334.  Id. at 94. 
 335.  Id. at 95. 
 336.  Id. at 95. 
 337.  Id. 
 338.  See Grimes, supra note 255, at 476.  
 339.  See Lao, supra note 207, at 80 
 340.  Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement 
Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1988) (arguing that vertical constraints do not create 
incentives for competitive free-riding retailers to provide demonstration services, regardless 
of resale price maintenance practices). 
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because it is based on “the unrealistic assumption that the sole avenue of 
nonprice competition available to retailers is the supply of the particular 
services desired by the manufacturer.”341  Dealers may use the rent generated 
by RPM to supply services that are not wanted by the supplier.342  In fact, 
nothing stops a dealer from enjoying the benefit of the extra retail margin 
generated by RPM and free-riding on other dealers’ effort.343 
Despite the divergent views on the validity of prevention of free-riding 
as a justification for RPM, what is clear is that none of these commentators 
have argued that the applicability of the defense is premised on the way in 
which the RPM is implemented.  The effectiveness of RPM to prevent free-
riding does not depend on whether the RPM scheme is achieved by unilateral 
policy announcement or an illegal agreement.  As long as the dealers abide 
by the minimum resale prices, free-riding could be prevented. 
2. Quality Certification 
Marvel and McCafferty propose an alternative explanation for RPM.  
As opposed to prevention of free-riding, which requires retailers to provide 
tangible services, they argue that RPM is useful in inducing retailers that 
serve as quality certifiers in the eyes of consumers to carry the product.344  
These quality certifying retailers 
serve as their customers’ agents, selecting from a wide variety of 
available merchandise those items [are] most likely to appeal to 
their clientele.  By stocking a particular product on its shelves, the 
retailer attests that the quality and suitability of the item in question 
are consonant with the retailer’s overall reputation.345 
This explanation is only valid when the retailer’s reputation is greater 
than the reputation of the product brand.346  This could often be the case in 
the grocery market, where consumers are likely to be more familiar with the 
retailer, such as Whole Foods or Wal-Mart, than the brand name of a 
particular food item.  It is less likely to be the case with well-known fashion 
brands such as Louis Vuitton and Chanel, which will not require quality 
certification, even by retailers as exclusive as Neiman Marcus and Bergdorf 
Goodman.  Marvel and McCafferty themselves concede that this explanation 
 
 341.  Id. 
 342.  Id.; Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se 
Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J.1487, 1493 (1983). 
 343.  Id.; S\see generally Grimes, supra note 255, at 483. 
 344.  Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 179, at 347. 
 345.  Id. at 348. 
 346.  Id.  
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is likely to be particularly relevant to a new entrant.347 
The question is what does the retailer provide in return for the greater 
retail profit margin.  The greater return will be justified to the extent that 
quality certification entails significant costs, such as time and human 
resources needed to examine the products.  This may be true for some 
products, such as food items, but may be less so for products whose quality 
can be readily observed.  The greater return will also be justified if the retailer 
requires higher profit margin to maintain a better ambience or provide higher 
quality customer service to maintain the quality image.348  RPM is necessary 
because otherwise consumers will observe the product at a quality certifying 
retailer, but proceed to purchase it at a cheaper retailer which does not sustain 
the costs of quality certification. 
Scherer is among the most vocal critics of the quality certification 
justification.  He raises three main criticisms of the justification.  First, he 
argues that if consumers are unable to discern the quality of a product, they 
would be unable to know that products carried by a particular retailer are of 
high quality.349  Second, Scherer doubts that a higher retail margin is 
necessary for the quality certifying retailer to recoup its costs.  If the retailer 
is the first to sell the product, it will enjoy first-mover advantage and be the 
only retailer of the product for some time.350  Finally, Scherer’s more 
fundamental criticism of the justification is that quality certification amounts 
to a “status phenomenon,”351 which means that consumers judge the quality 
of a product by the price level or by who else has bought the good.352  This 
means that “the utility of diverse consumers is interdependent.  And when 
the utility of consumers is interdependent, the whole foundation of welfare 
economics — that is to say, the branch of economics on which many of these 
judgments have been based crumbles.”353  Other commentators have also 
criticized this justification.  Klein and Murphy argue that Marvel and 
McCafferty’s prediction that new products are more likely to benefit from 
RPM does not comport with empirical evidence, which suggests that it is 
usually well-established brands that employ RPM.354 
For our purpose, suffice it to note that nothing in Marvel and 
McCafferty’s model requires the RPM scheme to be imposed by agreement.  
 
 347.  Id. at 349. 
 348.  Id.  
 349.  See F.M. Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 695 
(1983) (arguing that the Marvel and McCafferty explanation of discounter’s impact on stores 
that certify high-quality goods is problematic and leaves a number of issues unaddressed). 
 350.  Id.  
 351.  Id.  
 352.  Id. 
 353.  Id. at 696. 
 354.  Klein & Murphy, supra note 340, at 289.  
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The quality certification effect does not depend on the way in which RPM is 
implemented.  In fact, Marvel and McCafferty compare dealer termination 
and RPM as alternatives for a manufacturer to implement quality 
certification, suggesting that the RPM scheme could be put in place simply 
by terminating non-compliant dealers.355 
3. Facilitation of Contract Enforcement 
Klein and Murphy propose yet another alternative justification for 
RPM.  They argue that RPM is used not to avoid free-riding of sales services, 
but “to optimally compensate dealers on a per unit of sales basis for an 
increased supply of product promotion services and to prevent price 
competition that would eliminate the desired targeted marketing scheme.”356  
They summarize their idea as follows: 
The manufacturer accomplishes this by creating an implicit 
contractual understanding with the dealer whereby the dealer 
agrees to provide the desired level of promotional services in 
exchange for a payment from the manufacturer.  The contract is 
implicit because measurement problems prevent the manufacturer 
and dealer from contracting on the services directly.  The payment 
may be made by the manufacturer with the use of vertical restraints 
such as an exclusive territory or resale price maintenance 
arrangement, . . .  In any event, the manufacturer must always 
monitor dealer performance and terminate dealers who violate the 
implicit contractual understanding regarding the supply of 
promotional services.357 
A manufacturer’s RPM policy would serve as a contract enforcement 
mechanism to procure from retailers’ non-contractible retail services that 
will boost the demand for the manufacturer’s product.  The RPM scheme 
creates quasi-rent, which entices dealers to provide the desired services.358  
Without the RPM scheme, the quasi-rent will be eroded by retail 
competition.359  The manufacturer uses the quasi-rent stream as leverage over 
the dealers, which takes the place of contractual enforcement through the 
courts.360  RPM saves the manufacturer time and effort to write a contract 
that exhaustively specifies the services required, often along dimensions that 
are difficult to articulate and measure.361  If a dealer fails to perform the 
 
 355.  Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 179, at 354. 
 356.  Id.  
 357.  Id. at 285. 
 358.  Id. at 268. 
 359.  See Mathewson & Winter, supra note 274, at 74.  
 360.  Klein & Murphy, supra note 340, at 268.  
 361.  See Elzinga & Mills II, supra note 294, at 1844.  
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desired services, it will be terminated and will cease to earn the quasi-rent.362  
Klein and Murphy argue that the quasi-rent stream need not represent 
supranormal return to the dealers.  In the presence of manufacturer-specific 
investments, termination of a dealer would inflict sufficient pain on the 
dealer even if it was only earning normal profit.363  However, they note that 
for RPM to serve its intended purpose, the quasi-rent created by RPM must 
exceed a dealer’s short-run shirking potential,364 which is what a dealer could 
hope to earn in the short run by not providing the requested services. 
Paldor criticizes this justification for RPM as inadequate in that it will 
likely induce an insufficient level of service.365  By using RPM to provide 
remuneration for retail services, dealers will be compensated on a per-unit 
basis.366  Per-unit compensation is likely to under-compensate the dealers in 
light of diminishing returns to retail services and an upward-sloping supply 
for retail services.367  Under-compensation means there will be an under-
provision of services.368 
Nothing in Klein and Murphy’s model requires an agreement between 
the supplier and the dealers.  In fact, the very essence of their model is that 
RPM will replace formal contracts to secure the necessary retail services.  
Enforcement of the RPM scheme only requires termination of non-
compliance dealers to cut off their quasi-rent stream, which is precisely what 
is allowed under the Colgate doctrine. 
4. Facilitation of Introduction of New Product 
One of the justifications often offered for RPM is to induce dealers to 
carry a new product.  The idea is that dealers may need to invest in the initial 
promotion of the new product.  In the absence of RPM, subsequent dealers 
who did not incur such promotional expenses would be able to undercut the 
initial dealers and prevent the latter from recouping their investments.369  
Foreseeing this scenario, no dealers would agree to make the initial 
investments without RPM.  This is one of the justifications for RPM that is 
accepted by both the majority and the dissent in the Supreme Court Leegin 
 
 362.  Elzinga & Mills I, supra note 270, at 358. 
 363.  Klein & Murphy, supra note 340, at 268.  
 364.  Id. at 276. 
 365.  See Paldor, supra note 313, at 331 (stating that retailers provide less than the desired 
level of service under the contract enforcement mechanism explanation).  
 366.  Id. 
 367.  See id. (noting that diminishing returns and an upward sloping supply are usually 
true). 
 368.  See id. (concluding that dealers will be incentivized to provide fewer services). 
 369.  Lao, supra note 207, at 76. 
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case.370  In his dissent, Justice Breyer suggested creating an exception for 
new products employing RPM.371  Despite the broad support this justification 
received in Leegin, it has been subject to a number of criticisms.  It has been 
argued that vertical non-price restraints, such as exclusive territories, would 
be better suited for the purpose than RPM.372  To the extent that the supplier 
itself can undertake the initial promotion, this justification for RPM 
crumbles.  There are reasons to believe that the supplier can undertake much 
of the initial promotion itself. 
5. Ensuring an Efficient Number of Outlets 
RPM has been justified on the grounds that it can be used to induce 
retailers to open outlets in remote locations that will attract customers with 
high time costs.373  The idea is that retailers need a higher margin to cover 
the costs of opening new outlets in remote locations, which would capture 
customers who otherwise would not have purchased the product.374  Using 
RPM for this purpose entails a trade-off.  On the one hand, a supplier would 
lose some sales from the higher retail price resulting from the RPM.375  On 
the other hand, the supplier would gain sales from the improved availability 
of its product.376  Whether it is worthwhile to use RPM to induce opening of 
more outlets comes down to whether the latter effect outweighs the former 
effect. 
Three conditions are required for this use of RPM to be justified.  First, 
the role of retailers is to reduce the consumers’ time costs in obtaining the 
 
 370.  See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) at 913, 
917-18 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that both the majority and dissent credit this 
theory). 
 371.  See id. (proposing that the per se rule be modified to include an exception because 
resale price maintenance facilitates the entry of new products, which is a consumer benefit).  
 372.  Michael E. Jacobs, Legal Treatment of Vertical Restraints: Some Lessons from the 
Ongoing International Debates, FISCALÍA NACIONAL ECONÓMICA 17 (Oct. 25, 2012), 
http://www.fne.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Legal-Treatment-of-Vertical-
Restraints.pdf [https://perma.cc/EZ78-DVVR]. 
 373.  See generally J.R. Gould & L.E. Preston, Resale Price Maintenance and Retail 
Outlets, 32 ECONOMICA 302 (1965) (proposing that manufacturer may use RPM to induce 
retailers to open more outlets under the outlet hypothesis). 
 374.  See Paldor, supra note 313, at 312-13 (explaining increasing the number of retail 
outlets as one potential justification for RPM). 
 375.  See Calvani & Berg, supra note 9, at 1183 (observing that retailers with higher prices 
will lose some sales to price-sensitive consumers who can price shop at low-cost sellers); 
Mathewson & Winter, supra note 274, at 67 (stating that when all else is equal, a higher price 
results in a lower quantity sold).  
 376.  See Mathewson & Winter, supra note 274, at 67 (noting that wider distribution can 
offset the loss from the higher prices of the protected margins). 
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product.377  The product is the same no matter where it is bought.  Second, 
retailers are differentiated in terms of their location and the time it takes 
consumers to search within a store.378  Third, consumers have different 
opportunity costs of time.379  Some consumers have very high search costs 
and would only purchase the product from a nearby store.  Some consumers 
have low search costs and will travel long distances to purchase a product.  
Consumers with low search costs are likely to be more price sensitive, as 
they are willing to travel longer distances to save money.  Therefore, when 
RPM is introduced, the trade-off is a balance between the number of new, 
high-search cost consumers attracted by the new outlets and the number of 
existing, low-search cost customers lost due to the higher retail price. 
Winter argues that consumers with low search costs, who tend to have 
lower demand for the availability service at issue here, tend to be 
overrepresented in the retailer’s calculus.380  Thus when retailers try to 
accommodate the consumers’ average preferences, they tend to focus on the 
low-cost customers who value low price and require low level of services.381  
Retailers tend to under-provide availability services and under-price their 
products.382  Winter posits that this explanation for RPM should be most 
relevant for small-ticket items such as clothing, groceries, and drugs.383  He 
also predicts that RPM should be most common “in markets or geographical 
areas in which the dispersion in income among consumers is the greatest.  
These markets, one can reasonably assume, have the greatest variation in 
opportunity costs of time.”384 
One obvious criticism of this justification is the huge discrepancy 
between the extra retail margin generated by RPM for small-ticket items, 
such as groceries and medication, and the enormous costs required to open a 
new outlet.  Given that most supermarkets and drugstores carry hundreds, if 
not thousands, of brands, a higher retail margin on one brand will have a 
negligible impact on the overall profitability of the store, let alone generate 
enough revenue to open a new store.  Therefore, a majority of brands sold in 
 
 377.  Ralph A. Winter, Vertical Control and Price Versus Nonprice Competition, 108 Q.J. 
ECON. 61, 62 (1993). 
 378.  Id. 
 379.  Id. 
 380.  See id. at 63 (explaining that retailers often overlook the customers whose high time 
costs prevent them from buying the product and instead focus on consumers with low time 
costs who do not need services). 
 381.  Id. 
 382.  See id. (noting that retailers focus on consumers who have a low demand for services 
and, thus, rely on low prices to attract customers). 
 383.  See id. at 70 (stating that the service provided for small-ticket items is shelf space, 
but the customers willing to shop in stores are the least influenced by shelf space since they 
have the time to shop carefully). 
 384.  Id. at 70-71. 
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supermarkets and drugstores must simultaneously practice RPM for this 
justification to hold.  The free-rider problem here is obvious.  If each brand 
accounts for a negligible proportion of the overall profit of the store, it will 
have overriding incentives to cheat and free-ride on the retail margin 
generated by other brands.  Given the multitude of brands that need to be 
monitored, it will be extremely costly to police against free riding.  
Therefore, one may argue that this justification verges on unrealistic. 
For our present purpose, suffice it to note that nothing in this 
justification requires the RPM scheme to be implemented through an 
agreement.  As long as the retailers follow the minimum resale prices, the 
intended effect of inducing the opening of more outlets will be produced.  It 
matters not whether the RPM scheme is implemented by unilateral policy 
announcement or an illegal agreement. 
None of the main theories of harm and economics justifications for 
RPM are premised on the existence of an agreement.  The economic effects 
of the conduct will materialize as soon as the dealers abide by the supplier’s 
wishes, and vice versa.385  As Robinson observes, “the form of the vertical 
arrangements between manufacturer and dealer is irrelevant.  The existence 
of a vertical agreement has no evidentiary significance on whether to accept 
the benign or malign account because it is entirely consistent with either.”386  
The agreement requirement adds nothing to the economic analysis and 
merely serves to obscure its focus.  There are thus no coherent economic 
justifications for an agreement requirement. 
V.       PRACTICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR AN AGREEMENT REQUIREMENT 
One practical justification for an agreement requirement and retaining 
the Colgate doctrine is that the doctrine serves as a safe harbor for firms that 
wish to institute RPM schemes while avoiding litigation.  Before Leegin, the 
consequences of exceeding the doctrine were dire as it would result in per se 
illegality.  After Leegin, the RPM scheme would not be subject to summary 
condemnation but would be examined under the rule of reason.  If a firm 
wishes to avoid any litigation at all, it could do so by staying within the 
confines of the Colgate doctrine. 
The reality is that the Colgate doctrine has provided a very costly and 
byzantine safe harbor for firms to navigate.  Given the highly complex and 
 
 385.  See generally Burns, supra note 61, at 32 (noting that whether a vertical agreement 
is legal does not depend on the distinction between an agreement and a unilateral action); 
Grimes, supra note 255, at 491 (stating that there must be interaction between the dealers and 
suppliers, so the effects should be determined by whether the vertical integration is 
anticompetitive or procompetitive).  
 386.  Robinson, supra note 24, at 597-98.  
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at times contradictory Supreme Court case law on the Colgate doctrine, 
administering a compliant RPM system requires detailed and constant legal 
advice.  Henry and Zelek, Jr. produced a detailed practical guide on how to 
implement an RPM scheme under Colgate.387  In order to stay within the 
Colgate doctrine, a firm must exercise caution in choosing whom to involve 
in the RPM scheme.  The scheme should only apply to dealers that deal 
directly with the supplier and not to downstream dealers.388  A decision has 
to be made as to whether to adopt the same or different policies with respect 
to the resellers and the wholesalers, which may produce different legal 
consequences.389  Suppliers can also choose to minimize legal risks by 
attempting to recast wholesalers as agents and by instituting an authorization 
policy for resellers.390  Under this policy, wholesalers can only sell to 
authorized resellers.  If a reseller violates the unilateral policy 
announcement, the wholesalers are notified that they can no longer supply 
that reseller.391 
Communication with the dealers needs to be handled with care.  At no 
point should the supplier be seen as seeking commitment to comply with the 
unilateral policy.392  The authors recommend a centralized administration 
structure that reports directly to the management to administer such a 
scheme.393  They emphasize the importance of providing adequate training 
to employees who interact with the dealers on a regular basis.394  They also 
advise that: 
[A]ntitrust counsel, whether inside or outside, be assigned to work 
closely with the administrator or the administration team.  In the 
early stages of policy implementation, it is not uncommon for 
teams to meet several times each week to consider issues that arise 
during implementation, but that could not have been realistically 
 
 387.  See Brian R. Henry & Eugene F. Zelek, Jr., Establishing and Maintaining an 
Effective Minimum Resale Price Policy: A Colgate How-to, 17 ANTITRUST 8, 9 (2003). 
 388.  See id. at 10 (providing that sales directly from supplier to dealer satisfy the 
requirement that resale price policies be unilaterally imposed). 
 389.  See id. (proposing that a business’s needs and a supplier’s capabilities should 
influence whether the policy adopted applies only to resellers or to both resellers and 
wholesalers).  
 390.  See id. at 11 (explaining two additional ways to alter the relationships between the 
supplier and resellers). 
 391.  Id.  
 392.  See id. at 12 (describing a requirement for unambiguous language which 
communicates that suppliers are not pursuing reseller’s agreement to follow a unilateral 
policy). 
 393.  See id. (highlighting uniformity and consistent reporting to senior management as 
benefits of centralizing the policy administration). 
 394.  See id. at 14 (asserting the need for anyone who communicates with dealers to obtain 
antitrust and policy education). 
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foreseen in the planning process.395 
The authors also provide detailed guidance on what the supplier can and 
cannot do to monitor compliance and handle dealer complaints.  Suppliers 
are told not to rely exclusively on complaints from other dealers.396  In 
particular, suppliers are cautioned not to have any conversations regarding a 
dealer’s pricing intentions, but “must walk a fine line in unilaterally 
assessing the retailer’s intent and making the policy violation termination.”397  
The authors even suggest the use of marketing research firms, accounting 
firms, or detective agencies to help monitor dealer compliance.398  Doing so 
would substantially increase the costs of the scheme.  It is not even clear that 
reliance on agents to police an RPM scheme is allowed under Parke and 
Albrecht.  If a dealer has been found to have violated the scheme, the letter 
notifying of the termination “must be carefully crafted”399 to avoid giving 
any impression that the supplier is seeking reassurance of future compliance 
from the dealer.  Lastly, the authors point out that reinstatement of terminated 
dealers is fraught with difficulty and must be handled with extreme care.400 
In its study of the use of RPM in the contact lens sector, the American 
Antitrust Institute (“AAI”) notes similar difficulties in the implementation of 
a unilateral RPM policy.401  The authors of the study refer to the 
“management issues associated with unilateral price policies”402 and note 
that such policies “are challenging to develop and adopt and costly to 
monitor and enforce.”403  They further conclude that as a result of the 
management challenges, a unilateral RPM policy is “typically harder to 
control and less efficient.”404 
A recurrent theme in the detailed advice from Henry and Zelek and the 
 
 395.  Id. at 12. 
 396.  See id. at 13 (warning that legal and business risks will befall the supplier who relies 
exclusively on complaints from other dealers).  
 397.  Id. 
 398.  See id. (explaining how the credibility problems associated with dealer-sourced 
complaints can be mitigated through audit programs, with a more formal program including 
the use of market research companies, accounting firms, or detective agencies performing 
mystery shops or audits of dealer records). 
 399.  Id. 
 400.  See id. (describing how suppliers must determine whether, and when, to reinstate 
dealers and how the Sherman Act prevents this reinstatement from being conditional on 
compliance with the policy in the future). 
 401.  Gregory T. Gundlach & Riley T. Krotz, Resale Price Maintenance After Leegin: The 
Curious Case of Contact Lenses 25 (Am. Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 15-04, 2015), 
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/AAI%20working%20paper%2015-04.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3QRE-APBL] (concluding that unilateral RPM is difficult to develop and 
costly to monitor). 
 402.  Id. 
 403.  Id. 
 404.  Id. at 26. 
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AAI study is difficulty of implementation and the care with which 
implementation must be handled.  Brunell observes that the Colgate doctrine 
“only pushes manufacturers that wish to set retail prices to adopt wasteful or 
seemingly irrational measures”405 and is “too draconian and costly a weapon 
to use to combat discounting.”406  RPM is one of the few areas of antitrust 
law where the implementation details of the conduct requires such extensive 
counseling.  It is one of the few areas of antitrust where legality turns on not 
whether particular conduct took place but how it was implemented. 
The result of such specific and detailed requirements of a legal RPM 
scheme under Colgate is very high administration costs.  Hinman and Shah 
note that the need to comply with Colgate means that “monitoring and 
enforcing a unilateral policy can impose significant costs on a 
manufacturer.”407  The golf club company Ping reportedly spends several 
million dollars per year and devotes as many as twelve full-time employees 
to administer its RPM scheme.408  The staggering costs and human resource 
requirements led Grimes to conclude that “the Colgate defense requires 
‘legal gymnastics’ that are costly, disruptive to dealer-manufacturer 
relations, and have no relevance to the procompetitive or anticompetitive 
effects of the underlying practice.”409 
While the Colgate doctrine arguably still served a purpose when the per 
se rule prevailed, it is clear that the convoluted body of case law under the 
doctrine has become a needless distraction from the crux of the issue, which 
is the competitive effects of the restraint.  The safe harbor that it allegedly 
provides to firms is costly and immensely complicated to navigate.  It is beset 
with uncertainty as a single misstep can cause the whole scheme to unravel.  
The entire area of law would be much improved if, instead of relying on a 
form-based safe harbor such as the Colgate doctrine, substantive safe harbors 
based on market power and perhaps the origin of the scheme are used. 
VI.      THE PROPOSAL 
A. The Colgate Doctrine and the Agreement Requirement 
It should come as no surprise that this Article advocates the abolition of 
the agreement requirement for vertical restraints.  From the perspective of 
 
 405.  Richard M. Brunell, Overruling Dr. Miles: The Supreme Trade Commission in 
Action, 52 ANTITRUST BULL. 475, 523 (2007). 
 406.  Id. at 524. 
 407.  Frank M. Hinman & Sujal J. Shah, Counseling Clients on Vertical Price Restraints, 
23 ANTITRUST 60, 62 (2009). 
 408.  See Grimes, supra note 255, at 489 (illustrating the high cost of implementing an 
RPM scheme and the extent to which dealers are terminated).  
 409.  Id. at 490. 
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the purpose of an agreement requirement, it has been argued that the 
requirement is most justified as an identification device to discover conduct 
that is the subject of possible antitrust condemnation.  This identification 
device should accord the same treatment to conduct that produces the same 
economic effects.  In the context of horizontal restraints, the agreement 
requirement arguably serves a useful function because it distinguishes 
between permissible parallel pricing and illegal collusive conduct.  In the 
context of vertical restraints, however, there is no overriding reason to 
condone unilaterally imposed RPM but condemn mutually agreed RPM.  
Both kinds of RPM produce the same economic effects and may benefit from 
the same justifications.  Therefore, the agreement requirement does not serve 
a useful function in the vertical restraint context. 
The various theories of agreement under the Colgate doctrine are 
logically incoherent and theoretically unsound.  They also fail to provide 
meaningful and clear guidance on the boundary between permissible 
unilateral conduct and illegal concerted action.  This means that the 
agreement requirement does not even perform the function that it purports to 
serve.  Furthermore, the agreement requirement makes no contribution to the 
ultimate issue in the analysis, the competitive effects of RPM.  None of the 
main economic theories of harm and justifications for RPM are premised on 
the existence of an agreement.  This means that the abolition of the 
agreement requirement will make no difference in the substantive analysis.  
So long as the supplier demands the observation of minimum resale prices 
and the dealers comply, the economic effects of RPM, both good and bad, 
will materialize. 
The argument for doing away with the agreement requirement is even 
stronger after the abolition of the per se rule in Leegin.  While the per se rule 
still applied, the Court tried to use the agreement device to distinguish 
anticompetitive uses from pro-competitive uses of RPM.  The agreement 
requirement and the related Colgate doctrine took on a substantive function.  
With the per se rule overruled by Leegin, this commingling of formal and 
substantive issues no longer seems justified.410  The sharp distinction 
between vertical price restraints and vertical non-price restraints maintained 
in Business Electronics is also no longer warranted.  The abolition of the per 
 
 410.  See Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 6 (“Under the rule of reason such strictness is no 
longer necessary because anticompetitive effects are no longer inferred from the price 
agreement alone.”); see also Harrison, supra note 92, at 1144 (explaining how moving away 
from per se treatment focuses the analysis on competitive effects); Grimes, supra note 255, at 
491 (praising a rule of reason which considers the substantive competitive effects rather than 
the supposedly unilateral form of the agreement); Robinson, supra note 24, at 601-02 
(discussing how the per rule was based on formalistic, rather than substantive, assumptions); 
Hay, supra note 10, at 440 (arguing that the issues of the form of agreement under Colgate 
would no longer be as important under a rule of reason). 
CHENG_FINAL_EIC EDITS (DO NOT DELETE) 9/27/2018  3:18 PM 
86 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20.1 
 
se rule also calls for a new perspective on the legality of dealer termination. 
One obvious objection to abolishing the agreement requirement is that 
it is a statutory requirement, or at least a requirement supported by decades 
of case law.  Section 1 of the Sherman Act only applies to agreements.  Short 
of a statutory amendment or drastic turn in the case law, the agreement 
requirement is here to stay.  It is possible to unofficially abolish the 
agreement requirement without either development: to overturn the Colgate 
doctrine.  The Colgate doctrine can be said to consist of two components.  
The first part is the right of a supplier to implement an RPM scheme through 
unilateral policy announcements without exposing itself to antitrust scrutiny.  
The second part is the right of a supplier to terminate a non-compliant dealer.  
The second part will be discussed in greater detail below.  As for the first 
part, if the Colgate doctrine was abolished, it would mean that an RPM 
scheme implemented through unilateral policy announcements would also 
be deemed to be agreements within the reach of Section 1.  This position is 
relatively uncontroversial as quite a number of commentators have argued 
that the kind of conduct sanctioned by the doctrine amounts to an implied 
contract under contract law and therefore would most certainly constitute an 
agreement.411  If even the kind of conduct sanctioned by the Colgate doctrine 
is deemed to be an agreement, there is probably no way for a supplier to 
implement an RPM scheme while staying beyond the reach of Section 1.  A 
supplier cannot implement an RPM scheme with less interaction with the 
dealers than what is currently allowed by the Colgate doctrine.  Eliminating 
the Colgate doctrine means that every RPM scheme contains an agreement, 
which is no different from saying that an agreement is no longer required to 
establish an illegal RPM scheme.  While formally abolishing the agreement 
requirement would be an intellectually more honest way to proceed, 
overturning the Colgate doctrine would produce the same result. 
B. The Consignment Exception 
Even though the consignment exception strictly speaking is not related 
to the agreement issue — in consignment cases, there is no doubt that there 
are agreements, the question is whether these agreements should somehow 
be exempted because they involve consignment — it should also be 
considered in this Article because it is similarly concerned with how form 
 
 411.  See Harrison, supra note 92, at 1134 (“Under basic contract law principles, the 
outcome could easily be squared with the existence of an implied agreement.”); see also 
Robinson, supra note 24, at 587 (arguing that it is odd to refer to the supplier-dealer 
relationship as something other than an implied contract); Pitofsky & Dam, supra note 223, 
at 774 (demonstrating that a tacit agreement can be found even when the dealer is able to 
prove coercion). 
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trumps substance in the antitrust analysis of RPM.  Unsurprisingly, just as 
this Article suggests that the agreement requirement be abolished, it 
recommends the same fate for the consignment exception.  The reasons are 
similar to those supporting the abolition of the agreement requirement.  
Substantive issues have similarly seeped into the formal issue of whether 
there is a bona fide consignment agreement.  It has been argued that the kind 
of analysis undertaken in Simpson is reminiscent of a rule of reason 
analysis.412  Similar to the agreement issue, where the existence of an 
agreement makes no substantive difference, whether a dealer is a bona fide 
agent or an independent reseller has no bearing on the substantive effects of 
the conduct.413  As Harrison argues, “[a]s long as independent business 
entities are involved, the issues of price and sham agencies become 
irrelevant. . . . The overarching question would remain whether the 
arrangement has an undesirable effect.”414  Therefore, the consignment 
exception should be abolished, ending the confusion about the state of the 
law with the conflicting General Electric and Simpson opinions.  Instead, the 
analysis should focus on whether the arrangement produces consumer harm 
and is otherwise justified by pro-competitive benefits. 
C. Dealer Termination 
One suggestion put forward earlier is the decoupling of dealer 
termination from vertical price fixing and treating dealer termination as a 
possible independent antitrust violation.  This means that regardless of 
whether there is a concomitant RPM scheme, dealer termination could 
constitute an antitrust violation if certain conditions are met.  This, however, 
does not mean that every dealer termination is illegal under antitrust law.  It 
was mentioned earlier that there are two components to the Colgate doctrine, 
the second of which being that a supplier has the right to terminate a non-
compliant dealer and the right to choose with whom it will deal.  Despite the 
proposed abrogation of the first component of the doctrine, the second 
component should be maintained.  One reason that the Colgate doctrine has 
outlasted the per se rule in Dr. Miles is the great intuitive appeal of the notion 
that a supplier should have the freedom to choose with whom it will deal.  
There is no reason that a supplier’s trader freedom should be any greater or 
smaller than any other business.  If this freedom is unduly restricted, 
 
 412.  See Harrison, supra note 92, at 1153 (finding that the analysis in Simpson reflects a 
rule of reason analysis because it focuses on substantive impact, rather than formalistic 
labels). 
 413.  See id. at 1152 (describing the classification of a dealer as a bona fide or sham agent 
as formalistic and irrelevant after Leegin). 
 414.  Id. at 1153. 
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suppliers will simply be more hesitant to enter into relationships with dealers.  
But such freedom should not be unfettered.  It should be subject to the usual 
strictures of antitrust under which dealer termination that harms consumers 
will be prohibited.  What this means is that at the very least, dealer 
termination should be subject to the law on unilateral refusal to deal under 
Section 2.  This is consistent with the intention of the Colgate court, which 
qualified the Colgate right of termination by the caveat that the right only 
applies “[i]n the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a 
monopoly.”415  A dealer termination should only fall within the ambit of 
Section 2 if it is a genuinely unilateral decision.  This means that the supplier 
would have terminated the dealer anyway regardless of other factors, such 
as complaints by other dealers.  Given the stringent standard imposed by the 
Supreme Court on a unilateral refusal to deal claim in Trinko,416 the reality 
is that very few plaintiffs will successfully invoke Section 2 to challenge 
dealer termination. 
For dealer termination that is not genuinely unilateral, the focus of the 
analysis should not be on whether there is an agreement between the supplier 
and the complaining dealer either to adhere to minimum resale prices or to 
terminate the offending dealer.  The existence of an agreement adds nothing 
to the analysis.  What matters is whether the supplier would have terminated 
the offending dealer but for the dealer complaint.  If the supplier would not 
have terminated the offending dealer but for the complaint, there is a prima 
facie claim that the termination is anticompetitive.417  The plaintiff can meet 
its burden of proof under the but-for standard by showing that it was 
terminated because of its price cutting and it was plausible that the supplier 
would have terminated the plaintiff in response to complaints by another 
dealer because the latter dealer’s business is more important to the supplier.  
And if the supplier fails to furnish alternative reasons for the termination, the 
plaintiff will have a valid dealer termination claim.  The question is whether 
this should be the end of the inquiry or whether further showing of 
competitive effects should be required.  In other words, whether dealer 
termination should be per se illegal once it is proven that it was impelled by 
 
 415.  Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307. 
 416.  See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408-
9 (2004) (recognizing the limited circumstances under which a unilateral refusal to deal may 
constitute an anticompetitive act). 
 417.  See Hovenkamp, supra note 24, at 13 (“Further, termination responses reflecting the 
manufacturer’s own distribution policy differ greatly from those imposed upon it by a 
complaining dealer.  In the latter case, the manufacturer’s compliance with the complainer’s 
demand is more likely to be anticompetitive.”).  But see Floyd, supra note 18, at 273 (“Thus, 
termination of a price-cutting distributor following receipt of price complaints, even if the 
complaints are the ‘but for’ cause of the termination, is not by itself a violation of the Sherman 
Act.”) 
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dealer complaints. 
Despite contrary arguments by some commentators,418 the rule of reason 
should prevail.  There are two reasons for this.  First, commentators who 
suggested that the per se rule should apply did so when the per se rule still 
applied to RPM.  This is no longer the case.  The overturning of the per se 
rule for RPM does not necessarily mean that the per se rule cannot apply to 
complaint-motivated dealer termination.  RPM and dealer termination need 
not be subject to the same legal standard.  If one focuses on competitive 
effects, however, it is clear that complaint-motivated dealer termination 
cannot produce greater harm than a supplier-imposed RPM scheme.  The 
most that such termination can do is produce price uniformity at the dealer 
level for a particular brand.  The extent to which such uniformity can harm 
consumers depends on the extent of interbrand competition.  If interbrand 
competition is keen, consumers are unlikely to be harmed by the unilateral 
exercise of market power by one dealer under one brand.  Second, once one 
does away with the agreement requirement for dealer termination, a 
complaint-motivated dealer termination is nothing more than what Judge 
Posner describes as a unilateral exercise of market power.  The powerful 
dealer is effectively demanding exclusivity if it exercises its market power 
to the limit and eliminates every competitor.  If exclusive dealing is subject 
to the rule of reason, there is no reason that complaint-motivated dealer 
termination should be subject to a more stringent rule. 
Under the rule of reason analysis, dealer termination would only be 
illegal if interbrand competition is sufficiently weak that the decimation of 
intrabrand competition through dealer-driven dealer termination would have 
an impact on the relevant product market.  So long as interbrand competition 
is keen, the elimination of intrabrand competition through dealer-driven 
dealer termination would not harm consumers and should not be condemned 
by the antitrust law. 
The analysis would be different if multiple dealers come together to 
pressure the supplier to terminate a price-cutting dealer.419  In that case, it 
would no longer be a unilateral exercise of market power.  Regardless of 
whether there is an agreement among the complaining dealers, the dealers 
are aggregating their market power to coerce the supplier to do something 
which they individually would not be able to accomplish.  This would be 
 
 418.  See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Distributor Termination Pursuant to Conspiracies 
Among a Supplier and Complaining Distributors: A Suggested Antitrust Analysis, 67 Cornell 
L. Rev. 297, 397 (1982) (expressing that courts fail to consider the use of the per se rule for 
dealer terminations induced by a single dealer when they apply the rule of reason on the basis 
of the vertical form of the conspiracies). 
 419.  But see id. at 319-320 (proposing a two-step analysis in mixed termination cases that 
requires the existence of an agreement between the supplier and dealer and considers the 
supplier’s competitive purpose for entering the agreement).  
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analogous to a group boycott.420  Under Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 
such boycott would be per se illegal if it could be shown that the group 
possesses market power.421  And if the dealers acting in concert managed to 
coerce the supplier to terminate a price-cutting dealer, the dealers are likely 
to possess the requisite amount of market power for the purpose of Northwest 
Wholesale Stationers. 
CONCLUSION 
The abrogation of the Colgate doctrine is the logical conclusion of the 
rule of reason revolution in vertical restraints.  After Leegin introduced the 
rule of reason for RPM, there is no longer any reason to rely on the agreement 
requirement as a proxy for competitive harm and to soften the blow of the 
per se rule.  A formal requirement such as an agreement is not the right place 
for substantive analysis, as it becomes necessary to pigeonhole substantive 
elements into the strictures of a formal device.  This has led the courts to 
focus on tangential issues such as the degree of coercion and the extent of 
enforcement effort that have nothing to do with the ultimate inquiry of the 
competitive effects of the conduct.  With the rule of reason, it is now possible 
to undertake a full-fledged substantive analysis independent of the formal 
requirement.  The agreement requirement no longer serves a useful purpose 
as an agreement is not necessary to locate the locus of competitive harm.  
What matters is not whether an RPM was implemented by an agreement, but 
whether an RPM was implemented. 
In fact, abolishing the Colgate doctrine is merely aligning RPM with 
other vertical restraints such as tying and exclusive dealing, where the 
unilateral conduct defense has never played a prominent role.422  This is 
especially true in tying cases, where the tie is often unilaterally imposed by 
the defendant, and the agreement at issue is simply the sales agreement 
between the parties.423  This approach is more consistent with the Posnerian 
view that vertical restraints are simply a unilateral exercise of market power.  
 
 420.  See Levi, supra note 9, at 269-70 (stating that illegal boycotts may be created when 
wholesaler refuses to deal with retailers that adjust prices).  
 421.  See cf. Nw. Wholesale Stationers v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 
296 (1985) (stating that the immediate conclusion of an anticompetitive effect is not warranted 
unless the group has market power or access to an important competitive input). 
 422.  See Robinson, supra note 24, at 590 (arguing that the unilateral action defense is 
rarely used due to the Supreme Court’s failure to provide an instruction on the matter).  
 423.  See id. (adding that the unilateral action defense is often ignored in tying cases where 
the tie is unilaterally opposed by the seller on the buyer and the Colgate defense is applicable); 
Grimes, supra note 255, at 489 (asserting that the likelihood of dealers participating in resale 
price maintenance is higher than in tying cases, even though downstream buyer’s compelled 
acceptance of the tie suffices to establish an agreement). 
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It is curious that given tying is also subject to the per se rule, albeit a qualified 
one under Jefferson Parish,424 the courts have not extensively deployed the 
same tactic and softened the per se rule with a unilateral conduct defense.  
This could be because with tying the courts have instead turned to softening 
the substantive rule with the qualified per se rule. 
One may question whether the agreement requirement serves any useful 
purpose for vertical restraints.  This is not to say that an agreement never 
exists in vertical restraints.  There are probably some vertical restraints that 
are so complex that they cannot be put in place and implemented without an 
agreement between the supplier and the dealers.  But this does not mean that 
the finding of an agreement aids the analysis or helps to determine the 
legality of the restraint.  The only circumstance in which the finding of an 
agreement arguably serves this purpose is in the horizontal context, where 
the agreement concept is used to identify illegal price fixing among parallel 
pricing situations.  Even this view has been persuasively questioned by 
Kaplow.  Kaplow, however, stops short of advocating the abolition of the 
agreement requirement in the horizontal context, arguing that more careful 
studies need to be done.425 
A wholesale abolition of the agreement distinction between Section 1 
and Section 2 of the Sherman Act is beyond the scope of this Article.  It does 
have certain intuitive appeal, as there are persuasive arguments that what 
separates unilateral action from concerted conduct is not whether there is an 
agreement between the parties, but whether their market power is being 
directed to a common purpose.  One difficulty with the abolition of the 
distinction is that it may allow antitrust scrutiny of unilateral conduct when 
the party at issue possesses less than monopoly power.  Some have said that 
unilateral exercise of market power by non-monopolists is a gap in the 
current antitrust jurisprudence, while others have argued that it is a valuable 
distinction worth preserving.  Resolving this argument probably requires 
further research and careful analysis.  What remains true is that the de-
emphasis of the agreement requirement is a sensible development in antitrust 
as its focus shifts further away from form to substance.  Modern antitrust has 
always been about substance, and not form.  The form in which the conduct 
takes place matters much less in the analysis than the substantive impact of 
the conduct.  This is especially true in the RPM context where the analysis 
of the formal issues has become so convoluted that it has obscured the 
 
 424.  See Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 3 (1984), abrogated by Ill. 
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (holding that tying should only be 
condemned if it restrains competition by forcing purchases that would otherwise not be made). 
 425.  See Kaplow, supra note 165, at 813-14 (concluding that price-fixing prohibitions 
create doubts about abolishing the agreement requirement in the horizontal context such that 
additional analysis is required). 
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substantive analysis. 
 
